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"Once the exclusive preserve of member states, international organizations have become increasingly open in recent decades. Now virtually all international organizations at some level involve NGOs, business actors and scientific experts in policy-making. This book offers the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of this development. Combining statistical analysis and in-depth case studies, it maps and explains the openness of international organizations across issue areas, policy functions and world regions from 1950 to 2010. Addressing the question of where, how and why international organizations offer transnational actors access to global policy-making, this book has implications for critical issues in world politics. When do states share authority with private actors? What drives the design of international organizations? How do activists and businesses influence global politics? Is civil society involvement a solution to democratic deficits in global governance?"--

Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Illustrations; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; 1 Introduction; 2 Formal leadership: a rational institutionalist theory; 3 The institutional development of the EU Presidency: a search for efficient cooperation; 4 The EU Presidency as agenda manager: shaping political priorities; 5 The EU Presidency as broker: constructing intergovernmental bargains; 6 The EU Presidency as representative: negotiating on behalf of others; 7 Comparative perspectives: formal leadership in multilateral negotiations; 8 Conclusion.

AbstractWhat grants influence in the European Council? Drawing on general theories of negotiation, this article isolates and illustrates three complementary sources of bargaining power in the European Council: state sources of power, institutional sources of power and individual sources of power. It reports the results of a unique series of elite interviews with European heads of state and government, foreign ministers and top‐level civil servants. Elite testimonies suggest that the state dimension of power is the most fundamental, whereas the institutional and individual dimensions of power play a secondary role and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetries.

The exercise of leadership by the chairs of multilateral negotiations has so far received limited systematic attention in scholarship on international cooperation. This article addresses this gap by presenting a rational institutionalist theory of formal leadership that provides answers to three central questions: Why do states delegate powers of process control to the chairmanship of international negotiations? What are the power resources of formal leaders? And when, why and how do negotiation chairs wield influence over the outcomes of multilateral bargaining? The theory suggests that chairmanships are empowered to fulfil functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation in international bargaining; identifies procedural control and privileged information as essential power resources of negotiation chairs; and isolates the conditions under which formal leaders shape the efficiency and distributional implications of multilateral bargaining. The article ends by outlining an alternative theoretical approach to formal leadership, drawn from sociological institutionalism. Adapted from the source document.

Existing literature is overwhelmingly skeptical about the capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The presidency's ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited &, typically, the presidency is depicted as a "responsabilite sans pouvior." This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical & empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring, & agenda exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining & decision making developed in international relations & American politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the presidency within each form of agenda-shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive presidencies in the period 1999-2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden, & Belgium. 39 References. Adapted from the source document.

Die gegenwärtige Debatte über die Erfüllung wurde im Rahmen von zwei widerstreitenden Perspektiven, wie Staaten dazu veranlasst werden könnten, internationale Regeln einzuhalten, geführt: Durchsetzung oder Management. Während die Durchsetzungstheoretiker eine Zwangsstrategie der Überwachung und Sanktionen betonen, befürworten Management-Theoretiker einen Problemlösungsansatz, der auf dem Aufbau von Kapazitäten, der Interpretation von Regeln und Transparenz beruht. In diesem Artikel wird das Konzept, Durchsetzung und Management seien konkurrierende Strategien zur Erreichung von Erfüllung, kritisiert. Ausgehend vom Fall der Europäischen Union (EU) und einem Vergleich mit anderen internationalen Regimes wird vorgeschlagen, Management und Durchsetzung seien am effektivsten, wenn sie gemeinsam eingesetzt werden. Die Verbindung von kooperativen und Zwangsmassnahmen in einer "Management-Durchsetzungsleiter" macht die EU sehr erfolgreich in der Bekämpfung von Verletzungen, wodurch Nicht-Erfüllung zu einem temporären Phänomen wird. Eine Untersuchung der Regime in den Bereichen Handel, Umwelt und Menschenrechte unterstützt diesen Vorschlag; Erfüllungssysteme die beide Mechanismen beeinhalten sind besonders effektiv in der Regelsicherung, wohingegen Systeme, die nur auf eine der Strategie bauen, an identifizierbaren Schwächen leiden. (SWP-Jns)