Suchergebnisse

"Can international institutions help create more cooperative and peaceful relations between states? If so, how? And what motivates states to create meaningful institutions in the first place? Though theorists and researchers have approached these questions from different schools of thought, the commonality among them is that institutions are apolitical and their purpose is to assure common gains or develop shared social norms and identities. Institutions succeed if they rise above petty power politics and fail when they succumb to political confrontations. In this book, Erik Voeten offers a new broader understanding of international institutions. Current theories offer conflicting portraits of why IOs form, why the succeed (or not) and their role in current politics. While international institutions can enhance the welfare of participants, they are simultaneously the structural means through which actors try to get what they want, often at the expense of others. Voeten argues that these distributive politics shape institutions and, in turn, institutions shape the conduct of such politics. The book will largely be theoretical, as its purpose is to illustrate an alternative way of understanding institutions rather than to test a specific hypothesis. After developing what the distributive theory of international institutions is, Voeten examines how this theory bears on other understandings of international institutions on a variety of scholarly perspectives, drawing on the extensive work in this area"--

Nicht zuletzt der Golfkrieg 2003 hat gezeigt, dass Staaten zumindest bemüht sind, ihr Handeln durch den UN-Sicherheitsrat zu legitimieren. Doch warum ist die Legitimierung durch eine internationale Organisation so wichtig? In dem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass das Motiv hierfür weniger in dem Wunsch einer unabhängigen Bestätigung der Notwendigkeit einer Intervention liegt, als vielmehr in dem Bestreben, sich gegen die Folgen militärischen Handelns politisch abzusichern. Die Legitimität der Entscheidungen des Sicherheitsrates beruht hierbei weniger auf rechtlichen oder moralischen Grundsätzen als vielmehr auf durch wenige Staaten undemokratisch beschlossenen Kompromisslinien. Somit prägt die UN das Handeln von Staaten auf Grundlage einer Legitimation, die erst durch das Handeln bzw. die Stellungnahmen von Trägern staatlicher Macht zustande gekommen ist. Es wird deutlich, dass diese Legitimation größer wäre, wenn sie auf allgemein anerkannten normativen Grundsätzen beruhen würde. (rll-swp)

I examine if and how a superpower can use its asymmetric power to achieve favourable outcomes in multilateral bargaining between states that have conflicting interests and veto power. Using a game-theoretic framework, I show that the ability to act outside, either unilaterally or with an ally, helps the superpower to reach agreements that would be vetoed in the absence of the outside option. These agreements, however, are usually not at the superpower's ideal point. Under some conditions, uncertainty about the credibility of the outside option can lead to unilateral action that all actors prefer to avoid. In other circumstances, this uncertainty results in multilateral actions that the superpower (and the ally) would not initiate without multilateral authorisation. The model provides useful insights that help explain pattern of decision-making in the United Nations Security Council in the 1990s, including the failed attempt to reach agreement over the Kosovo intervention. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Der Artikel analysiert das Wahlverhalten der UN-Mitgliedsländer innerhalb der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen. Dabei spielt die Strukturveränderung im internationalen System nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt eine ebenso große Rolle wie Hegemoniebestrebungen von Staaten und die Blockbildung von Ländern. Es wird dabei deutlich, daß die Blockbildung, resultierend aus dem ehemaligen Ost-West-Konflikt, inzwischen in eine Blockbildung von Ländernaus der Nord- und der Südhalbkugel übergegangen ist (SWP-Drh)

Why and how do international courts justify decisions with citations to their own case law? We argue . - that, like domestic review courts, international courts use precedent at least in part to convince 'lower' . - (domestic) courts of the legitimacy of judgements. Several empirical observations are consistent with this . - view, which are examined through a network analysis of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) . - citations. First, the Court cites precedent based on the legal issues in the case, not the country of origin. . - Second, the Court is more careful to embed judgements in its existing case law when the expected value of . - persuading domestic judges is highest. These findings contribute to a developing literature that suggests . - international and domestic review courts develop their authority in similar ways. ((British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)