Suchergebnisse

The explanation of the rise and fall of the world system's leading powers in terms of uneven economic development tends to overlook the role of the creation and management of public credit and national debts. Prior to 1815, the Netherlands and Great Britain owed a significant proportion of their respective victories over the larger and wealthier states of Spain and France to the development of competitive financial capabilities. Winning, however, leads to higher absolute debt burdens which, prior to 1945, encouraged postwar reductions in governmental expenditures. In this fashion, world leaders have contributed to the erosion of their preponderant capability positions before the emergence of international rivals. These ideas are elaborated within the context of George Modelski's long cycle of world leadership theory and through a brief review of war-related financial problems between 1500 and 1815 and the consequent development of national debts. The longitudinal analysis of British and American public debt data provides collaborating empirical support.

Despite or because of a decade of research that yielded conflicting results, the question of whether or not military coups or regimes brought into power through coups have an impact on subsequent military spending remains open. A review of the relevant literature suggests that part of the analytical problem may result from assumptions about military political behavior as well as various limitations associated with cross-national analyses of change, and the use of exclusively cross-sectional or longitudinal research designs. In addition, some of the disparity in research findings may result from the reliance on different indicators—both dependent and independent—by a number of different analysts. In response to these potential technical problems, this analysis of military spending patterns in 66 less-developed states applies a GLS routine, pooling cross-sectional and time-series data, to the 1967–1976 relationships between two measures of military spending and several predictor variables, including regime type, coup occurrences, level of conflict, economic development, arms imports, and previous military spending. Although the empirical outcome varies according to which dependent variable is examined, we find, in general, that information on the distribution and timing of regime types—military, civilian, and mixed—and successful military coups is not very helpful in predicting post-coup military spending policies. This finding suggests, in turn, that the crucial presumption that military personnel participate in politics primarily to defend or advance their corporate interests is not a very useful predictive foundation for the examination of post-coup military spending.

DESPITE OR BECAUSE OF A DECADE OF RESEARCH THAT YIELD CONFLICTING RESULTS, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT MILITARY COUPS OR REGIMES BROUGHT INTO POWER THROUGH COUPS HAVE AN IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT MILITARY SPENDING REMAINS OPEN. A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE SUGGESTS THAT PART OF THE ANALYTICAL PROBLEM MAY RESULT FROM ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MILITARY POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AS WELL AS VARIOUS LIMITATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSES OF CHANGE, AND THE USE OF EXCLUSIVELY CROSS-SECTIONAL OR LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH DESIGNS. IN ADDITION, SOME OF THE DISPARITY IN RESEARCH FINDINGS MAY RESULT FROM THE RELIANCE ON DIFFERENT INDICATORS-BOTH DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT-BY A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ANALYSTS. IN RESPONSE TO THESE POTENTIAL TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, THIS ANALYSIS OF MILITARY SPENDING PATTERNS IN 66 LESS-DEVELOPED STATES APPLIES A GLS ROUTINE, POOLING CROSS-SECTIONAL AND TIME-SERIES DATA, TO THE 1967-1976 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TWO MEASURES OF MILITARY SPENDING AND SEVERAL PREDICTOR VARIABLES, INCLUDING REGIME TYPE, COUP OCCURRENCES, LEVEL OF CONFLICT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ARMS IMPORTS, AND PREVIOUS MILITARY SPENDING. ALTHOUGH THE EMPIRICAL OUTCOME VARIES ACCORDING TO WHICH DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS EXAMINED, WE FIND, IN GENERAL, THAT INFORMATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION AND TIMING OF REGIME TYPES-MILITARY, CIVILIAN, AND MIXED-AND SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUPS IS NOT VERY HELPFUL IN PREDICTING POST-COUP MILITARY SPENDING POLICIES. THIS FINDING SUGGESTS, IN TURN, THAT THE CRUCIAL PRESUMPTION PY: 1982

Despite the significance of Great Power summitry to the maintenance and evolution of world politics and order, little attention has been allocated to this central phenomenon. One earlier exception (Galtung, 1964) did find that the volume or restrictedness of summitry (1941–1961) was associated with two key properties of the global system: polarization and predictability. However, a close examination of this study reveals serious problems vis-à-vis a shifting contextual focus and conceptual ambiguity in the handling of the independent variables. A reexamination with an explicitly geocentric perspective, a dependent variable limited to chief executive summitry (1948–1971), and a focus on the conflict intensity aspect of polarization (primarily measured by the annual rate of change in world military expenditures and secondarily by event interaction data) produced results which differ greatly with those found in the earlier study. Most of the original hypotheses receive little if any support. Additional analysis suggests the possibility of such intervening variables as time, the bloc interaction variant of polarization, capability concentration, and capability distribution fluidity. Further study, probably over a longer period of time, will be required to arrive at a more definite conclusion. Moreover, while Great Power summitry does appear to be influenced by certain attributes of the global system, the weakness of the discovered relationships suggests that summitry is a complex form of Great Power behavior that must be placed in a larger framework of global politics.

Comparative Regional Analysis in an Era of Heightened Regional Salience -- Sources of Peace and Conflict Within Regions -- Whose Status Quo Is It, Anyway? Regions, Hierarchies, and Satisfaction* -- Asymmetric Rivals, State Capacity, and Regional Peace -- Regional Variation in Strategic Positional Rivalries -- Regions of Rivalry: Dominance Vacuums and Rivalry Prevalence -- Societal Heterogeneity, Weak States and Internal Conflict: Evaluating One Avenue to Territorial Peace and Instability -- Petroleum, Petrostates and Interstate Conflict: How Strong Are Some of the Relationships? -- Sources of Order Within Regions -- In Search of Common Grounds: A Preliminary Ordering of the Study of Regional Orders -- Intra-regional Trade and Regional Exposure to the Global Economy: Implications for Cooperation and Conflict -- States, Nations and Great-Power Expansion in their Neighborhood: Explaining the Russian War against Ukraine -- All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Comparing Regional Peace in the Caucasus and Central Asia -- Impact of the Rise of Eurasia on Grand Strategy for the 21st Century. .

China's rising status in the global economy alongside recent economic stagnation in Europe and the United States has led to considerable speculation that we are in the early stages of a transition in power relations. Commentators have tended to treat this transitional period as a novelty, but history is in fact replete with such systemic transitions-sometimes with perilous results. Can we predict the future by using the past? And, if so, what might history teach us?With Transition Scenarios, David P. Rapkin and William R. Thompson identify some predictors for pow.

In this far-reaching exploration of the evolution of warfare in human history, Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson provide insight into the perennial questions of why and how humans fight. Beginning with the origins of warfare among foraging groups, The Arc of War draws on a wealth of empirical data to enhance our understanding of how war began and how it has changed over time. The authors point to the complex interaction of political economy, political and military organization, military technology, and the threat environment & mdash;all of which create changing incentives for states and other.