Suchergebnisse

Analyzes the movement from conflict management, 1948-73, to conflict resolution, 1974-99, and linkages among the enduring rivalries between the PLO and Israel, Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel.

Analyzes reasons for the repeated failure of deterrence over time and for periods of stability, focusing on Egypt's leaders, including lessons learned, estimates of military balance, and political priorities and pressures.

The direction and scope of the change in Soviet foreign policy after 1985 cannot be explained without reference to the impact of Gorbachev's representation of the Soviet security problem. Changes in the international distribution of capabilities and generational change are indeterminate explanations of the changes in Soviet foreign policy. Building on propositions from social cognition and organizational psychology, I argue that through inductive "trial-and-error learning" from failure, Gorbachev developed a new representation of the "ill-structured" Soviet security problem. Gorbachev learned in part because he was a relatively uncommitted thinker on security issues and was open to the ideas of experts. He was also highly motivated to learn because of his commitment to domestic reform. The complex interactive relationship between learning and action that provided quick feedback is captured by the social cognition of "learning by doing." The conditionality of political learning suggests a rich research agenda for the analysis of foreign policy change.