Suchergebnisse

This study focuses on the regional effects of new domestic and foreign policies initiated by Russia's president and the challenging policy dilemmas faced by regional governors since 2012. It analyzes gubernatorial elections held during 2012–2015 to show the increased control over the electoral process and the regional cadre exercised by the Kremlin. It explores the implications of new identity politics and foreign policies advanced from Moscow on regional elites' place in Russia's system of power, their governance strategies and political economies. It reviews regional adjustment strategies undertaken in response to Russia's rising economic problems.

This study focuses on the regional effects of new domestic and foreign policies initiated by Russia's president and the challenging policy dilemmas faced by regional governors since 2012. It analyzes gubernatorial elections held during 2012-2015 to show the increased control over the electoral process and the regional cadre exercised by the Kremlin. It explores the implications of new identity politics and foreign policies advanced from Moscow on regional elites' place in Russia's system of power, their governance strategies and political economies. It reviews regional adjustment strategies undertaken in response to Russia's rising economic problems.

This study argues for the need to better integrate the role of international factors, specifically global financial institutions, in order to understand the roots of institutional failures in some post-communist countries, including Russia. It explores the differential nature of policy challenges facing Western democracies and authoritarian regimes regarding their participation in the globalized financial system.

Russlands Regionalregierungen spielen eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Aufrechterhaltung der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Stabilität des Landes. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die wichtigsten Strategien der Regierung der Republik Tatarstan, mit denen die Auswirkungen der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise auf die verschiedenen Industrien und Branchen der Republik abgefedert werden sollen.

Contributing to the literature on authoritarian elite management, this study explores a puzzle concerned with the elite evolution in Russia's two ethnic republics, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The variation of political legacies left by these two republics' first presidents cannot be addressed using mainstream explanations that are usually considered principal for the Kremlin's decisionmaking on gubernatorial cadres in Russia. Both Rakhimov and Shaimiev were very successful as political bosses who could effectively deliver electoral votes to the Kremlin and maintain relative social and economic stability within their republics. Yet, toward the end of their political careers, they faced different degrees of freedom in their negotiations with federal elites and had varying degrees of success in ensuring political and economic continuity within their republics. The study instead focuses on the legacies of republican privatization and the institutional dynamics of patronal presidentialism as two alternative explanations for their divergent political outcomes.

This essay brings attention to the recent discursive turn in Russian politics that is reflected in the Kremlin's turn to issues of traditional values and morality. Expressed in Russia's domestic and foreign policies, this new "morality politics" is dated by the Pussy Riot trial in 2012 that the Kremlin used to advance its new discursive frame in the public sphere. Although not entirely new in its orientation, this new stage of "morality politics" differs from the earlier policy initiatives in its intensity, scope and political significance for the regime. The moralizing stance taken by the regime is accompanied by a divide and rule political tactic, whereby the establishment has tried to marginalize the protesters from the rest of the Russian public that the regime is attempting to reconsolidate based on traditional, conservative values. The essay interprets this recent morality turn as a strategy selected by the Kremlin to restore the regime's legitimacy that has been shaken by the protests of 2011–2012 and looks at the social and political consequences of the selected strategy.

Strong institutions and accountable governments are imperative for any country's long-term prosperity. Yet the development of such institutions has presented a continuous challenge for many countries around the world. Using Russia as a case, this study brings attention to the unexpected negative impact of global interdependence and shows that institutional arbitrage opportunities have enabled economic actors to solve for institutional weaknesses and constraints in the domestic realm by using foreign institutions, thereby limiting the emergence of a domestic rule of law regime. We argue that such opportunities lower the propensity of asset-holders, normally interested in strong institutions at home, to organize collective action to lobby for better institutions. We demonstrate the main ways through which Russia's capital-owners make use of foreign legal and financial infrastructures such as capital flight, the use of foreign corporate structures, offshore financial centers, real estate markets, the round-tripping of foreign direct investment, and reliance on foreign law in contract-writing and foreign courts in dispute-resolution.

AbstractThis study uses the latest 2011 round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for the Russian Federation to take a closer look at regional‐level factors influencing the business environment in Russia. Specifically, the study explores the role of regional administrations and variables of administrative continuity and governor origin in shaping regional business environment. The findings reveal that regional businesses in Russia are (1) acutely anxious about administrative transitions (as expressed in gubernatorial replacements) and favour administrative continuity, and (2) favour government officials that are locally embedded. The analysis suggests that many localities in Russia have witnessed the emergence of mutually beneficial state‐business arrangements that are inimical to economic competition.