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Abstract
The concepts of stigma and stigmatization have recently made inroads into IR. However, scholarship on stigmatization has primarily focused on discrete instances of stigmatization and stigma management for the purposes of comparison. Less has been written about how the dynamics of stigmatization processes can alter over time as actors change stigma-management tactics and stigmatization varies in intensity, and the effect this may have on social norms. To that end, this article introduces a distinction between direct and diffuse forms of stigmatization that, when combined with different forms of stigma management, lead to changes in stigma dynamics over time. It applies this distinction to Russian stigma management vis-à-vis liberal international order, specifically the norms of democracy and human rights that constitute a "normal" for states to aspire to, any deviance from which requires stigma management. By outlining the interactive process of Russia's stigma management in relation to these norms since the end of the Cold War, and the degrees of direct and diffuse stigmatization of Russia by the norms' promoters, the article also seeks to make a contribution to work on the crisis of liberal international order, aligning itself with contributions focused on the co-constitution of order through processes of ordering. The article proposes that stigmatization is a constitutive mechanism of liberal ordering and that some of the explanation for the supposed crisis of liberal order is the alteration of international stigma dynamics.

Why does stigmatization sometimes fail? The literature on stigma in international relations has done an excellent job of pointing to the role successful stigmatization processes play in the construction and maintenance of normative hierarchies, but there has been far less exploration of the conditions under which they may fail in this purpose and the potential consequences for international security and society. This article contributes such an exploration by focusing on the attempted stigma imposition on Russia following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and support for the insurgency in eastern Ukraine. While Russia was stigmatized as an aggressor by a significant part of international society, including through diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, this failed to deter further Russian aggression, as demonstrated by its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and thus to reinforce the norm of territorial integrity. The article investigates the reasons for this failure, locating them both in insufficient stigma imposition—the difficulty in building and maintaining a committed "audience of normals" and to impose strong enough status loss and material costs—and to some extent in Russia's counter-stigmatizing stigma management. In conclusion, it considers what could in theory be done differently for stigma imposition to "work," and calls for further research on the connections between stigma and emotion, as a core under-researched factor in the stigma literature.

The concepts of stigma and stigmatization have recently made inroads into IR. However, scholarship on stigmatization has primarily focused on discrete instances of stigmatization and stigma management for the purposes of comparison. Less has been written about how the dynamics of stigmatization processes can alter over time as actors change stigma-management tactics and stigmatization varies in intensity, and the effect this may have on social norms. To that end, this article introduces a distinction between direct and diffuse forms of stigmatization that, when combined with different forms of stigma management, lead to changes in stigma dynamics over time. It applies this distinction to Russian stigma management vis-à-vis liberal international order, specifically the norms of democracy and human rights that constitute a "normal" for states to aspire to, any deviance from which requires stigma management. By outlining the interactive process of Russia's stigma management in relation to these norms since the end of the Cold War, and the degrees of direct and diffuse stigmatization of Russia by the norms' promoters, the article also seeks to make a contribution to work on the crisis of liberal international order, aligning itself with contributions focused on the co-constitution of order through processes of ordering. The article proposes that stigmatization is a constitutive mechanism of liberal ordering and that some of the explanation for the supposed crisis of liberal order is the alteration of international stigma dynamics.

Abstract
The 2016 Brexit referendum reignited debate on the UK's international role. Yet the stakes were complex, since neither side challenged Britain's global leadership role or its strong ties with non-European partners. Research on role contestation has thus struggled to account for the politics of Brexit, focusing instead on non-role-based conflict. We argue that Brexit debates can be understood by reference to second-order role contestation where role compatibility itself is the subject of political disagreements, a phenomenon role theory scholarship has missed by studying role conflict and role contestation in isolation. We distinguish between inclusive and exclusive second-order conceptions, which capture the respective positions of the Leave and Remain campaigns regarding Britain's European role and its relation to other (shared) roles. Our argument shows that role conflict is often contested politically and that role contestation operates at higher levels of abstraction than conventionally acknowledged.

Abstract
This article analyses the discursive constitution and contestation of British 'greatness' during the campaigns for the 1975 referendum on UK membership of the European Communities and the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union. It finds that ideas about British greatness formed a central part of the discourse on Britain's role in the world on both sides in each campaign, joining recent literature on Brexit challenging the view that greatness has been primarily a right-wing preoccupation. By demonstrating the existence of distinct yet overlapping discourses of greatness, the article also adds nuance to accounts of the centrality of greatness to British foreign policy identity. The article employs a discourse-theoretical approach to uncover the central discursive 'nodal points' and the 'floating signifiers' of greatness claimed by each side. Empirically, it draws on a collection of campaign materials from both referendums.