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This paper presents a model to explain why both industry leaders and follower firms often invest in R&D and explores the welfare implications of these R&D investment choices. Regardless of initial conditions, the equilibrium path in this model involves gradually convergence to a balanced growth path and R&D subsidies have no effect on the balanced growth rate. Nevertheless, it is always optimal for the government to intervene by subsidizing the R&D expenditures of industry leaders and taxing the R&D expenditures of follower firms. Without government intervention, market forces generate too much creative destruction.

We use a two‐country version of the quality ladders endogenous growth model and show that free international migration raises world growth if it is driven by imbalances in labour supplies. International migration may, however, lower growth if it is induced by policy differences across, countries. Moreover, other things being equal, workers want to migrate to less populated countries, to countries that subsidize R&D less, to countries with lower tariffs, and to countries with wealthier consumers. Neither structural nor public policy differences generate any differences in growth rates across countries when tariffs are set at non‐prohibitively high levels.

A common assumption in the Schumpeterian growth literature is that the innovation size is constant and identical across industries. This is in contrast with the empirical evidence which shows that: (i) the innovation size is far from being identical across industries; a (ii) the size distribution of profit returns from innovation is highly skewed toward the low value side, with a long tail on the high value side. In the present paper, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model that is consistent with this evidence. In particular, we assume that when a firm innovates, the size of its quality improvement is the result of a random draw from a Pareto distribution. This enables us to extend the class of quality-ladder growth models to encompass firm heterogeneity. We study the policy implications of this new set-up numerically and find that it is optimal to heavily subsidize R&D for plausible parameter values. Although it is optimal to tax R&D for some parameter values,this case only occurs when the steady-state rate of economic growth is very low.