When Do Elites Compete? The Determinants of Political Competition in Russian Regions
In: Comparative politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 273
ISSN: 2151-6227
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In: Comparative politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 273
ISSN: 2151-6227
In: Comparative politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 273-293
ISSN: 0010-4159
World Affairs Online
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 613-629
ISSN: 0966-8136
World Affairs Online
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 613-629
ISSN: 1465-3427
In: Problems of post-communism, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 13-22
ISSN: 1557-783X
In: Problems of post-communism, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 13-22
ISSN: 1075-8216
Discusses differences in leadership and social context, focusing on ethnic policies pursued by Presidents Shaimiev and Dudaev, respectively.
SSRN
This paper reviews the literature that explores the drivers and effects of financial secrecy on emerging economies. It shows that most of the research on financial secrecy has been focused on issues of tax avoidance, neglecting the problems of institutional arbitrage that go beyond taxation issues. The paper discusses the limits of the institutionalist paradigm that treats businesses solely as rule-takers and calls for more attention to business agency and responsibility. Discussions about corporate social responsibility in emerging economies should incorporate thinking about the potential role that businesses, and especially big corporations, could play in promoting more effective institutions at home. Further research is needed to understand the political and institutional effects of global financial secrecy at the domestic level. The paper suggests some promising avenues for future research as well as new items to be included on the policy-making agenda in relation to financial secrecy.
BASE
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 361-378
ISSN: 1541-0986
Strong institutions and accountable governments are imperative for any country's long-term prosperity. Yet the development of such institutions has presented a continuous challenge for many countries around the world. Using Russia as a case, this study brings attention to the unexpected negative impact of global interdependence and shows that institutional arbitrage opportunities have enabled economic actors to solve for institutional weaknesses and constraints in the domestic realm by using foreign institutions, thereby limiting the emergence of a domestic rule of law regime. We argue that such opportunities lower the propensity of asset-holders, normally interested in strong institutions at home, to organize collective action to lobby for better institutions. We demonstrate the main ways through which Russia's capital-owners make use of foreign legal and financial infrastructures such as capital flight, the use of foreign corporate structures, offshore financial centers, real estate markets, the round-tripping of foreign direct investment, and reliance on foreign law in contract-writing and foreign courts in dispute-resolution.
In: Economics of transition, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 471-493
ISSN: 1468-0351
AbstractThis study uses the latest 2011 round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for the Russian Federation to take a closer look at regional‐level factors influencing the business environment in Russia. Specifically, the study explores the role of regional administrations and variables of administrative continuity and governor origin in shaping regional business environment. The findings reveal that regional businesses in Russia are (1) acutely anxious about administrative transitions (as expressed in gubernatorial replacements) and favour administrative continuity, and (2) favour government officials that are locally embedded. The analysis suggests that many localities in Russia have witnessed the emergence of mutually beneficial state‐business arrangements that are inimical to economic competition.
In: Post-soviet affairs, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 161-175
ISSN: 1060-586X
World Affairs Online
In: Economics of Transition, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 471-493
SSRN
In: Sharafutdinova , G & Turovsky , R 2017 , ' The Politics of Federal Transfers in Putin's Russia : Regional Competition, Lobbying and Federal Priorities ' , Post-Soviet Affairs , vol. 33 , no. 2 , pp. 161-175 . https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2016.1163826
Most studies of intergovernmental financial flows in the Russian Federation focus on the federal center's decision-making in determining the direction of these flows. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that regional governments employ a variety of tools and strategies to compete over federal transfers. This study uses data on federal transfers during 2002–2012 to examine the factors associated with the politically sensitive share of such transfers occurring in this period. The key findings highlight the importance of administrative capacity and the value of attracting attention from, as well as cultivating relations with, federal officials for shaping decision-making on the distribution of federal transfers. We discuss some specific strategies used by more successful regional governments in attracting additional federal funds.
BASE
In: Sharafutdinova , G & Dawisha , K 2017 , ' The Escape from Institution-Building in a Globalized World : Lessons from Russia ' , PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS , vol. 15 , no. 2 , pp. 361-378 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592717000068
Strong institutions and accountable governments are imperative for national prosperity. Yet the development of such institutions has presented a continuous challenge for many countries around the world. In this study we bring attention to the negative implications of global interdependence and institutional arbitrage opportunities that enable economic actors to solve for institutional weaknesses and constraints in the domestic realm by using foreign institutions. We argue that such opportunities lower the propensity of asset-holders, presumably interested in strong institutions at home, to organize the collective action and take the risk of lobbying for better institutions. Based on the case of post-Soviet Russia we demonstrate the main ways through which Russia's capital-owners make use of foreign legal and financial infrastructures such as capital flight, the use of foreign corporate structures, offshore financial centers, real estate markets, the round-tripping of foreign direct investment, and reliance on foreign law in contract-writing and foreign courts in dispute-resolution.
BASE