Suchergebnisse

Recent writing on industrial policy stresses the need for coordination between the public and private sectors. This paper examines the performance of one such coordination mechanism, Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils, in Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. It finds that the councils have been better at focusing attention on a donor-driven agenda of regulatory reforms than they have been at addressing the binding constraints to private investment. Notwithstanding their name, the actual level of commitment to Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils varies quite substantially. None have established a track record of experimentation, effective implementation, and evaluation of the impact of decisions taken.

After stagnating for much of its postcolonial history, economic performance in Sub?Saharan Africa has markedly improved. Since 1995, average economic growth has been close to 5 percent per year. Has Africa finally turned the corner? This paper analyzes growth accelerations and decelerations-that is, country level deviations from long?run trend growth. Seen from this perspective, Africa's record of slow and volatile growth reflects a pattern of offsetting accelerations and declines, and much of the improvement in economic performance in Africa post 1995 turns out to be due to a substantial reduction in the frequency and severity of growth decelerations. The fall in economic declines since 1995 is largely due to better macroeconomic policies, but changes in such 'growth determinants' as investment, export diversification, and productivity have not accompanied the growth boom. Lack of change in these variables and the significant role played by natural resources in sparking growth accelerations suggest that Africa's growth recovery was fragile, even before the recent global economic crisis. The paper concludes by setting out four elements of a strategy that can help move Africa from fewer mistakes to sustained growth: managing natural resources better, pushing nontraditional exports, building the African private sector, and creating new skills.

After stagnating for much of its postcolonial history, economic performance in Sub?Saharan Africa has markedly improved. Since 1995, average economic growth has been close to 5 percent per year. Has Africa finally turned the corner? This paper analyzes growth accelerations and decelerations-that is, country level deviations from long?run trend growth. Seen from this perspective, Africa's record of slow and volatile growth reflects a pattern of offsetting accelerations and declines, and much of the improvement in economic performance in Africa post 1995 turns out to be due to a substantial reduction in the frequency and severity of growth decelerations. The fall in economic declines since 1995 is largely due to better macroeconomic policies, but changes in such 'growth determinants' as investment, export diversification, and productivity have not accompanied the growth boom. Lack of change in these variables and the significant role played by natural resources in sparking growth accelerations suggest that Africa's growth recovery was fragile, even before the recent global economic crisis. The paper concludes by setting out four elements of a strategy that can help move Africa from fewer mistakes to sustained growth: managing natural resources better, pushing nontraditional exports, building the African private sector, and creating new skills.

Natural resources can make diversification and structural change more challenging. This chapter focuses on why public policy matters. International competitiveness depends on both relative prices and on the policy and institutional changes and investments that governments make to enhance it. Drawing on the five country case studies in this volume, the authors suggest lessons for the design of policies to promote structural change in Africa's resource exporters. They address the three key themes—managing the boom, the construction sector, and linking industry to the resource—then propose ideas for widening options for structural change. These include reforms to deal with 'Dutch disease', expanding the concept of structural change from a focus on industrialization to 'industries without smokestacks', and investing in knowledge.

There is increasing recognition that the market imperfections on which theoretical arguments for industrial policies rest are widespread in low-income countries, and that well-designed government policies can contribute to improved economic outcomes. There is also greater understanding that the private sector has a central role to play in formulating and implementing industrial policy. Because much of the information relevant to policy-making is held by firms, some form of structured engagement—often referred to as close or strategic coordination—between the public and private sectors is needed, both to assist in the design of appropriate public actions and to provide effective feedback on their implementation. This introductory chapter provides an overview of common themes and outlines a set of forward-looking ideas for strengthening public–private coordination in Africa. It argues that these ideas must form part of any development agenda for Africa in the years to come.

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His conduct was wrong and punishable; he reacted erroneously due to lack of reflection; wishes to be reinstated so as to "have an opportunity to do as much towards promoting dicipline [sic] as I have done (tho not intentionally) to destroy it."

Inspection report of the quarters of the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy signed by John O. Page on 1 February 1823.

There are a myriad of laws, guidelines and unwritten agreements relating to human, hominid and hominin remains. Legal gaps and inadequate definitions of what constitutes a fossil have meant that a 'finders keepers' approach is often applied to the ownership and control of our ancestors' remains. Such shortcomings expose numerous legal and ethical conundrums. Should any one organisation, individual or government control access to recently-found remains, limiting opportunities to unlock the secrets of evolution? Given that humans can start fossilisation processes immediately after burial, at what point does it become appropriate to dig up their remains? And who should control access to them? Could any prehistoric Homo ever have imagined they would one day be exhumed and their remains laid out in cases as the centrepiece of a museum exhibit? This paper surveys a number of implications that arise from these foundational questions, and ultimately challenges the belief that human, hominin and hominid remains are self-evident 'objects' capable of clear ownership: rather they constitute creative cultural intersections, which are deserving of greater ethical consideration. Protocols for respecting, protecting and conserving remains while allowing a greater equity in access to information about our common ancestors are both desirable and urgently required.

This study combines evidence from interviews in seven countries with (i) government institutions responsible for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), (ii) 102 multinationals (MNEs), and (iii) 226 domestic firms linked to these foreign affiliates as suppliers, customers, or competitors, to identify whether relations between MNEs and domestic firms lead to direct transfers of knowledge/technology. We first document that there are relatively few linkages between MNEs and domestic firms in sub-Saharan Africa compared with Asia. However, when linkages are present in sub-Saharan Africa they raise the likelihood of direct knowledge/technology transfers from MNEs to domestic firms as compared to linked-in firms in Asia. Finally, we do not find that direct knowledge/technology transfers are more likely to occur through FDI than through trade. As such our results are not consistent with the view that tacit knowledge transfers are more likely to occur through localised linkages.

This study combines evidence from interviews in seven countries with (i) government institutions responsible for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) 102 multinational enterprises (MNEs), and (iii) 226 domestic firms linked to these foreign affiliates as suppliers, customers, or competitors. The purpose of the interviews was to identify whether relations between MNEs and domestic firms lead to direct transfers of knowledge/technology. We first document that there are relatively few linkages between MNEs and domestic firms in sub-Saharan Africa compared with Asia. However, when linkages are present in sub-Saharan Africa, they raise the likelihood of direct knowledge/technology transfers from MNEs to domestic firms as compared with linked-in firms in Asia. Finally, we do not find that direct knowledge/technology transfers are more likely to occur via FDI than through trade. As such, our results are not consistent with the view that tacit knowledge transfers are more likely to occur through localized linkages.

This study combines evidence from interviews in seven countries with (i) government institutions responsible for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) 102 multinational enterprises (MNEs), and (iii) 226 domestic firms linked to these foreign affiliates as suppliers, customers, or competitors. The purpose of the interviews was to identify whether relations between MNEs and domestic firms lead to direct transfers of knowledge/technology. We first document that there are relatively few linkages between MNEs and domestic firms in sub-Saharan Africa compared with Asia. However, when linkages are present in sub-Saharan Africa, they raise the likelihood of direct knowledge/technology transfers from MNEs to domestic firms as compared with linked-in firms in Asia. Finally, we do not find that direct knowledge/technology transfers are more likely to occur via FDI than through trade. As such, our results are not consistent with the view that tacit knowledge transfers are more likely to occur through localized linkages.