Suchergebnisse

ObjectivesWe test whetherSupremeCourt media coverage (in terms of both overall volume and specific frames) is driven byCourt actions, by factional battles on theCourt, by theCourt's interaction with other governmental actors, or by all three.MethodsWe link elements of theSpaethSupremeCourtDatabase and real‐worldSupremeCourt and political events toAssociatedPress media coverage of the judicial branch over a nearly three‐decade span. Content analysis of the media coverage is performed and empirical relationships between decisions, events, and coverage are analyzed using error correction modeling.ResultsWe find that overall coverage of theCourt is driven by the ideological nature of decisions rendered and by judicial retirements. Legal coverage of theCourt is driven by issues of constitutionality. Political coverage of theCourt is driven by majority size and judicial retirements.ConclusionsThe findings speak to the newsworthiness ofCourt action, factional battles on theCourt, and moments where theCourt interacts with outsiders. Elements of all three shapes the types of stories journalists tell and the ways in which said stories are told.

The notion of "starving the beast" has been an important justification for fiscal programs emphasizing revenue reductions since the mid-1970s. While the idea of restraining government spending by limiting government revenues has an intuitive appeal, there is convincing evidence the reducing federal tax rates without coordinated reductions in federal spending actually produces long-term growth in spending. This perverse result is explained by a theory of "fiscal illusion." By deferring the costs of government services and benefits through deficit financing, starve the beast policies have the effect of lowering the perceived price of government in the minds of many citizens. We assess the principal behavioral prediction of the fiscal illusion theory.Incorporating estimates of the effects of federal deficits into a standard substantive model of Stimson's mood index, we find strong support for a subjective price-driven theory of demand for government. In particular, we find that the size of the federal budget deficit is significantly associated with greater demand for government services and benefits. This may have important implications for contemporary debates about fiscal discipline.