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"Can international institutions help create more cooperative and peaceful relations between states? If so, how? And what motivates states to create meaningful institutions in the first place? Though theorists and researchers have approached these questions from different schools of thought, the commonality among them is that institutions are apolitical and their purpose is to assure common gains or develop shared social norms and identities. Institutions succeed if they rise above petty power politics and fail when they succumb to political confrontations. In this book, Erik Voeten offers a new broader understanding of international institutions. Current theories offer conflicting portraits of why IOs form, why the succeed (or not) and their role in current politics. While international institutions can enhance the welfare of participants, they are simultaneously the structural means through which actors try to get what they want, often at the expense of others. Voeten argues that these distributive politics shape institutions and, in turn, institutions shape the conduct of such politics. The book will largely be theoretical, as its purpose is to illustrate an alternative way of understanding institutions rather than to test a specific hypothesis. After developing what the distributive theory of international institutions is, Voeten examines how this theory bears on other understandings of international institutions on a variety of scholarly perspectives, drawing on the extensive work in this area"--

Energy transition policies often have distributional effects that could have electoral consequences. I study this issue in the context of a Dutch policy change that increased taxes on household natural gas consumption and redistributed the revenues as subsidies for renewables. Radical right parties were the only source of political opposition. A Differences-in-Differences (DiD) analysis with panel data from 2007-2020 shows that after the policy change renters with individualized utility bills became 5–6 percentage points more likely to vote for the radical right compared to renters with utilities included in their rents. Renters with individualized utility bills also became relatively less sympathetic towards the Green party and more concerned about price increases but they did not alter their left-right self-placements nor their views on immigration or the European Union. A secondary analysis finds similar effects for individuals (including home-owners) who are energy poor. This suggests an emerging economically rooted political cleavage over energy transition policies.

AbstractMany of the most visible examples of the backlash against multilateralism, globalization, and democracy do not target free trade, investment, or elections directly, but the judicial institutions that were created to protect the rights of traders, investors, and citizens. Is the backlash against globalization and democracy really a backlash against the growing ideological convergence on rule of law principles as appropriate standards for both international and domestic governance? This essay suggests that this might be so by highlighting that the rule of law does not just constrain the powerful, but also majoritarian politics. A new domestic ideological cleavage permeates many liberal democracies that is in part about liberal conceptions of justice. An illustrative empirical analysis shows that illiberal views about justice are negatively and significantly correlated with trust in European institutions.

International courts, like domestic courts, protect liberal limits on majoritarianism. This sometimes puts these courts in a position to protect the property rights of the "corrupt elites" that are targeted by populists or the civil liberties of those who are targeted in domestic populist identity politics. Moreover, populism offers an ideology to attack the authority of a court rather than just its individual rulings. An empirical examination illustrates the plausibility of this argument. A large number of backlashes against international courts arise from judgments that reinforce local populist mobilization narratives. Populist backlashes against international courts are not just about sovereignty but often follow efforts to curb domestic courts, usually for similar reasons. Yet populist backlashes do not always succeed, either because populist leaders do not follow up on their exit threats or because populism is too thin an ideology for creating successful multilateral reform coalitions.

The design of international institutions varies in many ways: Institutions can be more or less formal, flexible, independent, precise, inclusive, centralized, and so on. This article classifies theoretical efforts to make sense of these similarities and differences. First, some theories focus on the bargains or contracts that attempt to construct equilibrium behavior while other theories analyze institutional design as a dynamic process. Second, theories vary in whether they understand institutional design as a response to the environment in which institutions operate or as a function of the incentives, interests, values, initiatives, and power of the actors that created the institutions. The article discusses four ideal-typical theoretical approaches that fit in each quadrant of the resulting 2×2 typology: rational functionalist, distributive rationalist, historical institutionalist, and structural process theories. These approaches identify different causes for suboptimal or even dysfunctional institutional design: domestic politics, power politics, path dependence, and culture. The conclusion discusses how these theories can help us make sense of current challenges to institutions and their design.

AbstractFragmentation and competition between global and regional institutions are not among the major issues that threaten the regime. There are three ways in which tensions nonetheless arise. First, consistent with the universalist aspirations of human rights, global conventions have played a focal role in verbally defining rights. This masks considerable cross‐regional and intra‐regional differences in how rights should be interpreted. Second, judicialization of human rights has mostly occurred at the regional level. This occasionally creates inconsistencies with the global regime. Third, rights concerns often encroach on other areas of international cooperation, including security, trade, and development. This raises similar issues of forum shopping as in the other issue areas, for example because some governments may shop for trade agreements or development loans with fewer rights conditions.