Suchergebnisse

This study examines federal reforms in Putin's Russia under the framework of principal-agent model. It establishes the rationale and intended outcomes of these reforms and then describes their real consequences. The main findings bear on the nature of changes in the gubernatorial body, regional political regimes and the new challenges for the regime emerging from these reforms. The study demonstrates that (i) most governors survived this change in the first four years after the reform; (ii) the elimination of gubernatorial elections undermined political competition in the regions, forcing it away from public sphere to less transparent venues and (iii) new problems emerged as a result of reforms, particularly, the need for a systematic mechanism of cadre formation and the problem of moral hazard.

This study examines federal reforms in Putin's Russia under the framework of principal-agent model. It establishes the rationale and intended outcomes of these reforms and then describes their real consequences. The main findings bear on the nature of changes in the gubernatorial body, regional political regimes and the new challenges for the regime emerging from these reforms. The study demonstrates that (i) most governors survived this change in the first four years after the reform; (ii) the elimination of gubernatorial elections undermined political competition in the regions, forcing it away from public sphere to less transparent venues and (iii) new problems emerged as a result of reforms, particularly, the need for a systematic mechanism of cadre formation and the problem of moral hazard. Adapted from the source document.

The phenomenon of crony capitalism has been explored primarily with reference to its impact on economic growth. This study investigates the political implications of crony capitalism and, specifically, the interaction between political competition and crony capitalism. Based on a case study of a political trajectory in one of the regions of the Russian Federation, I argue that under crony capitalism political competition can undermine the legitimacy of state authorities and such democratic institution as the electoral mechanism. Played out in public during the electoral campaigns unrestricted political competition uncovers the predatory nature of crony elites engaged in struggle for power and wealth and increases public perceptions of corruption.