Quand l'écologie fait de la politique
In: Projet: civilisation, travail, économie, Band 382, Heft 3, S. 20-24
ISSN: 2108-6648
In: Projet: civilisation, travail, économie, Band 382, Heft 3, S. 20-24
ISSN: 2108-6648
1ères lignes : Les partis verts ont réussi à faire entrer en politique la cause environnementale. Mais ce succès a un revers : ils n'ont plus le monopole de la nature, cette thématique étant devenue transpartisane.L'écologie politique est l'une des seules idéologies du 20e siècle à avoir donné naissance à une nouvelle famille de partis.Les partis verts, qui s'appuient sur une idéologie de rupture avec le productivisme, l'écologie politique, se sont développés dans la plupart des pays d'Europe, avec des succès variés mais significatifs. Leur développement s'est accompagné de la diffusion des problématiques écologistes dans le débat public, au point que les enjeux environnementaux sont désormais repris par la plupart des autres partis politiques. Le verdissement des idéologies traditionnelles est toutefois limité et fluctuant. Cela s'explique par la difficulté d'accommoder un discours fondé sur la défense de la croissance économique avec la nécessité de préserver l'environnement.
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1ères lignes : Les partis verts ont réussi à faire entrer en politique la cause environnementale. Mais ce succès a un revers : ils n'ont plus le monopole de la nature, cette thématique étant devenue transpartisane.L'écologie politique est l'une des seules idéologies du 20e siècle à avoir donné naissance à une nouvelle famille de partis.Les partis verts, qui s'appuient sur une idéologie de rupture avec le productivisme, l'écologie politique, se sont développés dans la plupart des pays d'Europe, avec des succès variés mais significatifs. Leur développement s'est accompagné de la diffusion des problématiques écologistes dans le débat public, au point que les enjeux environnementaux sont désormais repris par la plupart des autres partis politiques. Le verdissement des idéologies traditionnelles est toutefois limité et fluctuant. Cela s'explique par la difficulté d'accommoder un discours fondé sur la défense de la croissance économique avec la nécessité de préserver l'environnement.
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In: Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 157-186
ISSN: 2119-3851
« Déclarer qu'on va protéger la planète, ça ne coûte rien ». Les droites françaises et l'écologie (1971-2015) . Face au développement du mouvement écologiste et à l'aggravation de la crise environnementale, les principaux partis de droite français ont réagi en transformant leurs discours et leurs programmes. Mais l'intégration de l'écologie fut très chaotique. Les résistances internes et la prépondérance d'un idéal productiviste ont eu raison de l'activisme momentané des dirigeants sur les questions écologiques.
In: Revue française de science politique, Heft 3, S. 405-428
ISSN: 0035-2950
In: Revue française de science politique, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 405-428
ISSN: 1950-6686
La politisation des enjeux environnementaux et le développement des partis écologistes à partir du début des années 1970 ont posé un défi aux grands partis de gouvernement : comment ont-ils répondu à ces évolutions ? Leur stratégie a-t-elle consisté à éviter la question de la protection de l'environnement, ou au contraire à se l'approprier, en s'efforçant de concurrencer les écologistes sur leur propre terrain ? Pour répondre à cette question, cet article étudie les variations de la visibilité de l'environnement dans les programmes électoraux de 58 grands partis de 20 pays de l'OCDE depuis le début des années 1960. Si notre étude vient confirmer l'augmentation significative de la place accordée à l'environnement sur la période, elle met aussi en évidence l'importance du positionnement sur l'axe gauche-droite et de la menace posée par des concurrents écologistes.
This thesis studies how mainstream parties have reacted to a new cleavage dividing Environmentalism and Productivism in advanced industrial democracies. To do so, it associates cleavage theory and issue competition theories. The central hypothesis of this research is that mainstream parties should neutralize the new cleavage, by granting little attention to the diverse environmental issues that form the new cleavage, by framing those issues in relation to the historical cleavages on which they are funded, and by taking positions that imply no direct conflict with their opponents. The research design rests on comparison and mixed methods. The study concludes that big governing parties mostly fail to follow their ideal strategy. Their attention to the environmental theme has grown considerably over the last four decades, and they have had to deal with numerous new environmental issues that have no connection to the old cleavages. The only way these parties have been able to prevent the expansion of conflict is by taking consensual positions on those issues. Yet, many factors explain variations in parties' reactions: the environmental agenda in the media and in social movements, the severity of environmental degradation, the left-Right position of parties and internal divisions. Other variables have limited effect: the macroeconomic situation, incumbency, and, more surprisingly, the threat posed by green party challengers do not seem to affect big governing parties' politicization of the environment. The fact that social and environmental factors matter more than explanations based on party competition's internal dynamics upholds a cleavage-Based approach. ; Ce travail étudie la réaction des grands partis de gouvernement face au développement d'un clivage entre Écologie et Productivisme dans les démocraties occidentales. Pour ce faire, il croise la théorie des clivages et les théories de la compétition sur enjeux. L'hypothèse centrale de ce travail voudrait que ces partis neutralisent le nouveau clivage, en ...
