Power Elites and Club-Model Governance in Global Finance
In: International Political Sociology, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 340-342
In: International Political Sociology, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 340-342
In: Review of international political economy, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 225-256
ISSN: 1466-4526
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 389-407
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 389-407
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: International political sociology: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 324-342
ISSN: 1749-5679
Fields of Global Governance: How Transnational Power Elites Can Make Global Governance Intelligible (pages 324-330) Niilo Kauppi and Mikael R. Madsen. - Knowledge Warfare: Social Scientists as Operators of Global Governance (pages 330-332) Niilo Kauppi. - The International Judiciary as Transnational Power Elite (pages 332-334) Mikael R. Madsen. - Identity Switching and Transnational Professionals (pages 335-337) Leonard Seabrooke. - The International Civil Servant (pages 338-340) Ole Jacob Sending. - Power Elites and Club-Model Governance in Global Finance (pages 340-342) Eleni Tsingou
World Affairs Online
In: The British journal of politics & international relations: BJPIR, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 318-334
ISSN: 1467-856X
Research Highlights and Abstract Concepts from domestic and comparative politics can be applied in a transnational context; the article develops the notion of 'transnational veto players'to explain the practice of financial reform. Understanding the nature of constituency in a transnational context is important for explanations of actor preferences and the mode of policy that ensues. While actors involved in global standard-setting in finance have formal defined constituencies, when operating in a transnational setting their interactions render their constituencies diffuse, including peers and other interlocutors. In transnational settings, actors act as veto players by defining and delimiting the pool of ideas available for reform. 'Too big to fail' has been highlighted as an important target for reform but the resulting changes in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions do not alter their core functions. Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These 'transnational veto players'frame and delimit policy options. The concept of 'transnational veto players' is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed 'too big to fail'. Actors debating and developing policy on 'too big to fail' may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The 'too big to fail' case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players.
In: Regulation & governance, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 407-416
ISSN: 1748-5991
AbstractIt is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.
In: Studies in European political science
In: Review of international political economy, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 1-16
ISSN: 1466-4526
In: International politics: a journal of transnational issues and global problems, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 617-637
ISSN: 1740-3898
In: International politics, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 617-637
ISSN: 1384-5748
World Affairs Online
In: The British journal of politics & international relations: BJPIR, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 313-323
ISSN: 1467-856X
This financial crisis emerged from an over-supply of financial innovation and an under-supply of financial regulation within the core advanced economies. Financial governance reform can focus on behaviour, acknowledge systemic implications and inherent limitations, and strive for more representation and accountability.
In: International political sociology, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 457-461
ISSN: 1749-5687
In: International political sociology: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 327-350
ISSN: 1749-5679
World Affairs Online