Book Review: Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress, by Alasia Nuti
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 539-544
ISSN: 1552-7476
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In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 539-544
ISSN: 1552-7476
This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu's theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu's account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.
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This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu's theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu's account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.
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In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 207-228
ISSN: 2194-5624
AbstractThis article argues against privileging the expectations of settlers over those of dispossessed peoples. I assume in this article that historical rights to occupancy do not persist through all changes in circumstances, but a theory of justice should reduce perverse incentives to unjustly settle on land in hopes of legitimating occupancy. Margaret Moore, in her 2015 book,A Political Theory of Territory, tries to balance these intuitions through an argument based on legitimate expectations. I argue that Moore's attempt to reduce perverse incentives (through expectation-altering institutional design) fails. Moore unduly privileges settler expectations, especially over those of indigenous peoples. I criticize United States court decisions resurrecting the expectations of past settlers in the allotment era (which share structural features with Moore's arguments). Lastly, distinguishing between 'final' supersession of historical injustice through changing circumstances, and 'dormant' supersession, shows how indigenous claims to land and jurisdiction may revive.
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 42-66
ISSN: 1741-3060
This article adapts John Rawls's writings, arguing that past injustice can change what we ought to publicly affirm as the standard of justice today. My approach differs from forward-looking approaches based on alleviating prospective disadvantage and backward-looking historical entitlement approaches. In different contexts, Rawls's own concern for the 'social bases of self-respect' and equal citizenship may require public endorsement of different principles or specifications of the standard of justice. Rawls's difference principle focuses on the least advantaged socioeconomic group. I argue that a historicized difference principle (i) considers the relative standing of racial, gender, and other historically stigmatized groups; (ii) provides their members assurance by weakening incentives to manipulate justice to another group's advantage; and (iii) may result in policies resembling reparations, though justified by forward-looking considerations of self-respect and public assurance. I then examine how disrespectful justifications were historically used to forcibly include indigenous peoples as citizens. While Rawls thinks providing citizens one package of basic liberties signals respect, indigenous self-government could better support self-respect. I invoke Rawlsian international justice, which calls for mutual respect between peoples. Indigenous peoples' status should reflect their past and persisting peoplehood, providing assurance by weakening incentives to unjustly transform international into domestic contexts.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 441-448
ISSN: 2365-9858
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, S. 1-25
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 319-330
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy, 66
In: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy, 66
Domination consists in subjection to the will of others and manifests itself both as a personal relation and a structural phenomenon serving as the context for relations of power. Domination has again become a central political concern through the revival of the republican tradition of political thought (not to be confused with the US political party). However, normative debates about domination have mostly remained limited to the context of domestic politics. Also, the republican debate has not taken into account alternative ways of conceptualizing domination. Critical theorists, liberals, fe.