CatSpanish citizenry : from silence to prominence -- The void of central Spanish state -- Secessionist top leaders -- Madrid-Barcelona competition -- Dual identities : "As Catalan as Spanish" -- Cantonalism and cainism in Spain -- Longitudinal profiles of Catalonian citizenry -- Immersive education : another divisive tool -- A dangerous decade (2010-2020) -- CatSpanish melancholy : temptative prescriptions -- Epilogue.
Amid the tensions created by the secession push in Catalonia (Spain), an important conflicting issue has been the "immersion linguistic educational system", in which the Catalan language has precedence throughout all of the primary and secondary school curricula. Here, we present an analysis of a survey (n = 1002) addressing features of linguistic and political opinion profiles with reference to the mother language and feelings of national identity. The results show that the mother language is a factor that differentiated the participants in terms of common linguistic uses and opinions about the "immersion educational system". These results were confirmed when segmenting respondents via their feelings of national self-identification. The most distinctive political opinions consisted of either asserting or denying the damage to social harmony produced by the secession campaign. Overall, the findings show that a major fraction of the Catalonian citizenry is subjected to an education system that does not meet their linguistic preferences. We discuss these findings, connecting them to an ethnolinguistic divide based mainly on mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) and family origin—a complex frontier that has become the main factor determining alignment during the ongoing political conflict.
During the last decade, the Catalonian secessionist challenge induced a chronic crisis within Spain's politics that does not offer hints of a viable arrangement. The rapidly escalating demands for secession ran almost in parallel with the accentuation of the economic recession that followed the disruption of the world financial system in 2008–2010. Such secession claims reached maximums during 2012–2014, attaining support levels of nearly 50% of citizenry in favour of independence. These figures subsequently diminished a bit but remained close to that level until today. Despite the coincident course, previous studies had shown that the impact of economic hardships was not a major factor in explaining the segregation urgencies, connecting them instead to triggers related to internecine political struggles in the region: Harsh litigations that resulted in an abrupt polarization along nationalistic features in wide segments of the population. In this longitudinal analysis based on the responses of 88,538 individuals through a regular series of 45 official surveys, in the period 2006–2019, we show that economic factors did play a role in the secessionist wave. Our findings showed that the main idiomatic segmentation (Catalan vs. Spanish, as family language) interacted with economic segmentations in inducing variations on national identity feelings that resulted in erosions of the dual CatSpanish identity. Moreover, our findings also showed that the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry where those that mostly supported secession, whereas poorer and unprotected citizenry was clearly against it. All the data points to the conclusion that the secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the wealthier and well-situated people.
During the last decade, the Catalonian secessionist challenge induced a chronic crisis within Spain's politics that does not offer hints of a viable arrangement. The rapidly escalating demands for secession ran almost in parallel with the accentuation of the economic recession that followed the disruption of the world financial system in 2008-2010. Such secession claims reached maximums during 2012-2014, attaining support levels of nearly 50% of citizenry in favour of independence. These figures subsequently diminished a bit but remained close to that level until today. Despite the coincident course, previous studies had shown that the impact of economic hardships was not a major factor in explaining the segregation urgencies, connecting them instead to triggers related to internecine political struggles in the region: Harsh litigations that resulted in an abrupt polarization along nationalistic features in wide segments of the population. In this longitudinal analysis based on the responses of 88,538 individuals through a regular series of 45 official surveys, in the period 2006-2019, we show that economic factors did play a role in the secessionist wave. Our findings showed that the main idiomatic segmentation (Catalan vs. Spanish, as family language) interacted with economic segmentations in inducing variations on national identity feelings that resulted in erosions of the dual CatSpanish identity. Moreover, our findings also showed that the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry where those that mostly supported secession, whereas poorer and unprotected citizenry was clearly against it. All the data points to the conclusion that the secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the wealthier and well-situated people.
