This text explores the wide variation across states in convenience voting methods-absentee/mail voting, in-person early voting, same day registration-and provides new empirical analysis of the beneficial effects of these policies, not only in increasing voter turnout overall, but for disadvantaged groups. By measuring both convenience methods and implementation of the laws, the volume improves on previous research. It draws generalizable conclusions about how these laws affect voter turnout by using population data from the fifty state voter files.
Most research on election reforms to increase voter turnout has downplayed their effects, showing that they generally benefit educated, older, and more affluent people. This book shows the positive effects that these reforms have on overall voter turnout, and among voters of disadvantaged groups. It emphasizes the ways that state governments are making it easier to participate in elections in an effort to strengthen democratic government. With important implications for the 2020 general election and beyond, Accessible Elections underscores how state governments can modernize their electoral practices to increase voter turnout, address electoral inequalities, and influence campaign and party mobilization strategies.
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It has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly vote to raise taxes on the wealthy they decline to do so. This raises the question of how economic self-interest shapes voting on tax proposals, and what factors may weaken the links between economic self-interest and tax policy preferences. In the U.S. context partisanship is a factor that has a major influence on attitudes about taxation. To explore how self-interest sometimes overcomes partisanship we take advantage of competing initiatives that were simultaneously on the ballot in California in 2012. California's Proposition 30, a successful 2012 initiative, significantly increased taxes on the wealthy. By comparing voting on Proposition 30 to voting on Proposition 38, which would have raised taxes on nearly everyone, we observe that when tax hikes are focused only on the wealthy a substantial number of lower income Republicans (i.e., conservatives) defect from their party position opposing taxation. We identify these low-income Republicans as "populists." Lower income Republicans are also less supportive of income tax increases on the lower and middle classes, and are more sensitive to income tax increases than sales tax increases. We argue that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.
It has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly vote to raise taxes on the wealthy they decline to do so. This raises the question of how economic self-interest shapes voting on tax proposals, and what factors may weaken the links between economic self-interest and tax policy preferences. In the U.S. context partisanship is a factor that has a major influence on attitudes about taxation. To explore how self-interest sometimes overcomes partisanship we take advantage of competing initiatives that were simultaneously on the ballot in California in 2012. California's Proposition 30, a successful 2012 initiative, significantly increased taxes on the wealthy. By comparing voting on Proposition 30 to voting on Proposition 38, which would have raised taxes on nearly everyone, we observe that when tax hikes are focused only on the wealthy a substantial number of lower income Republicans (i.e., conservatives) defect from their party position opposing taxation. We identify these low-income Republicans as "populists." Lower income Republicans are also less supportive of income tax increases on the lower and middle classes, and are more sensitive to income tax increases than sales tax increases. We argue that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.
"Government matters. And you can make a difference. We the People is the number one book for American government because of its unparalleled ability to help students understand American government-how it applies to them, and how they can participate. In her first edition as coauthor, Andrea Campbell used stories of real people to show students how government and politics can affect their lives and how individual participation matters. Now Campbell takes her emphasis on the citizen's role one step further with new How To guides that present concrete steps to effective political participation"--