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Information flows in EU policy-making are heavily dependent on personal networks, both within the Brussels sphere but also reaching outside the narrow limits of the Belgian capital. These networks develop for example in the course of formal and informal meetings or at the sidelines of such meetings. A plethora of committees at European, transnational and regional level provides the basis for the establishment of pan-European networks. By studying affiliation to those committees, basic network structures can be uncovered. These affiliation network structures can then be used to predict EU information flows, assuming that certain positions within the network are advantageous for tapping into streams of information while others are too remote and peripheral to provide access to information early enough. This study has tested those assumptions for the case of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy for the time after 2012. Through the analysis of an affiliation network based on participation in 10 different fisheries policy committees over two years (2009 and 2010), network data for an EU-wide network of about 1300 fisheries interest group representatives and more than 200 events was collected. The structure of this network showed a number of interesting patterns, such as not surprisingly a rather central role of Brussels-based committees but also close relations of very specific interests to the Brussels-cluster and stronger relations between geographically closer maritime regions. The analysis of information flows then focused on access to draft EU Commission documents containing the upcoming proposal for a new basic regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy. It was first documented that it would have been impossible to officially obtain this document and that personal networks were thus the most likely sources for fisheries policy actors to obtain access to these "leaks" in early 2011. A survey of a sample of 65 actors from the initial network supported these findings: Only a very small group had accessed the draft directly from the Commission. Most respondents who obtained access to the draft had received it from other actors, highlighting the networked flow of informal information in EU politics. Furthermore, the testing of the hypotheses connecting network positions and the level of informedness indicated that presence in or connections to the Brussels sphere had both advantages for overall access to the draft document and with regard to timing. Methodologically, challenges of both the network analysis and the analysis of information flows but also their relevance for the study of EU politics have been documented. In summary, this study has laid the foundation for a different way to study EU policy-making by connecting topical and methodological elements – such as affiliation network analysis and EU committee governance – which so far have not been considered together, thereby contributing in various ways to political science and EU studies.

