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The democratic peace program arguably constitutes one of the most successful empirical research programs in the discipline. Its main empirical finding motivated extensive theorizing (e.g., challengers, as well as distinct theoretical enterprises), sparked further debate about how to conceptualize and operationalize democracy, and shifted the foreign policy discourse, particularly in the United States. Lost in these successes, however, is a critical unanswered question: how much interstate peace can the democratic peace potentially explain? We explore these limits (i.e., scope, or empirical coverage) in this study. We first identify the peaceful dyadic relationships—namely those that never go to war across long historical periods. We next classify these dyads as democratic (i.e., both members are democracies) or nondemocratic. The empirical analysis then examines this democracy–peace relationship across three time periods, three distinct samples (which address potential false positives), two definitions of "peace," and two thresholds for democracy. Regardless of how we approach the data, only 4–26 percent of all peaceful dyads qualify as "democratic." Because we control for the obvious trivial explanation (insufficient capabilities due to distance), some other (set of) factor(s) must account for the majority of interstate peace. We close with a discussion about where future research might search for these factors, as well as the larger policy implications of the study.

AbstractThe democratic peace program arguably constitutes one of the most successful empirical research programs in the discipline. Its main empirical finding motivated extensive theorizing (e.g., challengers, as well as distinct theoretical enterprises), sparked further debate about how to conceptualize and operationalize democracy, and shifted the foreign policy discourse, particularly in the United States. Lost in these successes, however, is a critical unanswered question: how much interstate peace can the democratic peace potentially explain? We explore these limits (i.e., scope, or empirical coverage) in this study. We first identify the peaceful dyadic relationships—namely those that never go to war across long historical periods. We next classify these dyads as democratic (i.e., both members are democracies) or nondemocratic. The empirical analysis then examines this democracy–peace relationship across three time periods, three distinct samples (which address potential false positives), two definitions of "peace," and two thresholds for democracy. Regardless of how we approach the data, only 4–26 percent of all peaceful dyads qualify as "democratic." Because we control for the obvious trivial explanation (insufficient capabilities due to distance), some other (set of) factor(s) must account for the majority of interstate peace. We close with a discussion about where future research might search for these factors, as well as the larger policy implications of the study.

Many dyads develop peaceful relationships, avoiding war for long, historical periods. Are such dyads common? How many exist, and why have they never fought? This study provides a territorial perspective on peaceful dyads, defined as those that never fight a war over a given historical period. It compares two explanations for why peaceful dyads exist: the territorial peace and the democratic peace. A series of hypotheses test the relative ability of these two theories to account for peaceful dyads. The tests employ three samples – all dyads, politically relevant dyads, and grievance dyads – from 1816–2001, with an emphasis on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Through our analyses, we produce three major findings. First, the absence of territorial conflict – but not democracy – predicts peaceful dyads. Second, the absence of territorial disagreements appears in the vast majority (i.e., 85–96%) of peaceful dyads. Finally, approximately, 93–98% of democratic dyads lack any territorial disagreements. This implies that democratic dyads are peaceful because they face different issues than non-democratic dyads – ones less likely to undermine the development of peaceful, dyadic relationships.

Do democratic dyads handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads, or have they cleared the most contentious issues (that is, unsettled borders) off their foreign policy agenda before becoming democratic? This study compares the conflicting answers of the democratic peace and the territorial peace and examines the empirical record to see which is more accurate. It finds that almost all contiguous dyads settle their borders before they become joint democracies. Furthermore, the majority of non-contiguous dyad members also settle their borders with all neighboring states before their non-contiguous dyad becomes jointly democratic. Such findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations of the territorial peace, rather than the democratic peace. They also weaken a core argument of the democratic peace, for this analysis finds that one reason democratic dyads may handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads is not because of their institutions or norms, but rather because they have dispensed with the disputes most likely to involve the use of military force prior to becoming democratic.

As a rule, countries consider clearly defined international borders to be paramount for their survival and prosperity. Most borders gain definition peacefully and, once they do, these definitions stick (i.e., the border remains settled). The failure to define borders, however, produces protracted, geopolitical, militarized competitions (or rivalries) between neighboring countries. Rider and Owsiak model this failure as a particular type of bargaining problem - namely, bargaining over territory that affects the distribution of power between neighbouring states significantly - that undermines efforts to resolve border disagreements peacefully. Countries must then overcome this bargaining problem or risk falling into a protracted rivalry, which then needs to be addressed with more resources. The authors develop a theory of how borders settle. They then explore the consequences of the failure to settle, theoretically connecting it to the onset of rivalries. This leads to the process that helps rivals overcome the bargaining problem, resolve their border disagreement, and terminate their rivalry.

AbstractBased on a comprehensive empirical analysis of maritime disputes during the twentieth century, this Article argues that international courts cast a shadow that markedly changes bargaining by potential litigating states. In particular, the filing of optional declarations under Article 287 of UNCLOS increases states' use of non-binding methods of dispute settlement, and the Article theorizes that this occurs because the declarations credibly threaten court involvement and provide more information about likely litigation outcomes. The Article's central finding is that states that file Article 287 declarations have fewer maritime claims, more peaceful negotiations, and less need for judicial dispute settlement.

There is increasing evidence that territorial conflict is associated with centralized and nondemocratic regimes. We explore whether this relationship is due to the facility of democratic regimes to settle their international borders. Using Owsiak's data set on border settlement processes, we find little evidence that democratic regimes are more likely than other types of regimes to settle their borders. In fact, joint democracy rarely precedes the first border agreement or full settlement of the border, and there is almost no qualitative evidence suggesting a link between democracy and border settlement in the rare instances of successful agreements. Democracies are also not more likely to keep their borders settled or even to be more peaceful during settled-border years. Overall, our findings suggest that border settlements lead to peace in the dyad and affirm a clear temporal sequence of border settlement, then peace and democracy for neighboring dyads.

There is increasing evidence that territorial conflict is associated with centralized and nondemocratic regimes. We explore whether this relationship is due to the facility of democratic regimes to settle their international borders. Using Owsiak's data set on border settlement processes, we find little evidence that democratic regimes are more likely than other types of regimes to settle their borders. In fact, joint democracy rarely precedes the first border agreement or full settlement of the border, and there is almost no qualitative evidence suggesting a link between democracy and border settlement in the rare instances of successful agreements. Democracies are also not more likely to keep their borders settled or even to be more peaceful during settled-border years. Overall, our findings suggest that border settlements lead to peace in the dyad and affirm a clear temporal sequence of border settlement, then peace and democracy for neighboring dyads.

Why do disputants favor some conflict management strategies when managing certain territorial claim types—land, river, or maritime—but not others? We propose that state interests—defined via claim characteristics and interdependence—and transaction costs (i.e., the challenges associated with aggregating state preferences over outcomes) differ across claim types. These differences then incentivize states to cede varying levels of control over claim management, ultimately encouraging them to prioritize and institutionalize certain conflict management strategies when managing particular types of territorial claims. More specifically, we theorize and find that states pursue distinct management strategies when addressing their land (informal; bilateral negotiations and arbitration), river (more formal; third-party non-binding), and maritime claims (most formal; multilateral negotiations and legal processes).