The blind spots of collaborative innovation
In: Public management review, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 12-20
ISSN: 1471-9045
26 Ergebnisse
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In: Public management review, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 12-20
ISSN: 1471-9045
In: Der moderne Staat: dms ; Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 3-30
ISSN: 2196-1395
In: European journal of risk regulation: EJRR ; at the intersection of global law, science and policy, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 369-371
ISSN: 2190-8249
How can one not applaud the renewed better regulation agenda launched by the First Vice President Timmermans? Finally this fuzzy reform field is in the hands of a strong executive politician with the authority to make substantial progress on an agenda that always appeared good on paper, but somehow did not deliver against the expectations it defined for itself. 'Better regulation for better results' not only promises tangible results, but it combines this with the ambition of 'changing how we work at the European level'. This ambition should provide us – as citizens, stakeholders and scholars – with an opportunity to essentially present a scorecard concerning these results in the near future. And, indeed, experts and other stakeholders in the better regulation game do welcome the initiative.My view on this agenda is that the promise of 'better results' will be hard to deliver, whereas the ambition of 'changing how we work' is more likely to materialize in one way or another.
In: Public management review, Band 17, Heft 7, S. 940-959
ISSN: 1471-9045
In: Public management review, Band 17, Heft 7, S. 940
ISSN: 1471-9037
In: Der gut organisierte Staat, S. 492-509
In: Executive politics and governance
How to better coordinate policies and public services across public sector organizations has been a major topic of public administration research for decades. However, few attempts have been made to connect these concerns with the growing body of research on biases and blind spots in decision-making. This book makes that connection. It explores how day-to-day decision-making in public sector organizations is subject to different types of organizational attention biases that may lead to a variety of coordination problems in and between organizations, and sometimes also to major blunders and disasters. The contributions address those biases and their effects for various types of public organizations in different policy sectors and national contexts. In particular, it elaborates on blind spots, or 'not seeing the not seeing', and different forms of bureaucratic politics as theoretical explanations for seemingly irrational organizational behaviour. The book's theoretical tools and empirical insights address conditions for effective coordination and problem-solving by public bureaucracies using an organizational perspective. Tobias Bach is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway. Kai Wegrich is Professor of Public Administration and Public Policy at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany.--
In: European political science review: EPSR, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 415-431
ISSN: 1755-7747
AbstractThe article analyses the public attribution of blame and the use of presentational strategies of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures. We theorize and empirically demonstrate that complex delegation structures result in the diffusion of blame to multiple actors so that a clear allocation of responsibility becomes more difficult. The article shows that public attribution of blame follows a distinct temporal pattern in which politicians only gradually move into the centre of the blame storm. We also find that blame-takers deploy sequential patterns of presentational management and use blame shifting to other actors as a dominant strategy. However, the analysis suggests that complex delegation structures impose limitations on blame-takers' use of blame avoidance strategies, and that sequential presentational management becomes less useful over time. The article uses media content analysis to study blame games during a major crisis of the public transport system in Berlin, Germany.
In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 97, Heft 4, S. 845-860
ISSN: 1467-9299
AbstractThis article contributes to the politics of policy‐making in executive government. It introduces the analytical distinction between generalists and specialists as antagonistic players in executive politics and develops the claim that policy specialists are in a structurally advantaged position to succeed in executive politics and to fend off attempts by generalists to influence policy choices through cross‐cutting reform measures. Contrary to traditional textbook public administration, we explain the views of generalists and specialists not through their training but their positions within an organization. We combine established approaches from public policy and organization theory to substantiate this claim and to define the dilemma that generalists face when developing government‐wide reform policies ('meta‐policies') as well as strategies to address this problem. The article suggests that the conceptual distinction between generalists and specialists allows for a more precise analysis of the challenges for policy‐making across government organizations than established approaches.
In: Journal of urban affairs, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 117-134
ISSN: 1467-9906
In: The Governance of Infrastructure, S. 21-42
In: Law & policy, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 250-267
ISSN: 1467-9930
Nudge and the wider behavioral economics approach has become increasingly dominant in contemporary political and policy discourse. While much attention has been paid to the attractions and criticisms of nudge (such as liberal paternalism), this article argues that nudge is based on a rationality paradox in that it represents an approach that despite its emphasis on bounded rationality, does not reflect on its own limits to rationality. The article considers the implications of this paradox by considering mechanisms that influence government decision making and mechanisms that lead to unintended consequences in the context of policy interventions.
In: Law & Policy, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 250-267
SSRN
In: Journal of risk research: the official journal of the Society for Risk Analysis Europe and the Society for Risk Analysis Japan, Band 19, Heft 9, S. 1141-1157
ISSN: 1466-4461
In: Oxford scholarship online
In: Political Science
Infrastructure only tends to be noticed when it is absent, declining, or decrepit, or when enormous cost overruns, time delays, or citizen protests make the headlines. If infrastructure is indeed a fundamental driver of economic growth and social development, why is it so difficult to get right? In addressing this perennial question, this volume makes the case for a governance perspective on infrastructure