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All negotiations in international organizations and all multilateral conferences are chaired by member state representatives or supranational officials, with mandates to manage the agenda, structure the deliberations, and broker agreements. Yet existing literature offers no coherent explanation of the sources of this institutional practice or its effects on negotiation outcomes. The intention in this paper is to present the first cut of a theory whose purpose it is to address this gap. The paper asks two main questions: What explains the emergence of the chair as a governance form in international negotiations? What determines the influence of the chair over multilateral bargaining outcomes?

In recent years, the question of what determines compliance with international regulatory agreements has gained an increasingly prominent position on the research agenda through a burgeoning literature on international regime effectiveness and international legal systems. The contemporary debate is framed in terms of two alternative perspectives on compliance: enforcement or management. The two perspectives present contending claims about the most effective means of addressing non-compliance in international cooperation. Whereas enforcement theorists characteristically stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency.

One of the central bones of contention in the study of the European Union (EU) is the capacity of its supranational institutions to be a driving force in the process toward deeper integration. Whereas existing research predominantly addresses the institutions' ability to shape European integration through pre-decisional agenda-setting, this study examines the scope for supranational influence in the post-decisional phase of EU enforcement. Do the Commission and the Court have the capacity to enforce member state compliance in other ways than EU governments desire and originally intended? If so, what are the determinants of such supranational influence in EU enforcement? The study explores these questions by tracing the supranational institutions' efforts to secure compliance with the European Internal Market in the period 1985-1998. Departing from the fixed and competing conceptions of supranational influence in neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, which portray the institutions as either "engines of integration" or "obedient servants," the study employs a mode of analysis—principal-agent theory—which is specifically designed to explain variations in control and autonomy. The inquiry indicates that the Commission and the Court indeed may succeed in moving EU enforcement beyond member states' wishes and intentions, but that this capacity is conditioned by the latter's means for controlling the institutions. Three parallel attempts to strengthen the enforcement of Internal Market rules are traced: efforts to enhance the potential of the Article 169 infringement procedure, attempts to induce the delegation of new and more far-reaching powers at the 1991 and 1996-97 intergovernmental conferences, and concerted moves to independently boost decentralized enforcement through national courts. The examination suggests that the scope for supranational influence is most extensive in the promotion of decentralized enforcement, where governments enjoy fewer means for monitoring and sanctioning the institutions. Another highly significant finding, which confirms untested presumptions in earlier research, is the greater ease with which the Court, as compared to the Commission, can exploit its position to introduce measures which go beyond governments' preferences.

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy.

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy. © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy. © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academicscholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel andunique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in sixcountries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state'svoice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are onlypartly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individuallevel that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governancebest predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggestthat only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands forstate voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy.

In this chapter, we trace the emergence of institutional approaches in IR theory, outline three important areas of research on international institutions, and suggest promising directions for future research. The review demonstrates that rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and normative institutionalism, as developed in the study of domestic institutions, have constituted sources of inspiration in IR theory. At the same time, the relative absence of formal institutions in the international realm has encouraged IR scholars to theorize more subtle institutional forms and influences, with general implications for institutional analysis in political science.

This article offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of the effects of elite communication on citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Departing from cueing theory, it develops novel hypotheses about the effects of elite communication under the specific conditions of global governance. It tests these hypotheses by conducting a population-based survey experiment among almost 10,000 residents of three countries in relation to five IOs. The evidence suggests four principal findings. First, communication by national governments and civil society organizations has stronger effects on legitimacy perceptions than communication by IOs themselves. Secondly, elite communication affects legitimacy perceptions irrespective of whether it invokes IOs' procedures or performance as grounds for criticism or endorsement. Thirdly, negative messages are more effective than positive messages in shaping citizens' legitimacy perceptions. Fourthly, comparing across IOs indicates that elite communication is more often effective in relation to the IMF, NAFTA and WTO, than the EU and UN. ; Elite Communication and the Social Legitimacy of International Organizations, Swedish Research Council (2015-00948) ; Leggov, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (M15-0048:1)

Recent public opinion research has established an empirical regularity of unusual stability and strength: citizen beliefs in the legitimacy of national and international institutions are highly linked. The dominant interpretation of this link holds that citizens draw on their perceptions of national institutions as a heuristic when forming opinions about international institutions. This article proposes an alternative mechanism, privileging social trust as an antecedent factor contributing to both national and international legitimacy beliefs. Using original survey data on citizen attitudes toward four international institutions in three countries, the article provides evidence for social trust as an antecedent factor, while granting no support for the dominant interpretation. The article suggests three broader implications: social trust has more far-reaching consequences for international cooperation than previously understood; political efforts to affect the legitimacy of international institutions are constrained by individual predispositions; and a comparative approach is central to the study of public attitudes toward international institutions.

