Suchergebnisse

While it might have been viable for states to isolate themselves from international politics in the nineteenth century, the intensity of economic and social globalisation in the twenty-first century has made this impossible. The contemporary world is an international world - a world of collective security systems and collective trade agreements. What does this mean for the sovereign state and 'its' international legal order? Two alternative approaches to the problem of 'governance' in the era of globalisation have developed in the twentieth century: universal internationalism and regional supranationalism. The first approaches collective action problems from the perspective of the 'sovereign equality' of all States. A second approach to transnational 'governance' has tried to re-build majoritarian governmental structures at the regional scale. This collection of essays wishes to analyse - and contrast - the two types of normative and decisional answers that have emerged as responses to the 'international' problems within our globalised world

This fully updated text is a collection of the essential primary and secondary law of the European Union that quickly and effectively guides students to the material they need during exams and lectures. Part I contains the European Union's primary law in consolidated form. Part II offers a selection of the essential pieces of European Union legislation in five core areas of particular importance to undergraduate and graduate studies, namely: the EU institutions, the internal market, competition law, social policy and consumer protection. Lisbon numbering is used throughout, and colour-coded content will facilitate easy navigation. An annex contains all relevant UK statutes - from the 1972 European Communities Act to the 2017 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. This update takes Brexit into account, with a new section providing an overview of the Brexit relevant British statutes.

What are the different market philosophies or models that shape the European Union's internal market? This work proposes three models: an international model, a federal model and a national model; and argues that the structure of the EU internal market has moved from an international to federal model

What is the federal philosophy underlying the law-making function in the European Union? Which federal model best characterizes the European Union? This book analyses and demonstrates how the European legal order evolved from a dual federalism towards a cooperative federalist philosophy

AbstractFrom the start, Britain's feelings towards European integration were complex; and when Britain finally joined the 'common market' in 1973, its reasons were predominantly of an economic nature. Its profound doubts of any 'federal' or 'political' union would become a recurring theme throughout its membership; and, in later years, Britain's critical attitude towards transfers of legislative powers to the European Union found numerous expressions in a wide range of 'opt‐outs'. They gave the United Kingdom, in the words of the British government, a unique place within the Union. However, even this halfway house 'inside' and 'outside' the European Union could not prevent a British referendum in which the majority of British citizens decided to opt out of Union membership altogether. This article offers a very short historical overview of British membership in the Union. Six key moments in the story of British membership will illustrate the complex relationship between Britain and the European Union.

Abstract
Are the trade philosophies behind the EU internal market and the WTO international market converging or diverging; and are we, or are we not, moving towards a 'common law of international trade'? Twenty years ago, an interesting—and swiftly famous—answer to this question was given by Joseph H.H. Weiler. Studying the 'constitution of the common market', the historical evolution of free movement law is here divided into five periods or generations. The underlying Weiler thesis is thereby as simple as it is beautiful: starting with an early radical philosophy in Dassonville, the European Union has gradually and consistently moved away from its original hyper-liberal approach towards an ever more deferential approach; and the transformation of Article 34 TFEU into a discrimination format ultimately leads to a convergence with international law. What are the empirical and normative credentials of this stylised construction of the internal market? This article argues that there are fundamental shortcomings in this standard interpretation of the evolution of the internal market, and that a historical reconstruction arrives at a very different empirical and normative picture. What can this 'revisionist' result mean for EU law scholarship in general? If EU constitutionalism wishes to 're-constitute' its object of study properly, it needs to abandon the abstract ways of philosophizing that have become commonplace in the last 25 years. Part and parcel of this methodological renaissance must be a renewed commitment to test (constitutional) theory against (judicial) practice.

AbstractClassic constitutional thought considered the power to conclude international treaties to fall within the executive's exclusive domain. But this nineteenth‐century logic hardly convinces in the twenty‐first century. For the function of international treaties has dramatically shifted from the military to the regulatory domain; and in the wake of this 'new internationalism', the traditional divide between 'internal' and 'external' affairs has increasingly disappeared. Has this enlarged scope of the treaty power also triggered a transformation of its nature; and in particular: has the rise of 'legislative' international treaties been compensated by a greater role accorded to parliaments? This article explores this question comparatively by looking at the constitutional law of the United States and the European Union. Within the United States, international treaties were traditionally concluded under a procedure that excluded the House of Representatives; yet with the rise of the Congressional‐Executive‐Agreement in the twentieth century, this democratic deficit has been partially remedied. We find a similar evolution within the context of the European Union, where an increasing 'parliamentarisation' of the treaty power has taken place. Yet a democratic deficit here nevertheless also continues to exist.

Cet article fait l'hypothèse que la théorie sui generis de l'UE est une théorie « négative » et « antihistorique ». De telles limites explicatives reposent premièrement sur une tautologie conceptuelle de base (Hay, 1966, 37) : l'UE est… . ce qu'elle est ; et elle n'est pas… . ce qu'elle n'est pas ! Deuxièmement, la théorie sui generis ne considère l'UE qu'en termes négatifs – l'UE ne serait donc ni une organisation internationale ni un État fédéral – pérennisant ainsi les fondements conceptuels de la tradition westphalienne. Quel autre type d'approche permettrait de penser de façon plus pertinente l'UE ? Cette contribution cherchera alors à expliquer dans quelle mesure le cadre fédéraliste constitue une grille de lecture pertinente afin d'interroger la nature de l'UE.

AbstractThe Union's constitutional regime for development policy has traditionally progressed alongside two parallel tracks. In addition to a general regime for all developing countries, there exists a special regime for African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP countries). The Union's general development policy originated as a flanking policy within the Common Commercial Policy. This trade-centricity was only relativised by the insertion of an express development aid competence in 1992. The Union's development cooperation competence can today be found in Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and allows the Union to adopt legislative acts or conclude international agreements to reduce poverty within developing countries. By contrast, the Union's special development regime has had a very different constitutional source. It stemmed from the 'colonial' association to the Union (quaits Member States) of certain dependent 'oversees countries and territories' for which the 1957 Treaty of Rome had provided a limited development competence. Once these countries gained independence in the 1960s, however, the Union had to transfer this special regime to its contractual association competence under Article 217 TFEU. The association regime for ACP countries has itself undergone a number of significant changes with the transition from the Lomé Convention(s) to the Cotonou Agreement.