Information flows in EU policy-making are heavily dependent on personal networks, both within the Brussels sphere but also reaching outside the narrow limits of the Belgian capital. These networks develop for example in the course of formal and informal meetings or at the sidelines of such meetings. A plethora of committees at European, transnational and regional level provides the basis for the establishment of pan-European networks. By studying affiliation to those committees, basic network structures can be uncovered. These affiliation network structures can then be used to predict EU information flows, assuming that certain positions within the network are advantageous for tapping into streams of information while others are too remote and peripheral to provide access to information early enough. This study has tested those assumptions for the case of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy for the time after 2012. Through the analysis of an affiliation network based on participation in 10 different fisheries policy committees over two years (2009 and 2010), network data for an EU-wide network of about 1300 fisheries interest group representatives and more than 200 events was collected. The structure of this network showed a number of interesting patterns, such as – not surprisingly – a rather central role of Brussels-based committees but also close relations of very specific interests to the Brussels-cluster and stronger relations between geographically closer maritime regions. The analysis of information flows then focused on access to draft EU Commission documents containing the upcoming proposal for a new basic regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy. It was first documented that it would have been impossible to officially obtain this document and that personal networks were thus the most likely sources for fisheries policy actors to obtain access to these "leaks" in early 2011. A survey of a sample of 65 actors from the initial network supported these findings: Only a very small group had accessed the draft directly from the Commission. Most respondents who obtained access to the draft had received it from other actors, highlighting the networked flow of informal information in EU politics. Furthermore, the testing of the hypotheses connecting network positions and the level of informedness indicated that presence in or connections to the Brussels sphere had both advantages for overall access to the draft document and with regard to timing. Methodologically, challenges of both the network analysis and the analysis of information flows but also their relevance for the study of EU politics have been documented. In summary, this study has laid the foundation for a different way to study EU policy-making by connecting topical and methodological elements – such as affiliation network analysis and EU committee governance – which so far have not been considered together, thereby contributing in various ways to political science and EU studies. ; Informationsflüsse im Kontext von EU-Entscheidungsprozessen sind ohne persönliche Netzwerke kaum denkbar, sowohl solche innerhalb der Brüsseler Sphäre aber auch solche, die über die engen Grenzen der belgischen Hauptstadt hinausreichen. Solche Netzwerke entwickeln sich zum Beispiel im Laufe von offiziellen und inoffiziellen Treffen, oft auch am Rande solcher Ereignisse. Die Vielzahl von Ausschüssen auf europäischer, transnationaler und regionaler Ebene bildet daher die Grundlage für die Schaffung europäischer Netzwerkstrukturen. Indem wir die Teilnahme an solchen Ausschüssen untersuchen, ist es uns möglich, grundlegende Strukturmerkmale solcher Netzwerke aufzudecken. Solche Affiliationsnetzwerk-Strukturen können dann die Grundlage zur Vorhersage von europäischen Informationsflüssen bilden: Die Annahme ist, dass bestimmte Positionen in solchen Netzwerken vorteilhaft für den Zugang zu Informationsflüssen sind, während andere Positionen (zu) weit entfernt und zu peripher sind, um rechtzeitigen Zugriff auf relevante Informationen zu erhalten. Die vorliegende Studie testet diese Annahmen anhand der Reform der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik der Europäischen Union für die Zeit nach 2012 . Basierend auf Teilnahmedaten von 10 Fischereipolitik-Ausschüssen über den Zeitraum von zwei Jahren (2009 und 2010) wurde ein Affilationsnetzwerk aus mehr als 1300 Interessenvertretern und –vertreterinnen sowie über 200 Ereignissen erhoben. Die Struktur dieses Netzwerks zeigt eine Reihe von interessanten Mustern auf, zum Beispiel die zentrale Rolle von Brüssel-basierten Ausschüssen aber auch die enge Verknüpfung bestimmter Interessen mit dem Brüsseler Kern des Netzwerk sowie die enge Vernetzung geographisch benachbarter Meeresregionen. Die Analyse von EU-Informationsflüssen wurde dann Anhand des Zugangs von Akteuren aus dem erhobenen Netzwerk zu (nichtöffentlichen) Entwurfsfassungen des Kommissionsvorschlags für eine neue Gemeinsame Fischereipolitik durchgeführt. Zunächst wurde dokumentiert, dass der Zugang zu diesen Dokumenten auf offiziellen Wegen unmöglich war und dass daher Zugang durch erweiterte persönliche Netzwerke die wahrscheinlichste Erklärung für den Erhalt von "Leaks" durch Fischereipolitik-Interessengruppen in der ersten Hälfte von 2011 war. Eine Umfrage unter 65 Akteuren aus der Gesamtpopulation des Gesamtnetzwerk unterstützte diese Vermutung: Nur eine kleine Gruppe hatte Zugang zu den nicht-öffentlichen Entwurfsdokumenten durch ihre direkten Beziehungen mit der EU-Kommission. Die meisten Teilnehmer der Umfrage hatte Zugang zu diesen Dokumenten durch Dritte erhalten, ein Nachweis, dass EU-Informationen sich tatsächlich in weiteren Netzwerkstrukturen verbreiten. Die Studie konnte auch zeigen, dass enge Affiliations-Beziehungen zur Brüsseler Sphäre ein relevanter Indikator für den (zeitnahen) Zugang zu nicht-öffentlichen EU-Dokumenten ist. Die Herausforderungen in der methodischen Erhebungen von europäischen Affiliationsnetzwerkdaten und von EU-Informationsflüssen werden dabei in der Studie ausführlich dokumentiert. Die Relevanz dieser Methoden zur Analyse von EU-Politik wird ebenfalls im Detail dargelegt. Zusammenfassend legt diese Doktorarbeit die Grundlage für eine neue Art, europäische und transnationale politische Prozesse in Europa zu untersuchen. Sie verbinden thematische und methodische Ansätze – zum Beispiel Affiliationsnetzwerkanalyse und die Untersuchung des EU-Ausschusswesens – die bislang in dieser Form noch nicht zusammengeführt wurden, und trägt dadurch auf verschiedenste Weise zur Weiterentwicklung der Politikwissenschaft und der Europastudien bei.

Information flows in EU policy-making are heavily dependent on personal networks, both within the Brussels sphere but also reaching outside the narrow limits of the Belgian capital. These networks develop for example in the course of formal and informal meetings or at the sidelines of such meetings. A plethora of committees at European, transnational and regional level provides the basis for the establishment of pan-European networks. By studying affiliation to those committees, basic network structures can be uncovered. These affiliation network structures can then be used to predict EU information flows, assuming that certain positions within the network are advantageous for tapping into streams of information while others are too remote and peripheral to provide access to information early enough. This study has tested those assumptions for the case of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy for the time after 2012. Through the analysis of an affiliation network based on participation in 10 different fisheries policy committees over two years (2009 and 2010), network data for an EU-wide network of about 1300 fisheries interest group representatives and more than 200 events was collected. The structure of this network showed a number of interesting patterns, such as – not surprisingly – a rather central role of Brussels-based committees but also close relations of very specific interests to the Brussels-cluster and stronger relations between geographically closer maritime regions. The analysis of information flows then focused on access to draft EU Commission documents containing the upcoming proposal for a new basic regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy. It was first documented that it would have been impossible to officially obtain this document and that personal networks were thus the most likely sources for fisheries policy actors to obtain access to these "leaks" in early 2011. A survey of a sample of 65 actors from the initial network supported these findings: Only a very small group had accessed the draft directly from the Commission. Most respondents who obtained access to the draft had received it from other actors, highlighting the networked flow of informal information in EU politics. Furthermore, the testing of the hypotheses connecting network positions and the level of informedness indicated that presence in or connections to the Brussels sphere had both advantages for overall access to the draft document and with regard to timing. Methodologically, challenges of both the network analysis and the analysis of information flows but also their relevance for the study of EU politics have been documented. In summary, this study has laid the foundation for a different way to study EU policy-making by connecting topical and methodological elements – such as affiliation network analysis and EU committee governance – which so far have not been considered together, thereby contributing in various ways to political science and EU studies.