As political authority shifts to the global level, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) increasingly attempt to influence policy-making within international organisations (IOs). This article examines the nature and sources of non-governmental organisations' advocacy strategies in global governance. We advance a twofold theoretical argument. First, non-governmental organisation advocacy can be described in terms of inside and outside strategies, similar to interest group lobbying in American and European politics. Second, non-governmental organisations' chosen combination of inside and outside strategies can be explained by their organisational goals and membership base. Empirically, this argument is corroborated through a large-n analysis of original data from structured interviews with 303 non-governmental organisation representatives active in relation to the United Nations (UN), complemented by 19 semi-structured interviews with UN and state officials. The article's findings have implications for the theory and practice of non-governmental organisation involvement in global governance.

Social legitimacy is central to the effectiveness of international organisations (IOs). Yet, so far, we have little systematic knowledge about what drives citizens to support or oppose IOs. In this article, we isolate and assess three alternative explanations of social legiti- macy in global governance, privileging interest representation, institutional performance, and confidence extrapolation. We test these theories in a multilevel analysis of citizen confidence in the United Nations (UN) using World Values Survey and European Values Study data, sup- plemented by contextual measures. The results grant support to the arguments that institu- tional performance and confidence extrapolation shape popular confidence in the UN, while offering little support for the explanation of interest representation. These findings challenge the predominant understanding that more democratic procedures lead to greater social legitimacy for IOs. Instead, the UN case suggests that the social legitimacy of IOs is based primarily on the organisations' capacity to deliver, as well as on citizens' general confidence in political institutions, which IOs may have little to do with and can do little to change.

This article addresses one prominent expression of the interplay between politics and law in international cooperation: the dynamics of bargaining in the settling of compliance disputes. Our central argument is that the formal structure of dispute settlement systematically shapes the likelihood and terms of negotiated compliance settlements. We introduce an ideal type distinction between interstate dispute settlement, where the authority to sue states for non-compliance resides exclusively with states, and supranational dispute settlement, where this authority is partly or entirely delegated to a commission or secretariat with a prosecutorial function. We hypothesize that systems relying on supranational prosecution are more effective in addressing noncompliance, and more likely to mediate the impact of power asymmetries on dispute settlement outcomes, compared to systems relying on state-initiated complaints only. We find support for this proposition in an in-depth comparison of dispute settlement and compliance bargaining in the World Trade Organization and the European Union, and in a brief survey of experiences from other international organizations.

International organizations (IOs) have developed into important policy venues beyond the state. Yet our understanding of the broader dynamics of IO policy-making is limited. This article offers the first comparative analysis of macro patterns in IO policy-making. Theoretically, we draw on punctuated equilibrium theory to develop hypotheses about stability and change in the orientation of IO policy agendas. Empirically, we examine novel data on the policy output of five general-purpose IOs between 1980 and 2015, combining statistical analysis and comparative case illustrations. The analysis yields two central results. First, the policy agendas of all five IOs display patterns of punctuated equilibria, with longer periods of stability interrupted by shorter periods of dramatic change. Second, the level of institutional friction in decision-making contributes to variation in punctuations across IOs and within IOs over time. The results suggest four broader implications: (1) punctuated equilibrium theory applies to a broader empirical domain than previously thought; (2) patterns of change in IOs are more complex than conventionally expected; (3) institutional friction matters for IOs' responsiveness to societal demands and problem pressures; and (4) deeper integration of punctuated equilibrium theory into the study of IOs can pave the way for a promising IR research agenda.

International organizations (IOs) have developed into important policy venues beyond the state. Yet our understanding of the broader dynamics of IO policy-making is limited. This article offers the first comparative analysis of macro patterns in IO policy-making. Theoretically, we draw on punctuated equilibrium theory to develop hypotheses about stability and change in the orientation of IO policy agendas. Empirically, we examine novel data on the policy output of five general-purpose IOs between 1980 and 2015, combining statistical analysis and comparative case illustrations. The analysis yields two central results. First, the policy agendas of all five IOs display patterns of punctuated equilibria, with longer periods of stability interrupted by shorter periods of dramatic change. Second, the level of institutional friction in decision-making contributes to variation in punctuations across IOs and within IOs over time. The results suggest four broader implications: (1) punctuated equilibrium theory applies to a broader empirical domain than previously thought; (2) patterns of change in IOs are more complex than conventionally expected; (3) institutional friction matters for IOs' responsiveness to societal demands and problem pressures; and (4) deeper integration of punctuated equilibrium theory into the study of IOs can pave the way for a promising IR research agenda.