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The intensification of the Cold War in the 1980s bred tensions within both the NATO alliance and its member states. Criticism of NATO's policy was pronounced among the social democratic parties in Northern Europe and found extraordinary expression in Denmark during the so-called footnote period of 1982-88. Here a coalition of centre-left opposition parties was able to control NATO policy by way of parliamentary resolutions which forced the government to take increasingly critical positions in NATO, mainly by 'footnoting' communiques. The government chose to 'live with' footnoting in order to keep power. The result was domestic strife, allied criticism and a policy which moved Denmark away from NATO's mainstream. Adapted from the source document.

This article discusses the so-called polar strategy of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1958, when SAC decided to build Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, until 1968, when Airborne Alert flights over Greenland were abandoned after a fully armed B-52 crashed near Thule. The article traces the implementation of the polar strategy from a "bottom-up" perspective, concentrating on deployments and rotations to Thule and training missions and operations out of Thule. The analysis, based on U.S. Air Force unit histories and Danish military reports, shows that the early polar strategy operated under difficult conditions but gradually became more feasible. In 1957 the strategy was implemented at Thule, but paradoxically it did not come to full fruition until the introduction of the B-52, which was not dependent on support from Thule. By 1960, SAC had left Thule, the emblem of the early polar strategy, but SAC bombers continued to fly missions in Greenland's airspace until 1968.

This article discusses the so-called polar strategy of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1958, when SAC decided to build Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, until 1968, when Airborne Alert flights over Greenland were abandoned after a fully armed B-52 crashed near Thule. The article traces the implementation of the polar strategy from a "bottom-up" perspective, concentrating on deployments and rotations to Thule and training missions and operations out of Thule. The analysis, based on U.S. Air Force unit histories and Danish military reports, shows that the early polar strategy operated under difficult conditions but gradually became more feasible. In 1957 the strategy was implemented at Thule, but paradoxically it did not come to full fruition until the introduction of the B-52, which was not dependent on support from Thule. By 1960, SAC had left Thule, the emblem of the early polar strategy, but SAC bombers continued to fly missions in Greenland's airspace until 1968. Adapted from the source document.

During its long history, Denmark was able to pursue dominant foreign policy in her historical great power roles, while balancing normally was linked with her roles as a medium power. Until the 17th century, a policy of moderate dominance was the prevailing foreign policy mode, to be followed by a balancing mode, which lasted till 1864. The stunning defeat in that war reduced Danish option to a difficult choice between acquiescence and quiescence. Both are typical small state postures because of the lack of influence, but they differ on the sensitivity variable. The sensitive small state must adapt actively or passively to outside pressures, while the less sensitive small state may succeed in dodging situations where acquiescent adaptation would be required. Adapted from the source document.

The article attempts to fill a lacuna in integration theory by developing a theory of national integration policy. It argues that integrating states face an integration dilemma, which they handle by various coping strategies. The article applies adaptation theory to explore these strategies and the general policy modes in which they are embedded. It argues that balancing, i.e. a 'give and take' approach, is the most likely policy mode, but that other defensive or offensive strategies may also be used. The argument is illustrated by an analysis of Denmark's integration policy. (Journal of Common Market Studies / FUB)

Since 1951 a Danish‐American defense agreement on Greenland has regulated US military activities there. The article gives a detailed empirical‐theoretical analysis of the negotiation of the Agreement under five perspectives: bargaining power, agenda setting, negotiating positions, strategies and outcomes. An important parameter was the fact that negotiations took place in a cooperative setting with a long shadow of the future. This made for a skewed, though regular negotiation process with a give‐and‐take of positions, counter‐positions and concessions. Negotiating strategies varied, with the US side concentrating on an "authority" strategy, while the Danes relied on a mixture of off‐setting "moral" and "tied hands" strategies. Although the US got the best outcome, it was not a dictate, because the ground was leveled by the negotiations taking place as part of the build‐up of a long‐term security relationship and the fact that the United States was the demandeur vis‐à‐vis Denmark.

The article analyses the development of Denmark's European policy during the last decade on the basis of two theoretical approaches, Goldmann's change theory and Putnam's two-level analysis. During the period analysed, Danish policies towards European Union changed dramatically, mainly due to adaptation to external change, but learning experiences and changing policy-making setups also played a role. At the same time the formulation of Denmark's European policy was an almost paradigmatic example of the decision-makers' problems with playing simultaneously external and internal integration games and of defining `win-sets', i.e. solutions which are compatible with both their external and domestic environments.