Suchergebnisse

AbstractAlmost forty years ago, a small group of scholars drew on cognitive psychology to explain anomalous patterns of behavior by leaders on issues of international security. Although it made significant contributions to theory and research, that scholarship did not diffuse broadly into the field. Drawing on concepts in psychology and behavioral economics, research that uses new methods is now producing a wave of scholarship in international relations exemplified by the work in this special issue. Analysis of the use of prospect theory over the last three decades identifies the scope conditions that enable the predictions of rational choice and psychological theories. These scope conditions motivate the focus on the heterogeneity of decision makers that is at the core of current contributions. Future research will move beyond the now-sterile debate between rational choice and psychology.

"We rely on NGOs to monitor the ethical practices of governments and for-profit firms and to undertake many humanitarian tasks that public and private actors will not do. While we are critical of public and private sector failures, we do not reflect enough on the credibility of the NGOs which take their place. Can we be sure that products NGOs label as child-labor free are in fact so, that the coffee labeled as 'fair trade' is farmed in sustainable ways, or that the working conditions monitored by NGOs are safe and that the wages are reasonable? Can we know that humanitarian organizations are, in fact, using our donations to alleviate human suffering rather than pursuing other goals? This book explores the problems of establishing the credibility of NGO activities as they monitor working conditions, human rights and elections and provide finance through microcredit institutions, development aid and emergency assistance"--

Career as an International Relations Scholar. - Lebow, Richard Ned 3-17. - Some Thoughts on Richard Ned Lebow's The Politics and Ethics of Identity. - Frost, Mervyn 21-29. - Political Psychology: Deterrence and Conflict. - Stein, Janice Gross 31-34. - Methods and Philosophy of Science: Psychology, Historical Science and Inefficient Causation. - Guzzini, Stefano 35-44. - Social Psychological Micro-foundations for International Relations. - Kornprobst, Markus 45-53. - Lebow's Theory of International Relations. - Müller, Harald 55-65. - Aristos Eikastes-Ned Lebow as a 'Themistoclean' Classicist. - Wendt, Christian 67-74. - Ned Lebow on the Cold War's End, and Aftermath. - English, Robert 75-83. - Thucydides the Constructivist. - Lebow, Richard Ned 87-113. - Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining. - Lebow, Richard Ned 115-144. - Bibliography of Richard Ned Lebow's Publications. - Lebow, Richard Ned 147-158

Security assurances : initial hypotheses / Jeffrey W. Knopf -- The psychology of assurance : an emotional tale / Janice Gross Stein -- The role of security assurances in the nuclear nonproliferation regime / John Simpson -- Libya, nuclear rollback, and the role of negative and positive security assurances / Wyn Q. Bowen -- Security assurances and Iran : assessment and re-conceptualization / Jim Walsh -- Maintaining Japan's non-nuclear identity : the role of U.S. security assurances / Yuki Tatsumi -- Infusing commitment with credibility : the role of security assurances in cementing the U.S.-ROK alliance / Scott Snyder and Joyce Lee -- Assessing the role of security assurances in dealing with North Korea / John S. Park -- The United States and Swedish plans to build the bomb, 1945-1968 / Thomas Jonter -- The "model" of Ukrainian denuclearization / Sherman W. Garnett

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)