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Research Highlights and Abstract Concepts from domestic and comparative politics can be applied in a transnational context; the article develops the notion of 'transnational veto players'to explain the practice of financial reform. Understanding the nature of constituency in a transnational context is important for explanations of actor preferences and the mode of policy that ensues. While actors involved in global standard-setting in finance have formal defined constituencies, when operating in a transnational setting their interactions render their constituencies diffuse, including peers and other interlocutors. In transnational settings, actors act as veto players by defining and delimiting the pool of ideas available for reform. 'Too big to fail' has been highlighted as an important target for reform but the resulting changes in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions do not alter their core functions. Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These 'transnational veto players'frame and delimit policy options. The concept of 'transnational veto players' is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed 'too big to fail'. Actors debating and developing policy on 'too big to fail' may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The 'too big to fail' case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players.

AbstractIt is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.