Catalonian secessionism acquired prominence from 2010 onwards. During the last decade secessionist parties won three regional elections and sustained Governments by tiny majorities at the Autonomous Parliament. Two illegal consultations about self-determination were called and around 2 million (38% of population census) supported secession from Spain. An "Independence Declaration" was proclaimed on 27th Oct. 2017, followed by suspension of Home Rule sanctioned by Spanish Parliament that endured till mid-2018. The main consequence of the secessionist push was the build-up of a confrontation between two large segments of Catalan citizenry, unionists and secessionists, which was absent before. This study aims to shed light on the rise of secessionism and the appearance of a deep fissure between these communities. By building upon the complete series of data from iterated official polls (88.538 respondents, 45 surveys), the paper displays the evolving changes along the period 2006–2019 of national identity feelings ("sense of belonging"). Along that period, there were increases exceeding 15 percentage points of "only Catalan" national identity and analogous decreases of "equally Catalan and Spanish" dual national identity. The findings disclosed highly significant covariations between changing trends on national identity feelings with: (1) family/mother language, Catalan vs. Spanish; (2) following regional media versus other media. Since language/ascendancy origins and media consumption trends are closely interrelated, within Catalonia, our discussion focuses on the role played by such ethno-cultural cleavage. Further, statistical analysis for longitudinal data identified several turning points linked to singular political events that likely accentuated polarization around the issue of secession. The findings unveil evolving tracks that could help in the understanding of a process that, in a very short time, produced a severe social division within a fully open and democratic society at the heart of Europe. ; Damián Gil M.D. provided the first script that permitted to build the database of the full series of CEO Barometers. OEC Group members provided lively discussions with suggestions that improved and helped to focus the present research. A.T. work was partially supported by AFOSR-MINERVA FA9550-18-0496 Grant and Bial Foundation Grant 163/14. ; Damián Gil M.D. provided the first script that permitted to build the database of the full series of CEO Barometers. OEC Group members provided lively discussions with suggestions that improved and helped to focus the present research. A.T. work was partially supported by AFOSR-MINERVA FA9550-18-0496 Grant and Bial Foundation Grant 163/14.
A.T. work was partially supported by AFOSR-MINERVA FA9550-18-0496 Grant and Bial Foundation Grant 163/14. ; Catalonian secessionism acquired prominence from 2010 onwards. During the last decade secessionist parties won three regional elections and sustained Governments by tiny majorities at the Autonomous Parliament. Two illegal consultations about selfdetermination were called and around 2 million (38% of population census) supported secession from Spain. An "Independence Declaration" was proclaimed on 27th Oct. 2017, followed by suspension of Home Rule sanctioned by Spanish Parliament that endured till mid2018. The main consequence of the secessionist push was the build-up of a confrontation between two large segments of Catalan citizenry, unionists and secessionists, which was absent before. This study aims to shed light on the rise of secessionism and the appearance of a deep fissure between these communities. By building upon the complete series of data from iterated official polls (88.538 respondents, 45 surveys), the paper displays the evolving changes along the period 2006-2019 of national identity feelings ("sense of belonging"). Along that period, there were increases exceeding 15 percentage points of "only Catalan" national identity and analogous decreases of "equally Catalan and Spanish" dual national identity. The findings disclosed highly significant covariations between changing trends on national identity feelings with: (1) family/mother language, Catalan vs. Spanish; (2) following regional media versus other media. Since language/ascendancy origins and media consumption trends are closely interrelated, within Catalonia, our discussion focuses on the role played by such ethno-cultural cleavage. Further, statistical analysis for longitudinal data identified several turning points linked to singular political events that likely accentuated polarization around the issue of secession. The findings unveil evolving tracks that could help in the understanding of a process that, in a very short time, produced a severe social division within a fully open and democratic society at the heart of Europe.
Amid the tensions created by the secession push in Catalonia (Spain), an important conflicting issue has been the 'immersion linguistic educational system', in which the Catalan language has precedence throughout all of the primary and secondary school curricula. Here, we present an analysis of a survey (n = 1002) addressing features of linguistic and political opinion profiles with reference to the mother language and feelings of national identity. The results show that the mother language is a factor that differentiated the participants in terms of common linguistic uses and opinions about the 'immersion educational system'. These results were confirmed when segmenting respondents via their feelings of national self-identification. The most distinctive political opinions consisted of either asserting or denying the damage to social harmony produced by the secession campaign. Overall, the findings show that a major fraction of the Catalonian citizenry is subjected to an education system that does not meet their linguistic preferences. We discuss these findings, connecting them to an ethnolinguistic divide based mainly on mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) and family origin¿a complex frontier that has become the main factor determining alignment during the ongoing political conflict.
During the last decade, the Catalonian secessionist challenge induced a chronic crisis within Spain's politics that does not offer hints of a viable arrangement. The rapidly escalating demands for secession ran almost in parallel with the accentuation of the economic recession that followed the disruption of the world financial system in 2008-2010. Such secession claims reached maximums during 2012-2014, attaining support levels of nearly 50% of citizenry in favour of independence. These figures subsequently diminished a bit but remained close to that level until today. Despite the coincident course, previous studies had shown that the impact of economic hardships was not a major factor in explaining the segregation urgencies, connecting them instead to triggers related to internecine political struggles in the region: Harsh litigations that resulted in an abrupt polarization along nationalistic features in wide segments of the population. In this longitudinal analysis based on the responses of 88,538 individuals through a regular series of 45 official surveys, in the period 2006-2019, we show that economic factors did play a role in the secessionist wave. Our findings showed that the main idiomatic segmentation (Catalan vs. Spanish, as family language) interacted with economic segmentations in inducing variations on national identity feelings that resulted in erosions of the dual CatSpanish identity. Moreover, our findings also showed that the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry where those that mostly supported secession, whereas poorer and unprotected citizenry was clearly against it. All the data points to the conclusion that the secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the wealthier and well-situated people.
