Suchergebnisse

Dissatisfaction with two-party politics is at an all-time high in the US. As extreme polarization and minority rule persist, a possibility of an electoral reform becomes increasingly more likely. This editor's introduction discusses the ranked choice voting (RCV) as an alternative to the current single-member geographic districts with winner-take-all plurality elections in the US. The articles for this thematic issue critically evaluate whether RCV lives up to its promise in improving democracy in the US. Like any rule or institutional change, it has benefits and drawbacks. The empirical and historical research presented here focuses on the implementation and use of RCV in the US compared to other countries. This thematic issue offers new insights into the promise and perils of RCV as a way to aggregate votes in elections that ensure that the winning candidate receives a majority of the votes cast.

Despite very different historical and constitutional bases for how we nominate presidential candidates andelect presidentsto office, as well as very different political processes (sequential versus simultaneous voting), both the presidential nominating process and the Electoral College are rooted in state elections, not a national election, and both create state winners and losers. Previous research has not explored the role of state influence or state self-interest in presidential elections. States that voteearlyinthenomination process benefit,asdo battlegroundstatesinthe generalelection,especially small-populationstates.Giventhefundamentallydifferenttypes ofelectionsexaminedinthis paper, it is surprising that very similar forces shape efforts to nationalize presidential elections. Popular reform options of both the nomination process (national primary) and the general election (national popular vote) focus on a single national election in which the nation�s interests, rather than state interests, are paramount. This analysis of 2008 panel survey data shows that citizen opinions on nationalizing presidential elections through a national primary or national popular vote for president are based on strategic decisions defined by short-term electoral politics and long-term self-interest rooted in an individual�s state

Despite very different historical and constitutional bases for how we nominate presidential candidates andelect presidentsto office, as well as very different political processes (sequential versus simultaneous voting), both the presidential nominating process and the Electoral College are rooted in state elections, not a national election, and both create state winners and losers. Previous research has not explored the role of state influence or state self-interest in presidential elections. States that voteearlyinthenomination process benefit,asdo battlegroundstatesinthe generalelection,especially small-populationstates.Giventhefundamentallydifferenttypes ofelectionsexaminedinthis paper, it is surprising that very similar forces shape efforts to nationalize presidential elections. Popular reform options of both the nomination process (national primary) and the general election (national popular vote) focus on a single national election in which the nation�s interests, rather than state interests, are paramount. This analysis of 2008 panel survey data shows that citizen opinions on nationalizing presidential elections through a national primary or national popular vote for president are based on strategic decisions defined by short-term electoral politics and long-term self-interest rooted in an individual�s state

Includes bibliographical references and index. ; The Progressive Era vision : instrumental and educative justifications of direct democracy -- The education of citizens : voting -- The education of citizens : civic engagement -- The education of citizens : confidence in government -- The education of special interests -- The education of political parties -- The educative possibilities and limitations of citizen lawmaking. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Online businesses and platform work can create the impression that the digital economy is ephemeral and placeless. But the digital economy is experienced locally, and its effects are spatial. Measuring them requires better community-level data on economic activities online. While new government data measures broadband subscriptions down to neighborhoods, existing public data do not measure how broadband is used in local communities, and whether this digital activity affects economic outcomes. We analyze new monthly data on over 20 million domain name hosts/websites in the United States from November 2018 to November 2020 drawing on customer data. Surveys show that 3 out of 4 of these domains are commercial, including microbusinesses as well as websites for both online and brick-and-mortar establishments. How is the density of domain name hosts in a community (the number in a zip code or county divided by the population) related to local economic opportunity, controlling for other known factors? Using statistical matching and time series data, results show the density of domain name hosts positively predicts community economic prosperity, recovery from the 2008 recession, and change in median income. Interactions between the density of these hosts and broadband subscriptions also predict lower monthly unemployment rates over time, including after the March 2020 pandemic. Commercial data can improve our understanding of broadband's impacts, including its potential for inclusive growth in diverse communities.

It has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly vote to raise taxes on the wealthy they decline to do so. This raises the question of how economic self-interest shapes voting on tax proposals, and what factors may weaken the links between economic self-interest and tax policy preferences. In the U.S. context partisanship is a factor that has a major influence on attitudes about taxation. To explore how self-interest sometimes overcomes partisanship we take advantage of competing initiatives that were simultaneously on the ballot in California in 2012. California's Proposition 30, a successful 2012 initiative, significantly increased taxes on the wealthy. By comparing voting on Proposition 30 to voting on Proposition 38, which would have raised taxes on nearly everyone, we observe that when tax hikes are focused only on the wealthy a substantial number of lower income Republicans (i.e., conservatives) defect from their party position opposing taxation. We identify these low-income Republicans as "populists." Lower income Republicans are also less supportive of income tax increases on the lower and middle classes, and are more sensitive to income tax increases than sales tax increases. We argue that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.

How should we measure broadband adoption by individuals and communities, given different modes of access, including home broadband, smartphone use, and public access? We measure online activities and indicators of skill to understand opportunities for digital citizenship, or participation in society online. Based on a 2011 survey in Chicago, we find more mobile phone adoption among Blacks than among non-Hispanic Whites, and greater likelihood of Internet use for job searches among residents who rely primarily on smartphones to go online than among home broadband adopters. Yet our analysis also shows that broadband at home remains critically important for digital citizenship, and that the growth in mobile phone use has not erased inequalities in participation online and seems unlikely to do so. Moreover, smartphones are not bridging the gap in disadvantaged communities. Multilevel statistical models show inequality in both Internet access and economic and political activities across geographic areas, or communities. Technology disparities that are patterned by place have implications for opportunity and equity at the neighborhood level.