Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and particularly, Denmark; based on conference paper. Focuses on the breakdown of detente and increasing pressures on the European NATO members, changes in public opinion, transnational cooperation between political parties and social movements, and developments in Social Democratic perceptions.
Petersen, N. The Security Policies of Small NATO Countries: Factors of Change. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIII, 1988, 145-162. During the 1980s the traditional security policies of the smaller NATO countries in Northwest Europe have been under considerable stress. Policy changes have been most profound in Denmark, but similar trends have been evidenced in Norway, Holland and Belgium. Based on a simple analytical framework the article analyses the nature of these trends, mostly in the Danish case, and their background in domestic, transnational as well as systemic factors. Security policy values have changed, especially with respect to nuclear weapons; the policy process has become more complex and conflictual, and resulting policies have deviated from the old alliance loyalty of these countries. Among explanatory factors the article focuses on the breakdown of detente and increasing pressures on the European NATO members which were especially onerous for the small countries, changes in public opinion, transnational cooperation between political parties and social movements, and developments in Social Demo cratic perceptions. Even though some of these factors have been eclipsed by the present era of renewed detente, the adaptation of the small NATO countries to it is likely to be conditioned by the significant changes in perceptions, processes and policies which occurred in the 1980s.
Petersen, N. Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in Europe 1948-1951. Cooperation and Conflict, XXI, 1986, 169-186. The article analyses Danish attitudes towards NATO integration in the early years of the alliance in a perspective derived from alliance theory. In particular, Glenn Snyder's hypotheses on the motivations which drive the 'alliance game', i.e. intra-alliance relations, are utilized in analysing the Danish Government's reaction to the US proposal of September 1950 to create a joint, integrated force including German contingents for the defence of Western Europe. It is shown that both fears of 'entrapment' in the alliance and fears of 'abandonment' by the Allies played a significant role in the deliberations of Danish decision-makers, but that the fear of abandonment or, expressed positively, the demand for security outweighed both fears of losing freedom of action and fears of a German rearmament. The article highlights especially the role which Denmark's practically undefended border to the south played in the formulation of security policy in the 1950s.
Bargaining power is a somewhat neglected concept in the study of international negotiations. Who comes on top in the negotiating process and why, i.e. its power or influence aspect, has never been a central perspective of negotiation theorists. The 'classical' negotiation theorists of the 1960s1 make only passing references to the effects of differences in power resources on international negotiations, and even though more recent works pay considerably more attention to such variables,2 they can hardly be said to be central to the field. Nor has bargaining as a particular instance of the exercise of power been an important preoccupation of power theorists. Perhaps for these very reasons, the concept has remained a rather tricky one, often being used as an ad hoc or residual factor to 'explain' what cannot otherwise be accounted for. However, Christer Jönsson has argued that 'focussing on bargaining power promises to be… an avenue to further clarification of the perennially elusive concept of power'.3 To what extent what he calls the 'bridge-building and cross-fertilization between power analysis and bargaining studies'4 may also contribute to a better understanding of international negotiations, is an empirical question to which this article will attempt to give at least a preliminary answer.
The rise of the peace movements in the West can be interpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of ex isting party systems, and in particular the Social Democratic parties. But the parties still control the policy-making process, and if they want to make an impact on official policy, the peace movements will therefore have to work, directly or indirectly, through the party system and especially through the Social Democratic parties. The question is whether the peace movements are optimally structured for influen cing the policy process. The present article discusses these paradoxes through an analysis of the political impact of the Danish peace movement. First a short sketch is presented of the century-old relationship between the movement and the Danish policy-making establishment. Next, a structural analysis of the 'new' peace movement discusses its strengths and weaknesses as well as its chosen strategies for in fluence. Finally, a case study is presented of the political impact of the peace movement on the policies of the Social Democratic party since 1980.
Scandilux ist ein neues und wenig bekanntes sicherheitspolitisches Forum der Sozialdemokratischen und Sozialistischen Parteien der kleinen NATO-Partner Skandinaviens und der Benelux-Staaten (mit Beobachtern aus Frankreich, Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), die bedeutenden Einfluß auf die Sicherheitspolitik ihrer Länder haben. Artikel, der auf Interviews mit Teilnehmern beruht, zeigt den Hintergrund von Scandilux und analysiert die wesentlichen Merkmale des Forums durch Austausch von Informationen, erörtert politische Alternativen und behandelt politische Formulierungen. Besonders analysiert werden die Diskussionen über den Bereich von INF mit spezifischem Bezug auf die Politik der dänischen Sozialdemokratischen Partei. Schließlich werden die zukünftigen Aussichten von Scandilux dargestellt. (BIOst-BwD/Hie)