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Googling the WTO: what search-engine data tell us about the political economy of institutions
In: International organization, Band 67, Heft 3, S. 629-655
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
The Cost of Wiggle‐Room: Looking at the Welfare Effects of Flexibility in Tariff Rates at the WTO1
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 91-102
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 255-256
ISSN: 1537-5927
Why do some countries get better WTO accession terms than others?
In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 639-672
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
How states ration flexibility: tariffs, remedies, and exchange rates as policy substitutes
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 618-646
ISSN: 0043-8871
A close look at the commitments of World Trade Organization (wto) members presents a striking paradox. Most states could raise their duties significantly before falling afoul of their wto obligations. Moreover, such "binding overhang" varies between countries: some could more than double the amount of trade protection they offer overnight, whereas others are tightly constrained. What accounts for this variation? The author argues that more flexibility is not always better: obtaining it and subsequently using it are both costly. Rather than maximize flexibility, states thus seek an optimal amount. If they have access to policy space through other means, such as currency devaluations and trade remedies, they will exercise restraint in seeking binding overhang. The same supply-side logic holds at the domestic level: governments strategically withhold binding overhang from industries that are able to rely on trade remedies, despite the fact that these tend to have the greatest political clout. (World Politics / SWP)
World Affairs Online
Constraining coercion?: Legitimacy and its role in U.S. trade policy, 1975-2000
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 65-96
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 349-368
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
Cooperation in hard times: self-restraint of trade protection
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 2, S. 398-429
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
Fear of crowds in World Trade Organization disputes: why don't more countries participate
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 78, Heft 1, S. 88-104
ISSN: 0022-3816
World Affairs Online
Do international rulings have spillover effects? The view from financial markets
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 711
ISSN: 0043-8871
Over‐commitment and backsliding in international trade
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 55, Heft 2, S. 391-415
ISSN: 0304-4130
Measuring the Cost of Privacy: A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 1-29
ISSN: 0007-1234
Measuring the Cost of Privacy: A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining
In: British journal of political science, S. 1-29
ISSN: 0007-1234
Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 663-699
ISSN: 0020-8183