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This thesis studies how mainstream parties have reacted to a new cleavage dividing Environmentalism and Productivism in advanced industrial democracies. To do so, it associates cleavage theory and issue competition theories. The central hypothesis of this research is that mainstream parties should neutralize the new cleavage, by granting little attention to the diverse environmental issues that form the new cleavage, by framing those issues in relation to the historical cleavages on which they are funded, and by taking positions that imply no direct conflict with their opponents. The research design rests on comparison and mixed methods. The study concludes that big governing parties mostly fail to follow their ideal strategy. Their attention to the environmental theme has grown considerably over the last four decades, and they have had to deal with numerous new environmental issues that have no connection to the old cleavages. The only way these parties have been able to prevent the expansion of conflict is by taking consensual positions on those issues. Yet, many factors explain variations in parties' reactions: the environmental agenda in the media and in social movements, the severity of environmental degradation, the left-Right position of parties and internal divisions. Other variables have limited effect: the macroeconomic situation, incumbency, and, more surprisingly, the threat posed by green party challengers do not seem to affect big governing parties' politicization of the environment. The fact that social and environmental factors matter more than explanations based on party competition's internal dynamics upholds a cleavage-Based approach. ; Ce travail étudie la réaction des grands partis de gouvernement face au développement d'un clivage entre Écologie et Productivisme dans les démocraties occidentales. Pour ce faire, il croise la théorie des clivages et les théories de la compétition sur enjeux. L'hypothèse centrale de ce travail voudrait que ces partis neutralisent le nouveau clivage, en ...
BASE
This thesis studies how mainstream parties have reacted to a new cleavage dividing Environmentalism and Productivism in advanced industrial democracies. To do so, it associates cleavage theory and issue competition theories. The central hypothesis of this research is that mainstream parties should neutralize the new cleavage, by granting little attention to the diverse environmental issues that form the new cleavage, by framing those issues in relation to the historical cleavages on which they are funded, and by taking positions that imply no direct conflict with their opponents. The research design rests on comparison and mixed methods. The study concludes that big governing parties mostly fail to follow their ideal strategy. Their attention to the environmental theme has grown considerably over the last four decades, and they have had to deal with numerous new environmental issues that have no connection to the old cleavages. The only way these parties have been able to prevent the expansion of conflict is by taking consensual positions on those issues. Yet, many factors explain variations in parties' reactions: the environmental agenda in the media and in social movements, the severity of environmental degradation, the left-right position of parties and internal divisions. Other variables have limited effect: the macroeconomic situation, incumbency, and, more surprisingly, the threat posed by green party challengers do not seem to affect big governing parties' politicization of the environment. The fact that social and environmental factors matter more than explanations based on party competition's internal dynamics upholds a cleavage-based approach. ; Ce travail étudie la réaction des grands partis de gouvernement face au développement d'un clivage entre Écologie et Productivisme dans les démocraties occidentales. Pour ce faire, il croise la théorie des clivages et les théories de la compétition sur enjeux. L'hypothèse centrale de ce travail voudrait que ces partis neutralisent le nouveau clivage, en ...
BASE
This thesis studies how mainstream parties have reacted to a new cleavage dividing Environmentalism and Productivism in advanced industrial democracies. To do so, it associates cleavage theory and issue competition theories. The central hypothesis of this research is that mainstream parties should neutralize the new cleavage, by granting little attention to the diverse environmental issues that form the new cleavage, by framing those issues in relation to the historical cleavages on which they are funded, and by taking positions that imply no direct conflict with their opponents. The research design rests on comparison and mixed methods. The study concludes that big governing parties mostly fail to follow their ideal strategy. Their attention to the environmental theme has grown considerably over the last four decades, and they have had to deal with numerous new environmental issues that have no connection to the old cleavages. The only way these parties have been able to prevent the expansion of conflict is by taking consensual positions on those issues. Yet, many factors explain variations in parties' reactions: the environmental agenda in the media and in social movements, the severity of environmental degradation, the left-Right position of parties and internal divisions. Other variables have limited effect: the macroeconomic situation, incumbency, and, more surprisingly, the threat posed by green party challengers do not seem to affect big governing parties' politicization of the environment. The fact that social and environmental factors matter more than explanations based on party competition's internal dynamics upholds a cleavage-Based approach. ; Ce travail étudie la réaction des grands partis de gouvernement face au développement d'un clivage entre Écologie et Productivisme dans les démocraties occidentales. Pour ce faire, il croise la théorie des clivages et les théories de la compétition sur enjeux. L'hypothèse centrale de ce travail voudrait que ces partis neutralisent le nouveau clivage, en ...
