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This paper examines the interface between Henry Kissinger's operational code and his bargaining behavior during the Vietnam conflict. Kissinger's position at the pinnacle of the American foreign affairs hierarchy, amidst the existence of competing policy recommendations, may be regarded as necessary conditions to test the impact of his operational code upon American foreign policy. A comparison of his academic writings and his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations reveals a congruent relationship between his operational code and his bargaining behavior. Taken collectively, the code's components approximate game theory's "prisoner's dilemma" description of politics and specify a "general preference relation" that prescribes a consistent, predictable, metagame repertoire of responses.

Making friends and enemies in world politics -- The Iranian quest for independence -- Role theory and U.S.-Iran relations -- The oil nationalization crisis and the coup -- Remaking patron-client relations -- The Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis -- Making enemies -- Iran's new leader and the September 11 attacks -- Making partners -- Appendix 1: Binary role theory's pin model of grand strategic orientations -- Appendix 2: Role indices in the verbs in context system of content analysis -- Appendix 3: Washington post event narrative, 1951-1953 -- Appendix 4: Washington post event narrative, 1978-1981 -- Appendix 5: Washington post event narrative, 1997-2002

Focusing on how policy makers make decisions in foreign policy, this book examines how beliefs are causal mechanisms which steer decisions, shape leaders and perceptions of reality, and lead to cognitive and motivated biases that distort, block and recast incoming information from the environment.

"Operational Code Theory: Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decisions" published on by Oxford University Press.

The conventional account of American diplomacy in the modern era is marked by a cultural tension between realist and idealist themes symbolized by the statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, a revisionist account has emerged to challenge and even reverse the conventional account of Roosevelt and Wilson. This poses an intriguing empirical puzzle that is essentially psychological, as it pertains to the belief systems of these two presidents. In order to investigate this puzzle and its implications for U.S. strategic culture, we employ an automated content analysis of the public statements by the two leaders regarding their operational code beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the best approach to effective political action. The results reveal similarities and differences in their belief systems and illustrate how psychological models can provide insights into the psychocultural origins of U.S. diplomacy that remain relevant to the present day.