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The Restatement of the Law (Fourth): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States is a monumental work, which, just like the Restatement (Third), may prove influential abroad. This also applies to its restatement of the law of jurisdiction. The clarity of the relevant chapters on jurisdiction, including the reporters' notes, is admirable. Comparing the Restatement (Third) to the Restatement (Fourth), it is striking that the latter places greater emphasis on US law-based jurisdictional limitations. The relevance of the customary international law of jurisdiction has correspondingly diminished, especially in regard to jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate. This commentary critiques this shift towards jurisdictional 'parochialism'. It singles out (i) the drafters' characterization of the principle of jurisdictional reasonableness as a principle of US statutory interpretation (prescriptive comity) rather than a customary international law norm limiting prescriptive jurisdiction and (ii) the drafters' view that the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction is not constrained by customary international law.

The Restatement of the Law (Fourth): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States is a monumental work, which, just like the Restatement (Third), may prove influential abroad. This also applies to its restatement of the law of jurisdiction. The clarity of the relevant chapters on jurisdiction, including the reporters' notes, is admirable. Comparing the Restatement (Third) to the Restatement (Fourth), it is striking that the latter places greater emphasis on US law-based jurisdictional limitations. The relevance of the customary international law of jurisdiction has correspondingly diminished, especially in regard to jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate. This commentary critiques this shift towards jurisdictional 'parochialism'. It singles out (i) the drafters' characterization of the principle of jurisdictional reasonableness as a principle of US statutory interpretation (prescriptive comity) rather than a customary international law norm limiting prescriptive jurisdiction and (ii) the drafters' view that the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction is not constrained by customary international law.

In two decisions of 2019, the Dutch courts have come up with novel interpretations of the 'control-based' standard of attribution in the international law of State responsibility. This is a standard of attribution that is laid down in Article 8 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which is, by and large, reflective of customary international law. The traditional understanding of Article 8 ARSIWA is that it applies to relations between States and private persons or entities, in particular armed groups: conduct of a non-State armed group is attributed to a State to the extent that the State exercises control over that group. However, the Dutch courts have extended the scope of application of Article 8 ARSIWA to conduct of organs of international organisations (the UN) as well as foreign States (i.e., States other than the Netherlands). Internationally speaking, this is a novel interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, for which there are no precedents. After introducing the Dutch courts' reasoning in these cases, the contribution zooms out and inquires what the Dutch evolutions imply for the development of the controlbased attribution standard in the international law of State responsibility. The author argues that the relatively peculiar interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, as applying to interactions between States and international organisations and between States inter se, is practically viable in a narrow range of scenarios characterised by relatively strong politico-military relations and hierarchies.

In two decisions of 2019, the Dutch courts have come up with novel interpretations of the 'control-based' standard of attribution in the international law of State responsibility. This is a standard of attribution that is laid down in Article 8 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which is, by and large, reflective of customary international law. The traditional understanding of Article 8 ARSIWA is that it applies to relations between States and private persons or entities, in particular armed groups: conduct of a non-State armed group is attributed to a State to the extent that the State exercises control over that group. However, the Dutch courts have extended the scope of application of Article 8 ARSIWA to conduct of organs of international organisations (the UN) as well as foreign States (i.e., States other than the Netherlands). Internationally speaking, this is a novel interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, for which there are no precedents. After introducing the Dutch courts' reasoning in these cases, the contribution zooms out and inquires what the Dutch evolutions imply for the development of the controlbased attribution standard in the international law of State responsibility. The author argues that the relatively peculiar interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, as applying to interactions between States and international organisations and between States inter se, is practically viable in a narrow range of scenarios characterised by relatively strong politico-military relations and hierarchies.

In Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom, the European Court on Human Rights clarified the scope ratione loci of the European Convention on Human Rights. Without fully abandoning the territorial concept of jurisdiction, which it had affirmed in the 2001 Bankovic decision, the Court inched somewhat closer to the personal model of jurisdiction. After Al-Skeini, an ECHR Contracting State's exercise of public powers over a given territory, even in the absence of full effective control, may bring persons present in that territory within the State's jurisdiction. The Court did not, however, pronounce itself on the applicability of the ECHR in case (agents of ) a Contracting State exercise governmental authority over persons abroad without exercising public powers over the territory where these persons are located.

One of the main tools for 'socializing' private military contractors (PMCs) is litigation. The threat of litigation may encourage contractors to set up their own corporate social responsibility and accountability mechanisms with a view to preventing them being hauled before courts. The article identifies the jurisdictional opportunities and pitfalls of criminal (public law) and civil/tort (private law) litigation against PMCs in domestic courts. The focus lies on litigation for human rights abuses, with special emphasis on US proceedings, the US being the home and hiring state of the majority of PMCs active in overseas conflict zones. It is argued that, because the chances of success of tort litigation are, in fact, rather limited in the US, given the many procedural obstacles, the criminal law avenue may prove to be more promising, if at least prosecutors show more leadership in bringing cases. Also at a deeper accountability level, criminal litigation may be preferable on the ground that criminal punishment sends a stronger accountability and deterrence signal than a mere money judgment. ; The 'Regulating Privatisation of "War": The Role of the EU in Assuring the Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights" (PRIV-WAR) project is funded by the European Community's 7th Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 217405.

In this article, it is argued that Member States do not normally incur liability for damages caused by acts of the international organizations of which they are members. Deciding otherwise may endanger the autonomy and separate legal personality of the organization. Member State liability can only be found in cases in which some intervening state conduct can be established, as is laid down in Part V of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, drawn up by the International Law Commission in 2009. A strict interpretation of the principle that the organizational veil should not be pierced may prevent Member State intervention in the affairs of the organization, and thus strengthen the latter's autonomy vis-à-vis its Member States. However, in order to do justice to the legitimate claims of third parties adversely affected by the conduct of the organization, and to rebuff attempts at making Member States liable for such conduct, it is highly desirable that the organization puts in place adequate claims commissions and dispute-settlement mechanisms that are easily accessible to third parties.