Suchergebnisse

This article draws on a sample of city managers, assistant city managers, and department heads in U.S. local government jurisdictions to examine whether theoretical assertions about the relationships between performance-related pay, public service motivation, and employee job satisfaction hold empirical merit. Contrary to theoretical expectations, findings from an ordered logistic regression and a series of Monte Carlo simulations suggest performance-related pay is associated with greater job satisfaction, especially among employees who possess stronger public service motives. Results also suggest variable pay may be particularly important to employees who have lower levels of public service motivation.

Students of public management often argue that imposing market‐based logic on public sector organizations can undermine the altruistic motives of public employees. Focusing on the complex relationships between 'reinventing government' reforms, bureaucratic red tape, and public service motivation (PSM), we contend that the effects of reinvention reforms on PSM change as a function of the ability of reforms to cut bureaucratic red tape. A series of structural equation models reveal that the relationships between reinvention reforms, bureaucratic red tape, and PSM are much more complex than previously thought. Contrary to conjectures in the mainstream PSM literature, implementing market‐like reforms in public organizations positively influences PSM, if one views the reform as minimizing red tape.