Conflict management trajectories: theory and evidence
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 23-55
ISSN: 1547-7444
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In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 23-55
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Cambridge review of international affairs, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 559-562
ISSN: 1474-449X
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 36, Heft 1, S. 63-87
ISSN: 1549-9219
The democratic and territorial peace arguments explain interstate peace via distinct mechanisms. Yet they can be integrated. I theoretically derive both the unique domains in which each argument might operate and the ways in which the two arguments might reinforce one another. An analysis of the period 1816–2001 demonstrates support for a more integrative approach. Within contiguous dyads, border settlement significantly reduces conflict, even for non-democratic dyads. Democratic dyads, however, experience no such effect in the absence of border settlement. Nonetheless, the democratic peace functions strongly in non-contiguous dyads, and even the most peaceful, contiguous dyads require both democracy and border settlement. Such findings offer a foundation for further theoretical development that integrates the two arguments.
World Affairs Online
In: Irish studies in international affairs, Band 30, S. 195-216
ISSN: 0332-1460
World Affairs Online
In: Irish studies in international affairs, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 195-216
ISSN: 2009-0072
"International conflict has long plagued the world, and continues to do so. This comprehensive text introduces the varied approaches and factors that promote the deescalation and the peaceful management of conflict across the globe - from negotiation to arbitration, adjudication to peace ops, sanctions, and military or humanitarian intervention"--
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 57-70
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractWhy do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive attention—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need altered preferences that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need third-party assistance to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this "AAA Model" in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 57-70
ISSN: 1468-2478
Why do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive attention—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need altered preferences that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need third-party assistance to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this "AAA Model" in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.
World Affairs Online