Suchergebnisse

This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions and their.

AbstractInternational trustee courts embody a specific form of delegation, in which state principals confer on such courts the authority to interpret and apply treaties agreed by the states in order to realize specific values and interests. Human rights courts help states resolve commitment and enforcement problems that are inherent in human rights treaties. This study seeks to answer the question, what happens when states parties seek to reduce or eliminate the authority of a human rights court? To answer these questions, the article assesses six human rights treaty regimes: the Council of Europe; the Organization of American States; the African Union; the Economic Community of West African States; the East African Community; and the Southern African Development Community. The article identifies four types of de‐delegation possible with respect to international human rights courts and assesses the extent to which states have sought to de‐delegate from them. With one exception (the SADC Tribunal), the regimes examined here have so far successfully withstood the challenge of de‐delegation.

AbstractInA Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the ECHR, we sought to demonstrate the power of Kantian theory to explain – or at least meaningfully illuminate – (1) the defining characteristics of modern, rights-based constitutionalism; (2) the evolving law, politics and constitutional architecture of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); and (3) the emergence of a global, cosmopolitan commons, featuring inter-judicial dialogue at its core. This article responds to contributors to the special symposium on the book. In Part I, we defend our account of a Kantian-congruent, domestic system of constitutional justice. Part II reflects on the ECHR as an instantiation of a cosmopolitan legal order, and on the European Court's case law – particularly its enforcement of the proportionality principle. In Part III, we assess the evidence in support of a broader 'constitutionalization' of international human rights law.

In an article previously published by the APSR, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla claim that the decision making of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been constrained—systematically—by the threat of override on the part of member state governments, acting collectively, and by the threat of noncompliance on the part of any single state. They also purport to have found strong evidence in favor of intergovernmentalist, but not neofunctionalist, integration theory. On the basis of analysis of the same data, we demonstrate that the threat of override is not credible and that the legal system is activated, rather than paralyzed, by noncompliance. Moreover, when member state governments did move to nullify the effects of controversial ECJ rulings, they failed to constrain the court, which continued down paths cleared by the prior rulings. Finally, in a head-to-head showdown between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, the latter wins in a landslide.

This special issue commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of the Journal of Common Market Studies. Adapted from the source document.