Welche Verfassungsordnung für Europas 'erste Gemeinschaft'?
In: Demokratie und Frieden in Europa, 1
In: Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, 37
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In: Demokratie und Frieden in Europa, 1
In: Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, 37
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 203-226
ISSN: 0021-9886
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 8, Heft 5, S. 673-708
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Political studies, Band 49, Heft 5, S. 1081-1082
ISSN: 0032-3217
In: Integration: Vierteljahreszeitschrift des Instituts für Europäische Politik in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 323-77
ISSN: 0720-5120
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 8, Heft 5, S. 673-708
ISSN: 1350-1763
In: Political studies, Band 49, Heft 5, S. 1080
ISSN: 0032-3217
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 554-575
ISSN: 1350-1763
The model of EU legislative politics developed by Garrett & Tsebelis has served as the main reference point for scholars studying the EU legislative process. It stipulates that the preferences of actors in the EU legislative process (the member states, the European Parliament, & the Commission) are distributed one-dimensionally along a more-less integration continuum. Furthermore, the Garrett-Tsebelis model predicts that under the rules governing the co-decision introduced at Maastricht, the European Parliament will be systematically worse off than under the revisions of the cooperation procedure & will, as a result, invariably accept any legislation proposed by the pivotal Council member state. This article argues that the Garrett-Tsebelis model falls short of explaining why the European Parliament sometimes rejects legislation. It also demonstrates that the European Parliament may actually be more influential under the co-decision procedure than Garrett & Tsebelis suggest. By analyzing different directives that are subject to the co-decision procedure -- thus keeping the institutional rules of co-decision constant -- it can be demonstrated that actors' time horizons (their levels of impatience) & the type & salience of issue-dimensions (more or less integration, left-right, changes in institutional rules) exercise independent effects on legislators' influence & on legislative outcomes. This article thus explains cases otherwise unexplained by the "standard version.". 1 Figure, 52 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 554-575
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 10, Heft 6, S. 857-857
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 10, Heft 6, S. 858-883
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 445-473
ISSN: 0021-9886
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 10, Heft 6, S. 1020-1032
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Public administration: an international quarterly, Band 81, Heft 3, S. 575-606
ISSN: 0033-3298
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 10, Heft 6, S. 858-883
ISSN: 1350-1763