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Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind -- PART I New Perspectives on Belief Normativity -- A Doxastic Agency and Responsibility -- 2 Implications of the Debate on Doxastic Voluntarism for W. K. Clifford's Ethics of Belief -- 3 Believing as We Ought and the Democratic Route to Knowledge -- 4 Responsibility for Doxastic Strength Grounds Responsibility for Belief -- B Reasons for Belief -- 5 Relationships and Reasons for Belief

AbstractWhy has gold persisted as a significant reserve asset despite momentous changes in international monetary relations since the collapse of the classical gold standard? IPE theories have little to say about this question. Conventional accounts of international monetary relations depict a succession of discrete monetary regimes characterized by specific power structures or dominant ideas. To explain the continuous importance of gold, we draw on insights from social psychology and new materialist theories. We argue that international monetary relations should be understood as a complex assemblage of material artifacts, institutions, ideas, and practices. For much of its history, this assemblage revolved around the pivotal practice of referencing money to gold. The centrality of gold as experienced by policymakers had important effects. Using archival and other evidence, we document these effects from the 1944 Bretton Woods conference through the transition to floating exchange rates in the mid-1970s; most IPE scholars underestimate the role of gold during this period. Power relations and economic ideas were obviously important, but they contributed little to a fundamental development: the long process of reluctantly coming to terms with the limitations of specie-backed currency, and the progressive and still ongoing decentering of gold in international monetary relations.

Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm has long been a part of ordinary parlance in political science. Aside from its role in metatheoretical debate, scholars have enlisted the paradigm concept to explain policy change, particularly in the international political economy (IPE) literature. In this context, policy paradigms are defined primarily in ideational terms and with respect to a specific domain of policymaking. We argue that this stance overstates the ideational coherence of policymaking and runs a risk of reification. We re-evaluate the paradigm concept by drawing a link to the recent literature on norm change that emphasizes the importance of practice and process. This analysis highlights theoretical difficulties in using the paradigm concept, as the relation of ideas to practical logics elides the distinctness of paradigmatic frameworks. Without clear boundaries, paradigms lose much of their analytical purchase. While the paradigm concept initially proved useful in highlighting the role of ideas, it is time to recognize its limits in explaining stability and change in policymaking.

We study optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence can give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Unlike in the case of fundamental-driven liquidity traps, there is no straightforward recipe for mitigating the welfare costs and the systematic in ation shortfall associated with expectations-driven liquidity traps. Raising the in ation target or appointing an in ation-conservative central banker improves in ation outcomes away from the lower bound but exacerbates the shortfall at the lower bound. Using government spending as an additional policy tool worsens stabilization outcomes both at and away from the lower bound. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society can eliminate expectations-driven liquidity traps altogether.