Political tensions created by Catalonian secessionism within Spain are unsettled one year after the failed proclamation of independence at 27th October 2017. A big segment of citizens (38% - 48% of the region population) supports secession, but there is another portion of citizenry, of similar size, that has resisted secessionist aspirations. Secessionism acquired forceful impetus along the last decade, wining consecutive regional elections and two (illegal) consultations about self-determination. A rise of activism, however, showed by unionists both at street demonstrations and at the last Regional election, consolidated a draw within a deeply polarized and divided society. We present an analysis of survey data that distinguish prevalent mood and emotion profiles among unionist vs. secessionist segments. Despite their protracted and unsuccessful venture, secessionists felt much less tired and confused than unionists, and they referred to be much less fearful and more hopeful about political and economic future. We link those distinctive feelings and disparate beliefs about current difficulties with a cognitive distortion noticeable only among secessionists, about the real magnitude of their force. We discuss these findings connecting such cognitive and affective profiles with features of a compounded ethno-cultural frontier based mainly on habitual language (Catalan vs. Spanish) and family-descent origins that have probably worked as the principal alignment vector. This social cleavage might function as a fracture line for extremist aggravations of a serious political conflict within the European Union.
Willingness to fight and die (WFD) has been developed as a measure to capture willingness to incur costly sacrifices for the sake of a greater cause in the context of entrenched conflict. WFD measures have been repeatedly used in field studies, including studies on the battlefield, although their neurofunctional correlates remain unexplored. Our aim was to identify the neural underpinnings of WFD, focusing on neural activity and interconnectivity of brain areas previously associated with value-based decision-making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). A sample of Pakistani participants supporting the Kashmiri cause was selected and invited to participate in an functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) paradigm where they were asked to convey their WFD for a series of values related to Islam and current politics. As predicted, higher compared to lower WFD was associated with increased ventromedial prefrontal activity and decreased dorsolateral activity, as well as lower connectivity between the vmPFC and the dlPFC. Our findings suggest that WFD more prominently relies on brain areas typically associated with subjective value (vmPFC) rather than integration of material costs (dlPFC) during decision-making, supporting the notion that decisions on costly sacrifices may not be mediated by cost-benefit computation.
Willingness to fight and die (WFD) has been developed as a measure to capture willingness to incur costly sacrifices for the sake of a greater cause in the context of entrenched conflict. WFD measures have been repeatedly used in field studies, including studies on the battlefield, although their neurofunctional correlates remain unexplored. Our aim was to identify the neural underpinnings of WFD, focusing on neural activity and interconnectivity of brain areas previously associated with value-based decision-making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). A sample of Pakistani participants supporting the Kashmiri cause was selected and invited to participate in an functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) paradigm where they were asked to convey their WFD for a series of values related to Islam and current politics. As predicted, higher compared to lower WFD was associated with increased ventromedial prefrontal activity and decreased dorsolateral activity, as well as lower connectivity between the vmPFC and the dlPFC. Our findings suggest that WFD more prominently relies on brain areas typically associated with subjective value (vmPFC) rather than integration of material costs (dlPFC) during decision-making, supporting the notion that decisions on costly sacrifices may not be mediated by cost-benefit computation. ; This work was supported by the Minerva Program and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research of the U.S. Department of Defense (AFOSR FA9550-14-1-0030 DEF) and the BIAL Foundation (Grant #163/14) and the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (RTI2018-093550-B-I00).
Altres ajuts: This work was supported by the Minerva Program and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research of the U.S. Department of Defense (AFOSR FA9550-14-1-0030 DEF) and the BIAL Foundation (Grant #163/14). ; Willingness to fight and die (WFD) has been developed as a measure to capture willingness to incur costly sacrifices for the sake of a greater cause in the context of entrenched conflict. WFD measures have been repeatedly used in field studies, including studies on the battlefield, although their neurofunctional correlates remain unexplored. Our aim was to identify the neural underpinnings of WFD, focusing on neural activity and interconnectivity of brain areas previously associated with value-based decision-making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). A sample of Pakistani participants supporting the Kashmiri cause was selected and invited to participate in an functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) paradigm where they were asked to convey their WFD for a series of values related to Islam and current politics. As predicted, higher compared to lower WFD was associated with increased ventromedial prefrontal activity and decreased dorsolateral activity, as well as lower connectivity between the vmPFC and the dlPFC. Our findings suggest that WFD more prominently relies on brain areas typically associated with subjective value (vmPFC) rather than integration of material costs (dlPFC) during decision-making, supporting the notion that decisions on costly sacrifices may not be mediated by cost-benefit computation.
