This text advances a 'naturalized' normative theory of deliberative democracy; one that is informed by an empirically-grounded analysis of public deliberation in naturalistic settings and in unadulterated form, and goes on to provide institutional design proposals for how to improve it.
"Democratic theory's deliberative turn has hit a dead end. It is unable to find a good way to scale up its small-scale, formally-organized deliberative mini-publics to include the entire community. Some turn to deliberative systems for a way out, but none have found a credible way to deliberatively involve the citizenry at large. Deliberation Naturalized offers an alternative way out-one we have been using all along. The key sites of democratic deliberation are everyday political conversations among people networked across the community. Informal networked deliberation is how all citizens deliberate together, directly or indirectly. That is how public opinion emerges in civil society. Networked deliberation satisfies the classic deliberative desiderata of inclusion, equality, and reciprocity reasonably well, albeit differently than standard mini-publics. Reconceptualizing democratic deliberation in this way highlights some real threats to the networked mode of deliberative democracy, such as polarization, message repetition, and pluralistic ignorance. Deliberation Naturalized assesses the extent of each of those threats and proposes ways of protecting real-existing deliberative democracy against them. By focusing on the mechanisms underpinning every democratic deliberation among citizens, Deliberation Naturalized offers a truly novel approach to deliberative democracy"--
A Merit and ReciprocityB Fairness; C Signalling; D Social Values and Meanings; E Political Consequences; IV A Clarification; V Conclusion; Part II Consequences; 5 Multiple Citizenship and Collective Decision Making; I Multiple Citizens as Political Agents; II Voting, Deliberation, and Collective Rationality; A The Condorcet Paradox: How Majority Rule Can Yield Inconsistent Collective Decisions; B From Aggregating Preferences to Aggregating Judgements; C Why Consistency Matters; D Avoiding Inconsistency: Single-Peaked Preferences, Unidimensionally Aligned Judgements
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AbstractRefugee protection depends, minimally, on the identification of agents capable of discharging international obligations in this area of international law. Commonly discussed "agents of justice" include states, IOs, and NGOs. This article focuses on a different set of actors: subnational units (cities, states, and provinces in federal States) and the legal mechanisms they may use to discharge international obligations in the area of refugee protection. I advance three distinct theoretical models for understanding subnational units' responsibilities vis-à-vis international law: (1) derived delegated responsibilities; (2) derived back-up responsibilities; and (3) assumed responsibilities. I conclude by sketching some ways in which subnational units could play an even more salient role in the promotion of international law.
AbstractDeliberative democracy started out as an ideal for mass democracy. Lately, however, its large-scale ambitions have mostly been shelved. This article revivifies the ideal of mass deliberative democracy by offering a clear mechanism by which everyone in the community can be included in the same conversation. The trick is to make use of people's overlapping social communicative networks through which informal deliberative exchanges already occur on an everyday basis. Far from being derailed by threats of polarization, echo chambers, and motivated reasoning, informal networked deliberation can indeed put everyone in touch, directly or indirectly, with everyone else.
The article focuses on the question of how each of us should deliberate internally when forming judgements. That is a matter of political consequence, insofar as those judgements stand behind our votes. I argue that some violations of epistemic independence like message repetition can, if the receivers are not aware of the repetition, lead them to double-count information they have already taken into account, thus distorting their judgments. One upshot is that each of us should ignore or heavily discount certain sorts of inputs (e.g., bot messages or retweets) that are likely just to be repetition of what we have already taken into account in our internal deliberations. I propose various deliberative norms that may protect our internal deliberations from epistemic double-counting, and argue that opinion leaders have special epistemic duties of care to shield their audiences from clone claims.
Citizenship is no longer an exclusive relationship. Many people today are citizens of multiple countries, whether by birth, naturalization, or even through monetary means, with schemes fast-tracking citizenship applications from foreigners making large investments in the state. Moral problems surround each of those ways of acquiring a second citizenship, while retaining one's original citizenship. Multiple citizenship can also have morally problematic consequences for the coherence of collective decisions, for the constitution of the demos, and for global inequality. The phenomenon of multiple citizenship and its ramifications remains understudied, despite its magnitude and political importance. In this innovative book, Ana Tanasoca explores these issues and shows how they could be avoided by unbundling the rights that currently come with citizenship and allocating them separately. It will appeal to scholars and students of normative political theory, citizenship, global justice, and migration in political science, law, and sociology
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Abstract Democratic alternation in power involves uncontrolled policy experiments. One party is elected on one policy platform that it then implements. Things may go well or badly. When another party is elected in its place, it implements a different policy. In imposing policies on the whole community, parties in effect conduct non-randomized trials without control groups. In this paper, we endorse the general idea of policy experimentation but we also argue that it can be done better by deploying in policymaking randomized controlled trials. We focus primarily on the democratic benefits of using randomized trials in policymaking and on how they can enhance the democratic legitimacy of policy. We argue that randomized trials resonate well with three key democratic principles: non-arbitrariness, revisability and public justification. Randomized trials' contribution to non-arbitrariness and revisability is not unique; other types of evidence can advance these democratic principles as well. But through their peculiar democratic scrutability, randomized trials are well-equipped to contribute to the public justifiability of policy.
The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.
The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.