Suchergebnisse

AbstractWhile the Lisbon Treaty has been heralded as victory for the European Parliament, the crisis‐related reforms of the European Union's economic governance regime are commonly being considered to have empowered governments and supranational institutions – such as the Commission and ECB – at the expense of the EP and national parliaments. This article argues that the picture is more nuanced than suggested by the conventional wisdom: legitimacy‐seeking and interinstitutional bargaining arguments, which have been applied effectively to account for the expansion of the EP's power in the past, highlight the conditions under which the EP's struggle for more institutional power is either met with success (as in the case of the single supervisory mechanism) or faces virtually insurmountable obstacles (as in the case of the Troika and the European Stability Mechanism).

Representative democracy has been accorded constitutional status with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament (EP) and the history of its empowerment embody this constitutional principle and its gradual institutionalization. To shed light on the EP's empowerment and the institutionalization of the principle of representative democracy in the EU, this article adopts a 'domain of application' approach. Instead of presenting rival theoretical approaches competing for explanatory superiority, the article shows that a more comprehensive picture of the EP's empowerment can be obtained by distinguishing between three types of institutional choice and associated explanations. Institutional creation, institutional change and institutional use are introduced as different types of institutional choice, and it is argued that each type gives primacy to particular explanatory mechanisms and dynamics to analyze the EP's empowerment. Adapted from the source document.

The rapid proliferation of EU agencies represents one of the most significant changes to the EU's organisational set-up in past decades. At the same time, this development has significantly affected regulatory policy-making in the EU.This volume assembles the most renowned scholars in the field to address the key themes and challenges that agency governance in the EU poses to effective and legitimate policy-making. The first theme addresses the causes and dynamics of the creation and design of regulatory bodies in EU governance, focusing not only on EU agencies but also on alternatives to the