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Many Europeans today ask why the European Community chose the bold strategy of pursuing an Economic and Monetary Union at a time when a number of political and economic issues had not yet been resolved. Many economists like to think that the economic case for EMU was weak and that the decision was taken strictly on political grounds. As someone who had the privilege of being involved in the early preparatory efforts, I would argue that this is a misreading of history. I believe there was both a strong economic case for moving towards a single currency and a rare political opportunity for implementing it around 1990.

This paper summarises an official report to the Swedish government (and general public). The economic crisis in Sweden is explained by both system failures and specific policy mistakes. The system failures include distorted incentives and markets, and inappropriate and outdated institutions. The deep recession and extraordinary rise in unemployment started as a collision between inflationary wage development and attempts to pursue a hard-currency policy. The resulting loss of international competitiveness in the tradable sector was accompanied by increased real interest rates, collapsing real estate prices and a related financial crisis. Following the floating of the Swedish krona in November 1992, the main problem became a domestic demand collapse, which has been accentuated by a spectacular rise in the household saving rate. The report emphasizes that good policy advice is not enough; it is also necessary to analyse and reform not only to macroeconomic stability but also economic efficiency and growth. The proposed institutional reforms are designed to restore a highly competitive market system and to facilitate a responsible fiscal stabilisation programme. This would also enahnce the medium-run credibility for government policies and provide scope for a more expansionary policy in the short run.

In this statement the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is advocating a conditional relief of Greek's government debt based on Greece meeting certain targets for structural economic reforms in areas such as its labor market and pensions sector.The authors argue that the position of the European institutions that debt relief for Greece cannot be part of an agreement is based on the illusion that Greece will be able to service its sovereign debt and reduce its debt overhang after implementing a set of fiscal and structural reforms. However, the Greek economy would need to grow at an unrealistig level to achieve debt sustainability soley on the basis of reforms.The authors therefore view a substantial debt relief as inevitable and argue that three questions must be resolved urgently, in order to structure debt relief adequately: First, which groups must accept losses associated with debt relief. Second, how much debt relief should be offered. Third, under what conditions should relief be offered.

Die vorliegende kurze Studie zielt darauf ab, die Erfahrungen Japans, Westeuropas und Nordamerikas mit flexiblen Wechselkursen darzustellen und zu untersuchen, wie effizient das System flexibler Kurse im Hinblick auf die wirtschaftspolitischen Ziele gewesen ist. Der Aufbau dieser Studie ist wie folgt: Im Abschnitt II werden die Erfahrungen einzelner Länder mit flexiblen Wechselkursen seit 19 73 untersucht; im Abschnitt III wird die Beziehung zwischen Wechselkurs, Inflation und realen Anpassungsprozessen analysiert; Abschnitt IV ist verschiedenen wirtschaftspolitischen Problemen gewidmet, die sich bei flexiblen Wechselkursen ergeben; dazu gehören die Rolle des Dollars und anderer Anlagewährungen, die Devisenmarktinterventionen sowie nationale geld-, fiskal- und strukturpolitische Maßnahmen; Abschnitt V schließlich enthält die wichtigsten wirtschaftspolitischen Empfehlungen, die sich aus unserer Untersuchung ergeben.