BASE
In: Les Sens du droit
French coalition politics is distinctive in Western Europe. There is a strongly imbalanced power structures in favour of the party of the President (or Prime Minister in times of cohabitation). France is therefore a particular and rather extreme case of dominant Prime Minister Model. The constitution of the Fifth Republic creates strong incentives to build pre-electoral alliances, but the majoritarian electoral system and semi-presidentialism have led to an extreme predominance by the main parties, and in particular of the chief of the executive, over their junior partners. Institutional reforms have still reinforced the weight of president. Small parties can exert leverage mainly before the elections, given their capacity to negotiate their support during the campaign and mutual withdrawals for the first or the second round of elections. Once the election is passed, coalition politics are strongly structured by presidential logics (outside cohabitations) and take place to a large extent beyond parties: individual MPs from the same party may join different parliamentary groups depending on their attitude towards the president. Given the absence of formal coalition governance arrangements, junior parties' resources for influencing government policies are very much restricted to public communication, informal exchanges with the chief of the executive, and the threat to leave the coalition. Modalities of coalition governance provide the chief of the executive (i.e. the president since 2002) with strong leadership, extensive leverage in policymaking and a final say in interministerial disputes. He usually manages to get his way and only rarely consult parties in his coalition. Consequently, these parties will affect policy outcomes only with respect to very emblematic issues (usually one or two) and to the definition of "red lines" likely to be a motivation for terminating their participation to government. Political parties are aware of this and do not expect coalition agreements to be implemented – they conceive ...
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French coalition politics is distinctive in Western Europe. There is a strongly imbalanced power structures in favour of the party of the President (or Prime Minister in times of cohabitation). France is therefore a particular and rather extreme case of dominant Prime Minister Model. The constitution of the Fifth Republic creates strong incentives to build pre-electoral alliances, but the majoritarian electoral system and semi-presidentialism have led to an extreme predominance by the main parties, and in particular of the chief of the executive, over their junior partners. Institutional reforms have still reinforced the weight of president. Small parties can exert leverage mainly before the elections, given their capacity to negotiate their support during the campaign and mutual withdrawals for the first or the second round of elections. Once the election is passed, coalition politics are strongly structured by presidential logics (outside cohabitations) and take place to a large extent beyond parties: individual MPs from the same party may join different parliamentary groups depending on their attitude towards the president. Given the absence of formal coalition governance arrangements, junior parties' resources for influencing government policies are very much restricted to public communication, informal exchanges with the chief of the executive, and the threat to leave the coalition. Modalities of coalition governance provide the chief of the executive (i.e. the president since 2002) with strong leadership, extensive leverage in policymaking and a final say in interministerial disputes. He usually manages to get his way and only rarely consult parties in his coalition. Consequently, these parties will affect policy outcomes only with respect to very emblematic issues (usually one or two) and to the definition of "red lines" likely to be a motivation for terminating their participation to government. Political parties are aware of this and do not expect coalition agreements to be implemented – they conceive ...
BASE
French coalition politics is distinctive in Western Europe. There is a strongly imbalanced power structures in favour of the party of the President (or Prime Minister in times of cohabitation). France is therefore a particular and rather extreme case of dominant Prime Minister Model. The constitution of the Fifth Republic creates strong incentives to build pre-electoral alliances, but the majoritarian electoral system and semi-presidentialism have led to an extreme predominance by the main parties, and in particular of the chief of the executive, over their junior partners. Institutional reforms have still reinforced the weight of president. Small parties can exert leverage mainly before the elections, given their capacity to negotiate their support during the campaign and mutual withdrawals for the first or the second round of elections. Once the election is passed, coalition politics are strongly structured by presidential logics (outside cohabitations) and take place to a large extent beyond parties: individual MPs from the same party may join different parliamentary groups depending on their attitude towards the president. Given the absence of formal coalition governance arrangements, junior parties' resources for influencing government policies are very much restricted to public communication, informal exchanges with the chief of the executive, and the threat to leave the coalition. Modalities of coalition governance provide the chief of the executive (i.e. the president since 2002) with strong leadership, extensive leverage in policymaking and a final say in interministerial disputes. He usually manages to get his way and only rarely consult parties in his coalition. Consequently, these parties will affect policy outcomes only with respect to very emblematic issues (usually one or two) and to the definition of "red lines" likely to be a motivation for terminating their participation to government. Political parties are aware of this and do not expect coalition agreements to be implemented – they conceive ...
BASE
International audience ; Alors que s'achève prochainement la convention citoyenne pour le climat, comment concrétiser les propositions des citoyens tirés au sort dans le cadre d'un processus démocratique ? Quelle place et quelle forme doit prendre le référendum dans la prise de décision politique ?
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