How Can Governments of Low-Income Countries Collect More Tax Revenue?
In: ICTD Working Paper 70
In: ICTD Working Paper 70
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Working paper
In: ICTD Working Paper 66
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Working paper
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 80, S. 48-60
In: British journal of political science, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 427-457
ISSN: 1469-2112
Studies of political budget cycles in developing countries have generally sought to inform understanding of short-term fiscal dynamics, but can also offer unique insight into broader political dynamics in developing countries. This article correspondingly employs markedly improved data in order to study the impact of elections on tax collection, and draw broader lessons. It shows that while electionsas a grouphave had no significant effect on tax collection, the subset ofcompetitive electionshas had a significant negative impact on pre-election tax collection; while this effect appears to be largest where incumbents are particularly unpopular. This provides powerful evidence that the impact of elections on political incentives in developing countries is conditioned by the existence of an electorally competitive opposition, while offering preliminary evidence that popular resistance to taxation by unpopular governments may be an important means by which taxpayers may generate pressure for improved governance.
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1704-1721
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1759-1775
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: The journal of development studies, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1759-1775
ISSN: 1743-9140
This paper explains the persistence of a tax system characterised by low revenue collection and extensive informality in Bangladesh. It combines analysis of long-term formal and informal institutions and of micro-level incentives shaping negotiation of short-term reform. The system is unusually informal, discretionary, and corrupt, but remains resistant to change because it delivers low and predictable tax rates to business, extensive opportunities for corruption to the tax administration, and an important vehicle for fundraising by political leaders and rent distribution to their elite supporters. We then explore the dynamics of micro-level reform and external pressure within the constraints of this overarching political bargain.
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In: The journal of development studies, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1704-1721
ISSN: 1743-9140
In: ICTD/UNU-Wider Working Paper 2016/155
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Working paper