A comparison of shareholder identity and governance mechanisms in the monitoring of CEOs of listed companies in China
In: China economic review, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 24-37
ISSN: 1043-951X
11 Ergebnisse
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In: China economic review, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 24-37
ISSN: 1043-951X
SSRN
In: International Journal of Accounting, Forthcoming
SSRN
In: Emerging markets, finance and trade: EMFT, Band 50, Heft sup3, S. 140-157
ISSN: 1558-0938
In: Journal of accounting and public policy, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 1-26
ISSN: 0278-4254
In: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 80, 2022
SSRN
In: Accounting & Finance, Band 59, Heft 4, S. 2705-2734
SSRN
China has been adopting a "mercantilist" policy by lavishing massive government subsidies on Chinese firms. Using hand-collected subsidy data on Chinese listed companies, we find that firms receiving more subsidies tend to have a lower cost of debt. However, such firms fail to have superior financial performance. Instead, firms with more subsidies tend to be overstaffed, which demonstrates higher social performance. These results are mainly driven by non-tax-based subsidies rather than tax-based subsidies. Overall, our results suggest that the Chinese government uses non-tax-based subsidies to achieve its social policy objectives at the expense of firms' profitability.
BASE
We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.
BASE
We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.
BASE
In: Journal of risk research: the official journal of the Society for Risk Analysis Europe and the Society for Risk Analysis Japan, S. 1-14
ISSN: 1466-4461