The Steps to War: Theory and Evidence
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Steps to War: Theory and Evidence" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Steps to War: Theory and Evidence" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 62, Heft 9, S. 1847-1875
ISSN: 1552-8766
There is increasing evidence that territorial conflict is associated with centralized and nondemocratic regimes. We explore whether this relationship is due to the facility of democratic regimes to settle their international borders. Using Owsiak's data set on border settlement processes, we find little evidence that democratic regimes are more likely than other types of regimes to settle their borders. In fact, joint democracy rarely precedes the first border agreement or full settlement of the border, and there is almost no qualitative evidence suggesting a link between democracy and border settlement in the rare instances of successful agreements. Democracies are also not more likely to keep their borders settled or even to be more peaceful during settled-border years. Overall, our findings suggest that border settlements lead to peace in the dyad and affirm a clear temporal sequence of border settlement, then peace and democracy for neighboring dyads.
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 62, Heft 9, S. 1847-1875
ISSN: 1552-8766
There is increasing evidence that territorial conflict is associated with centralized and nondemocratic regimes. We explore whether this relationship is due to the facility of democratic regimes to settle their international borders. Using Owsiak's data set on border settlement processes, we find little evidence that democratic regimes are more likely than other types of regimes to settle their borders. In fact, joint democracy rarely precedes the first border agreement or full settlement of the border, and there is almost no qualitative evidence suggesting a link between democracy and border settlement in the rare instances of successful agreements. Democracies are also not more likely to keep their borders settled or even to be more peaceful during settled-border years. Overall, our findings suggest that border settlements lead to peace in the dyad and affirm a clear temporal sequence of border settlement, then peace and democracy for neighboring dyads.
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 43-61
ISSN: 2049-8489
Why do disputants favor some conflict management strategies when managing certain territorial claim types—land, river, or maritime—but not others? We propose that state interests—defined via claim characteristics and interdependence—and transaction costs (i.e., the challenges associated with aggregating state preferences over outcomes) differ across claim types. These differences then incentivize states to cede varying levels of control over claim management, ultimately encouraging them to prioritize and institutionalize certain conflict management strategies when managing particular types of territorial claims. More specifically, we theorize and find that states pursue distinct management strategies when addressing their land (informal; bilateral negotiations and arbitration), river (more formal; third-party non-binding), and maritime claims (most formal; multilateral negotiations and legal processes).