À propos de la lecture de deux modèles théoriques de négociation
In: Négociations, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 23
ISSN: 1782-1452
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In: Négociations, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 23
ISSN: 1782-1452
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 523, S. 1243-1259
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 116, Heft 510, S. C1-C9
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of political economy, Band 101, Heft 3, S. 473-484
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 101, Heft 3, S. 473
ISSN: 0022-3808
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 131, Heft 638, S. 2629-2641
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group's harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.
In: American economic review, Band 105, Heft 8, S. 2570-2594
ISSN: 1944-7981
We propose a new abstract definition of equilibrium in the spirit of competitive equilibrium: a profile of alternatives and a public ordering (expressing prestige, price, or a social norm) such that each agent prefers his assigned alternative to all lower-ranked ones. The equilibrium operates in an abstract setting built upon a concept of convexity borrowed from convex geometry. We apply the concept to a variety of convex economies and relate it to Pareto optimality. The "magic" of linear equilibrium prices is put into perspective by establishing an analogy between linear functions in the standard convexity and "primitive orderings" in the abstract convexity. (JEL I11, I18, J44, K13)
In: Journal of political economy, Band 120, Heft 6, S. 1057-1082
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: American economic review, Band 102, Heft 7, S. 3561-3573
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study experimentally a new two-player game: each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player, he receives an additional 20 shekels. Level-k reasoning is appealing due to the natural starting point (requesting 20) and the straightforward best-response operation. Nevertheless, almost all subjects exhibit at most three levels of reasoning. Two variants of the game demonstrate that the depth of reasoning is not increased by enhancing the attractiveness of the level-0 strategy or by reducing the cost of undercutting the other player.
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 522, S. 883-896
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 205-209
In: Economica, Band 56, Heft 223, S. 401
In: Public choice, Band 36, Heft 1
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 726