Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen
In: International Security, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 5
In: International Security, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 5
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 490-526
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 490-526
ISSN: 1086-3338
This article presents and tests a theory of learning in international politics. Drawing primarily from social psychology and organization theory, the learning theory proposes that lessons tend to be drawn only from high-impact events in world politics, such as large wars and economic depressions. Lessons drawn tend to be simple and are oriented around the question of which policies are likely to be successful and which policies are likely to fail. This learning theory is tested on the alliance choices of small powers in the twentieth century. The predictions of two learning hypotheses are compared with those of a leading realist explanation of alliance choices, balance of threat theory. Quantitative analysis of small powers' alliance choices reveals that a small power's experience in the previous world war is a very powerful explanation of its peacetime alliance choices after that war, whereas the level of threat in the international environment has only marginal effects on the small power's alliance choices. Further, these threat effects may be in the opposite direction of that predicted by balance of threat theory.
The 2002 National Security Strategy suggested preventive attacks, diplomacy, deterrence, and other policies as means of curtailing threats presented by the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons to terrorists and rogue states. The author analyzes which mix of these policies might best and most cost effectively address the NBC threat, with special focus on preventive attacks. The past performances of preventive attacks, diplomacy, deterrence, and other policies as means of curtailing the NBC threat are analyzed. The central findings are that preventive attacks are generally unsuccessful at delaying the spread of NBC weapons; that deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, is highly successful at preventing the use of NBC weapons by states; and that diplomacy has had moderate and perhaps unappreciated success at curtailing the spread of NBC weapons. The author also discusses how funds spent on preventive wars, which are much more expensive than diplomacy or deterrence, might be better spent to combat threats from terrorism and proliferation, on initiatives such as fissile material recovery, ballistic missile defense, and port security. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1713/thumbnail.jpg
BASE
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 49, Heft 6, S. 904-934
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Journal of human rights, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 399-418
ISSN: 1475-4843
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 59-77
ISSN: 1460-3667
We analyze a model of leader gender and crisis bargaining under asymmetric information. There are no essential differences between the sexes in their willingness to use force, but sexist leaders receive a subjective boost for defeating female leaders in war and pay a subjective cost for defeat. We show that this hostile sexism can lead to war for two reasons, first by offering sufficient private benefits to make peace impossible and second by influencing an uninformed leader's willingness to risk war. We also show that (a) the effect of leader sex on disputes and war depends on the distribution of power, (b) sexist leaders may initiate disputes at less favorable distributions of power than non-sexist leaders, and (c) sexist leaders adopt bargaining strategies that make it difficult for women to cultivate and benefit from reputations for resolve, even in the absence of sex differences in the willingness to use force.
In: Foreign policy analysis, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 490-511
ISSN: 1743-8594
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 5, S. 854-880
ISSN: 1552-8766
Governments are concerned about the dangers posed by ballistic missiles. However, there is almost no theoretical or empirical scholarship on ballistic missiles. This article presents and tests the conventional wisdom that the spread of ballistic missiles makes conflict more likely. Original data on ballistic missiles and on crisis initiation is collected, and analysis using a variety of statistical models is conducted. It is found that among all directed dyads from 1946 to 2007, potential challengers possessing ballistic missiles are significantly more likely to initiate international crises. Further, potential targets armed with ballistic missiles are significantly less likely to be challenged. Crises are less likely to escalate when targets are armed with missiles. The results are obtained after accounting for several control variables. Analysis reveals that the findings are not affected by possible endogeneity bias. The analysis also reveals complex interactive effects between ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons on the onset of international crises. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 5, S. 854-880
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 5, S. 854-880
ISSN: 1552-8766
Governments are concerned about the dangers posed by ballistic missiles. However, there is almost no theoretical or empirical scholarship on ballistic missiles. This article presents and tests the conventional wisdom that the spread of ballistic missiles makes conflict more likely. Original data on ballistic missiles and on crisis initiation is collected, and analysis using a variety of statistical models is conducted. It is found that among all directed dyads from 1946 to 2007, potential challengers possessing ballistic missiles are significantly more likely to initiate international crises. Further, potential targets armed with ballistic missiles are significantly less likely to be challenged. Crises are less likely to escalate when targets are armed with missiles. The results are obtained after accounting for several control variables. Analysis reveals that the findings are not affected by possible endogeneity bias. The analysis also reveals complex interactive effects between ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons on the onset of international crises.
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 453-475
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article proposes that foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target's political institutions as well as leadership. Using rare events logit to analyse civil war onset from 1920 to 2004, it is found that interstate war and institutional change are virtually necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for an FIRC to cause a civil war. Many control variables are included. The results are robust to different research design specifications; nevertheless, they cannot confirm that occupation troops make an FIRC more likely to spark civil war. Adapted from the source document.
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 453-475
ISSN: 0007-1234
This article proposes that foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target's political institutions as well as leadership. Using rare events logit to analyse civil war onset from 1920 to 2004, it is found that interstate war and institutional change are virtually necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for an FIRC to cause a civil war. Many control variables are included. The results are robust to different research design specifications; nevertheless, they cannot confirm that occupation troops make an FIRC more likely to spark civil war. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 453-476
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 453-475
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article proposes that foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target's political institutions as well as leadership. Using rare events logit to analyse civil war onset from 1920 to 2004, it is found that interstate war and institutional change are virtually necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for an FIRC to cause a civil war. Many control variables are included. The results are robust to different research design specifications; nevertheless, they cannot confirm that occupation troops make an FIRC more likely to spark civil war.