Crucible of beliefs: learning, alliances, and world wars
In: Cornell studies in security affairs
20 Ergebnisse
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In: Cornell studies in security affairs
In: The journal of politics, Band 59, Heft 02, S. 640
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 39-62
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: International Security, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 5
In: International security, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 5-34
ISSN: 0162-2889
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 490-526
ISSN: 1086-3338
This article presents and tests a theory of learning in international politics. Drawing primarily from social psychology and organization theory, the learning theory proposes that lessons tend to be drawn only from high-impact events in world politics, such as large wars and economic depressions. Lessons drawn tend to be simple and are oriented around the question of which policies are likely to be successful and which policies are likely to fail. This learning theory is tested on the alliance choices of small powers in the twentieth century. The predictions of two learning hypotheses are compared with those of a leading realist explanation of alliance choices, balance of threat theory. Quantitative analysis of small powers' alliance choices reveals that a small power's experience in the previous world war is a very powerful explanation of its peacetime alliance choices after that war, whereas the level of threat in the international environment has only marginal effects on the small power's alliance choices. Further, these threat effects may be in the opposite direction of that predicted by balance of threat theory.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 490-526
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 4, S. 981
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 640
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 75, Heft 4, S. 138
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 377-389
ISSN: 0003-0554
How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: Mershon International Studies Review, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 127
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 112, Heft 2, S. 329
ISSN: 0032-3195
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 42, Heft 3, S. 259-277
ISSN: 1552-8766
Why do democracies win the wars they fight? The authors explore this question by examining whether the armies of democratic states fight with higher military effectiveness on the battlefield, testing two general propositions: that the higher legitimacy of democratic states spurs superior individual soldiering and that democratic militaries are likely to have higher organizational efficacy. The authors test their propositions on a comprehensive set of major battles from 1800 to 1982, using data compiled by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. The authors find that the armies of democratic states tend to fight with marginally better logistics, substantially better initiative, and superior leadership. They also find that all three of these advantages dwindle as wars lengthen and interpret the results as indicating that although soldiers are not more willing to die for democratic governments, the emphasis on individual initiative in democratic culture generates important advantages on the battlefield.
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 377-389
ISSN: 1537-5943
How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability.