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The paper analyzes the challenge to India from China, and the dilemmas faced by India in shaping an appropriate response. A two-level theory analysis indicates that some diminishing cooperation is possible at the global level, for example over environmental issues. However, regionally, this has been overtaken structurally by increasing sharp confrontation along the Himalayas and by rising geopolitical and geo-economic competition across Asia and the Indo-Pacific. This has been overlaid in 2020–2021 by the particularly negative effect on Indian relations with China of the clashes and casualties at Galwan and the impact of Covid-19. Given this sharpening challenge, the paper finds that India's cherished axiom of full strategic autonomy now has to be tempered in its response by balancing dictates, particularly in the light of Stephen Walt's balance of threat model. India's responses pose various dilemmas in terms of effectiveness and counter-productiveness. Geopolitically, dilemmas continue to revolve for India around how far to invoke a Tibet Card and a Taiwan Card in its One China policy; and how far India can shape an immediate web (in effect around China) through strengthening security links with Vietnam, Mongolia and South Korea. Dilemmas also follow from how far India should pursue tighter security/military arrangements with more powerful China-concerned states like Australia, Japan, France, and above all, the United States. Geo-economically, India's dilemmas revolve around how to respond to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and to China's Maritime Silk Road scheme. Looking forward, an important factor will be how far India pulls away from Covid-19 disruption to the economy, and how far it will need to divert long-term economic funding away from immediate short-term military projects.

The rolling out of governing arrangements related to marketization and managerialization has characterized contemporary societies over the last decades, signaling a radical change in how governance is organized. A particular form of governing that has been given impetus during this transformation is the project. In an era of "projectification", politics is transformed into measurable and controllable activities that should be implemented during limited periods of time. The aim of this thesis is to explore how the project as an organizational form shapes Swedish development aid and makes it governable. By mobilizing the concept of assemblage, this thesis investigates how the project is constructed in order to govern development aid efforts and how it attains stability in contexts of tension. By studying how state funders, civil society organizations, and private consultants organize development aid through the project, the thesis shows that multiple components need to be assembled in order to form and sustain it. Thus, the work of brokers with the capacity to align the interests of different stakeholders, the mobilization of standardized work practices, the use of scientific approaches to control and evaluation, the construction of markets for project financing, and the mobilization of a particular form of project time are pivotal for the construction of the project. The assembling of these components transforms the project into a depoliticized form of governing in which marketization, expertise, and administrative procedures displace political and transformational ambitions. This depoliticization hampers the politicization of the colonial notions of rationality, logic, and linearity upon which the project rests. The thesis concludes that discourses of marketization, managerialization, and standardization constitute raw material from which an advanced neoliberal-modern project can be constructed. This form of governing arrangement requires attention and critique. ; The project enjoys a prominent position as a mode of governing in contemporary society. In a political landscape in which marketization and management principles exert great influence, the project has found fertile ground to thrive in, as it offers both flexibility and control. This thesis explores how the project is used to organize Swedish development aid and the political implications for transformational work. Exploring how civil society organizations, state funders, and consultants organize development work through the project, the thesis illustrates the importance of assembling a wide array of components, ranging from consensus-building among stakeholders to the mobilization of artifacts, standards, expertise, and markets. The drawing together of these components displays a high level of organizational capacity, as they stabilize the project into a depoliticized form of governing in which administration and expertise displace politics. Furthermore, depoliticization hampers the possibility to politicize the colonial notions of rationality, logic, and linearity upon which the project rests. The project, thus, reproduces power relations that are specific for modernity and neoliberal modes of governing, thereby warranting a critical approach to its use.

This article seeks to trace, explain and evaluate Japan's shift towards the 'Indo-Pacific'. It argues that Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy is one that explicitly seeks to (a) expand Japan's presence across Indo-Pacific in order to (b) openly and explicitly gain greater energy security and in order to (c) tacitly and implicitly restrain China. Stephen Walt's 'balance of threat' logic is of relevance, given its focus on 'geographic proximity' and 'perceived offensive intentions' posed by China to Japan and other states in the region. The structure of the article is threefold: (a) Indo-Pacific strategic discourse in Japan, (b) Japan's Indo-Pacific actorness, with regard to its role in regional structures and its own maritime projections across the region and (c) Japan's Indo-Pacific diplomacy, with regard to the various bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral partnerships, strategic geometry, that Japan has fashioned. The article concludes with overall evaluation of the effectiveness of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy.

President Macron talks of France's 'Indo-Pacific strategy' (une stratégie indo-pacifique). This article analyzes French strategic discourse and strategy adopted for the Indo-Pacific by France. It finds that French strategy has three main elements. Firstly it has seeks legitimacy, politically seeking to move from a colonial possessions position to democratic integration with France, and has sought to achieve regional integration and legitimacy of this. Secondly, geographically France has moved up northwards from its possessions in the Southern Indian Ocean and Southern Pacific to active maritime involvement in the northern Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Western Pacific. Thirdly, French strategy is to actively secure security partnerships with other countries in the region. Naval projection is a prominent feature of French strategy, which is a strategy which is significantly driven by China's maritime expansion across the Indo-Pacific. The article thus seeks to analyze, explain and evaluate the effectiveness of France's Indo-Pacific strategy.

This article analyses and evaluates Indonesia's grappling with the Indo-Pacific. Analysis is threefold – Indonesia's actorness in the Indo-Pacific, its strategic discourse on the Indo-Pacific, and its Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Actorness is pursued with regard to Indonesia's more active involvement in regional and subregional structures in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Strategic discourse is threefold – Natalegawa's "Indo-Pacific Treaty" concept (2013–2014), Widodo's "maritime nexus" drive (2014 onwards), and the current "Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept" (IPCC; 2018 onwards). Diplomacy is pursued with regard to Indonesia's relationship with Australia, Japan, China, India, and the United States. The article concludes that while Indonesia certainly is on the rise as an Indo-Pacific actor, its continuing naval weakness undermines Indonesia's "maritime nexus" stance, while its reluctance to challenge China leaves Indonesia's Indo-Pacific Treaty and its IPCC vague and to some degree ignoring uncomfortable security issues posed by China. A closer synergy for Indonesia with the US and Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative is suggested. (JCSA/GIGA)