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Methodologically and theoretically innovative, this monograph draws from Marxism and deconstruction bringing together the textual and the material in our understanding of international law. Approaching 'civilisation' as an argumentative pattern related to the distribution of rights and duties amongst different communities, Ntina Tzouvala illustrates both its contradictory nature and its pro-capitalist bias. 'Civilisation' is shown to oscillate between two poles. On the one hand, a pervasive 'logic of improvement' anchors legal equality to demands that non-Western polities undertake extensive domestic reforms and embrace capitalist modernity. On the other, an insistent 'logic of biology' constantly postpones such a prospect based on ideas of immutable difference. By detailing the tension and synergies between these two logics, Tzouvala argues that international law incorporates and attempts to mediate the contradictions of capitalism as a global system of production and exchange that both homogenises and stratifies societies, populations and space.

Methodologically and theoretically innovative, this monograph draws from Marxism and deconstruction bringing together the textual and the material in our understanding of international law. Approaching 'civilisation' as an argumentative pattern related to the distribution of rights and duties amongst different communities, Ntina Tzouvala illustrates both its contradictory nature and its pro-capitalist bias. 'Civilisation' is shown to oscillate between two poles. On the one hand, a pervasive 'logic of improvement' anchors legal equality to demands that non-Western polities undertake extensive domestic reforms and embrace capitalist modernity. On the other, an insistent 'logic of biology' constantly postpones such a prospect based on ideas of immutable difference. By detailing the tension and synergies between these two logics, Tzouvala argues that international law incorporates and attempts to mediate the contradictions of capitalism as a global system of production and exchange that both homogenises and stratifies societies, populations and space

Abstract: The 'unwilling or unable' doctrine is amongst the most contested in contemporary international law. However, this paper is not concerned with whether 'unwilling or unable' accurately reflects the international law of self-defense and force. Rather, drawing from critical security studies, especially those strands that study the relationship between the war on terror, and capitalist accumulation, and critical political economy this paper examines the forms of political economy and statehood implicit in the doctrine. The article argues two things: first, the doctrine envisages a gradated form of sovereignty dedicated to the reproduction of racial capitalism. Secondly, the doctrine incorporates the imperatives of financial capitalism insofar that it seeks to guarantee ongoing demand for military services and equipment into the future.

ABSTRACT
Scholars and practitioners of international investment law have repeatedly attempted to legitimise the field by presenting it as an antidote against the arbitrary and excessive powers of the (postcolonial) state. Early cases, such as AAPL v. Sri Lanka, have contributed to this popular, yet ultimately unpersuasive, argument by seemingly constraining the conduct of warfare in the Global South. My contribution questions this received wisdom and in so doing it shows that repressive state violence is not simply permitted but even mandated by international investment law. My analysis focuses on the obligation of host states to provide 'full protection and security' (FPS) to foreign investors. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I examine in detail the tribunal's approach to FPS in the von Pezold case, an award that stands out amongst the jurisprudent of investment tribunals due to its explicit engagement with questions of race/ism. Secondly, I construct a theory of FPS that draws from US legal realism in order to show that international investment law does not create bilateral legal relations (state-investor) but rather directly determines (and in particular, diminishes) the sphere of lawful action of a potentially indefinite number of actors subject to the host state's jurisdiction. In other words, I read FPS as a legal standard that aims to create an authoritarian form of statehood and mobilise the state against the exploited and racialised sections of its population. Finally, I link the above observation to broader debates about 'racial capitalism'. I show that the FPS demands a particular form of racial sovereignty in defence of global capitalist accumulation, and it does so as a matter of structural allocation of violence, and not simply due to bigoted or insensitive language.

Reflecting upon critical international scholarship and its evolution through time, this review essay focuses on a volume co-edited by José María Beneyto and David Kennedy, along with assistant editors, Justo Corti Varela and John Haskell, on the history of the new approaches to international law (NAIL) and the work of David Kennedy. Considering the individual contributions to this book, this essay argues that while the influence of NAIL upon younger scholars, critical or 'mainstream', is beyond contestation, it is questionable to what extent the intellectual priorities and institutional anxieties of the discipline (should) remain the same. Drawing heavily on the theme of professional responsibility that underlies most of the contributions to this volume, this essay proposes a re-orientation of critical inquiry in the light of the implication of international law and institutions in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. Echoing Kennedy's call to engage with questions of political economy and global governance, this review essay suggests that for critical international law to reclaim its radical and innovative character, it is imperative to engage with the concerns of a post-crash world and to identify and disrupt the role of international law in the constitution of an unstable and unjust international economic order

First published online: 09 June 2021 ; When, early in Capitalism as Civilisation: A History of International Law, I positioned this book as yet another instance of productive (mis)reading, I rendered some argumentative moves unavailable to me. Whatever I say about the engaging and thoughtful reviews by Kanad Bagchi, Daniel R. QuirogaVillamarín, Rohini Sen, and Julie Wetterslev, then, cannot come from a position of presumed authority (pun intended) or control over the text. Tempting as it might be, I cannot now proclaim that this is or is not what the book 'really' says. After all, one of the principal interventions of this book has been to decentre the lawyerly subject, to push back against the idea that anyone can ever be the full author and master of international law. Rather, I have opted to take this as an opportunity not so much to respond to or to defend anything, but rather to create a new text out of the silences, omissions and slippages of the book that is under review here. In so doing, I am not claiming that my remarks had always been part of the book or even that they are in perfect harmony with that is already there. Rather, in keeping with an understanding of scholarship as structured dialogue, I will put forward three main propositions: first, I will argue that looking at conventional materials in unconventional ways is not only intellectually and politically defensible, but cannot but be at the centre of critical inquiry into law as both a critical and a legal business. Secondly, I will explain why I consider the conceptualisation of international law as a product of the 19th century to be persuasive on both disciplinary and historical materialist grounds and the implications of this periodisation. Finally, I will elaborate on my own understanding of historical materialism, its implications for law, and under what conditions it can encounter deconstruction productively.

The revelation of a series of child abuse incidents committed by Catholic priests and other members of religious orders has given rise to the question of establishing the responsibility of the Holy See for these acts under international human rights law. This article focuses on the report issued in 2014 by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the monitoring body of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (crc). It is argued that in order to fulfil this task we need to take three steps: first, to establish the relationship between the Vatican City state and the Hole See, a distinct and peculiar international legal subject. To do so, a historical account of the Holy See and its position within the fabric of international law is considered necessary. Secondly, this article argues that the crc was ratified by the Holy See both in its capacity as the government of the Vatican City and as a non-territorial legal subject. Hence, the application of the crc is not confined within the limited territory of the Vatican City, but 'follows' the authority of the Holy See irrespective of state borders. Thirdly, it is argued that the vertical, hierarchical structure of the Holy See is homologous to that of the modern state and, therefore, attribution rules can be applied by analogy in this case. The final conclusion is that it is possible to hold the Holy See responsible under the crc for acts of child abuse that occurred under its authority around the globe.