Annual reports are a central element of international bureaucracies' accountability communication to member states and other stakeholders. Most UN system bureaucracies produce reports of significant length and detail. International agencies use these reports to draw attention to particular challenges or successes. Hitting the right tone with their diverse stakeholders is crucial to maintain continued support. UN agencies do so by employing differentiated sentiment-loaded language alongside factual reporting. We argue that agencies' operational focus, administrative structures and resource mobilization needs have a significant impact on how they use sentiment to communicate with different stakeholder groups. Drawing on a dictionary-based sentiment analysis of three text corpora of annual reports produced by three UN system agencies—UNRWA (reports published from 1951 to 2019), UNHCR (1953–2019) and IOM (2000–2019)—we show a general trend toward increased positive sentiment use across all three agencies, coinciding with a period of stronger donor orientation. At the same time, we find a more volatile and agency-specific use of negative sentiment in response to field-level challenges that are communicated to stakeholders in line with agencies' evolving mandates. Through a text-as-data perspective, this contribution enhances our comparative understanding of the diverse and context-dependent language of international bureaucracies. Points for practitioners Reading UN agency reporting, practitioners need to be aware of the constraints and incentives that international bureaucrats face—notably operational focus, administrative structures and resource needs—that drive tone differences across reports and over time.

AbstractThis article introduces, summarizes and contextualizes the key questions and findings of a special issue of Global Policy on the resourcing of international organizations (IOs). The article sets out trends in the financial resources available to IOs; discusses their organizational consequences; and highlights analytical implications for the study of IOs. We discuss resource diversification associated with growing complexity of the origins and types of funding available to IOs; the importance of non‐state actors in IO funding; and contestation over the classification of resources. Resource diversification encourages organizational differentiation, manifested in major shifts in resource‐related actor constellations and their impact on the autonomy of IOs; adjustments to budgeting procedures; and functional differentiation within IOs and the emergence of new types of IOs that are partly driven by resourcing. These observations invite an analytical perspective in the study of IOs that pays systematic attention to the administrative governance dimension of IOs; the entrepreneurial character of many IOs; and organizational fields as a focus of analysis. Read together, the 11 contributions to the special issue underline that paying attention to their resourcing can advance our understanding of IOs.

Built on the administrative system of the League of Nations, since the Second World War, the United Nations has grown into a sizeable, complex and multilevel system of several dozen international bureaucracies. Outside of a brief period in the 1980s, and despite growing scholarship on international public administrations over the past two decades, there have been few publications in the International Review of Administrative Sciences on the evolution of the United Nations system and its many public administrations. The special issue 'International Bureaucracy and the United Nations System' aims to encourage renewed scholarly focus on this global level of public administration. This introduction makes the case for why studying the United Nations' bureaucracies matters from a public administration perspective, takes stock of key literature and discusses how the seven articles contribute to key substantive and methodological advancements in studying the administrations of the United Nations system.

AbstractThis contribution theorizes on the emergence of affective styles in the accountability reporting of public agencies. Under conditions of multiple accountability towards heterogeneous stakeholders, public agencies are expected to make increased use of sentiment in their reporting. Agencies' differentiated modulation of positive and negative sentiment results in four ideal-typical affective styles: technocratic, political, alarming, and self-praising. The plausibility of this framework is demonstrated for the case of a major international public agency, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which serves several million Palestine refugees. We conduct a dictionary-based sentiment analysis of UNRWA annual reports published between 1951 and 2020, a corpus of 1.47 million words. Additional evidence from interviews with UNRWA officials and diplomats is also considered. Over time, the agency's use of sentiment has increased in response to diversifying stakeholders and its affective style of reporting has changed repeatedly. Contrary to established theoretical expectations, multiple accountability not only increases positive reporting and self-praise. Rather, with increasing levels of negativity, the alarming and political styles of communication have played a much stronger role. These findings demonstrate that agencies' chief goal in accountability reporting is not simply to elicit positive assessments from their respective accountability forums through self-praising language. Agencies may also aim to achieve "negativity congruence" with accountability forums by increasing negative sentiment, thus compelling stakeholders to acknowledge the operational challenges agencies face.

In recent decades, many international organizations have become almost entirely funded by voluntary contributions. Much existing literature suggests that major donors use their funding to refocus international organizations' attention away from their core mandate and toward serving donors' geostrategic interests. We investigate this claim in the context of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), examining whether donor influence negatively impacts mandate delivery and leads the organization to direct expenditures more toward recipient countries that are politically, economically, or geographically salient to major donors. Analyzing a new dataset of UNHCR finances (1967–2016), we find that UNHCR served its global mandate with considerable consistency. Applying flexible measures of collective donor influence, so-called "influence-weighted interest scores," our findings suggest that donor influence matters for the expenditure allocation of the agency, but that mandate-undermining effects of such influence are limited and most pronounced during salient refugee situations within Europe.