Localising political party appeals
In: European political science: EPS, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 378-380
ISSN: 1682-0983
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In: European political science: EPS, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 378-380
ISSN: 1682-0983
Do radical right fringe parties affect main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? Using data from the Manifesto Project, we analyze the relationship between radical right fringe parties' and main parties' policy programs regarding sociocultural issues in six post-communist countries of CEE. Even though radical right fringe parties have participated in government in several of these countries, and in Hungary a fringe party has become the country's second largest party, our analysis shows that the sociocultural issues in radical right fringe party manifestos do not systematically relate to the changes in main party manifestos regarding those issues. Even if some of the main parties in our study might often agree with the radical right fringe parties, our analysis shows that the latter do not directly influence the policy priorities of the main parties.
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In: Oxford scholarship online
The 2014 European Parliament elections were hailed as a 'populist earthquake' with parties like the French Front National, UKIP & the Danish People's Party topping the polls in their countries & commentators warning about the consequences of a large radical right populist bloc in the Parliament. But what happened after the elections? Based on policy positions, voting data, & interviews conducted over more than four years with senior figures from 14 radical right populist parties & their main partners, this major study explains these parties' actions & alliances in the European Parliament.
In: Representation, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 293-306
ISSN: 1749-4001
The spread and success of radical and populist parties has triggered a profound debate on the state of democracy. Not only are these parties described as the outcome of a democratic malaise in which democratic regimes had ceased to integrate, represent and engage all their citizens. At the same time, questions arose as to the consequences of these parties for existing representative democracies. Could radical and populist parties be a (partial) cure to the woes of established democracies? Or would they make the democratic malaise even worse, further poisoning an already sick patient? Could it be that these parties act like a placebo that exists because of the democratic malaise but does not actually change anything except for those who desperately want to believe in an effect? The contributions to this Special Issue address questions of the impact of radical and populist parties on representative democracy. This introduction systematise their findings along party functions and draws broader conclusions.
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In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 42, Heft 5, S. 613-630
ISSN: 1460-373X
Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when this cost the centre-right office. However, in Denmark, coalitions led by centre-right parties have cooperated with the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) (DF) on multiple occasions. Through a controlled comparison, we examine what explains these different outcomes. Using Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and public opinion data, we firstly look at the policy congruence between parties and the social acceptability of cooperation. We then examine interview material with representatives from centre-right and PRR parties in Sweden and Denmark to see their explanations of cooperation and non-cooperation. We conclude that, while the office goals of Danish centre-right parties, along with the policy focus and uncontroversial past of DF, explain that case, the reputation and past of SD has precluded a similar outcome.
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 1006-1027
ISSN: 1467-9248
The study of populist attitudes has thus far drawn heavily on ideational definitions of populism, focussing almost exclusively on attitudes related to dimensions such as people-centredness and anti-elitism. However, these accounts have largely ignored other approaches to populism, especially the discursive-performative school which see populism as something that is communicated and done by political actors. We argue that when studying populist attitudes, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. In this article, we develop a novel measure of attitudes towards populist communication and consider how these interact with populist ideational attitudes. Testing our measures on the Australian case, we demonstrate that attitudes towards populist communication exist independently of populist ideational attitudes, and that they have a significant effect on voting behaviour and on attitudes related to the ideational approach. Therefore, we argue that studies of populist attitudes need to take attitudes towards populist communication into account in future work.
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 189-205
ISSN: 1468-5965
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 189-205
ISSN: 1468-5965
AbstractConceptualizations and measurements of Euroscepticism tend to assume that, while parties may change positions from one period to another, they unequivocally espouse hard or soft euroscepticism at a given point in time. However, there are good theoretical reasons for some parties not to do so, in order to speak to different audiences and keep their decision‐making options open. Through an analysis of manifestos and leaders' speeches we show how two populist radical right parties, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party, espoused what we term 'equivocal euroscepticism' in the years around the 2014 European Parliament elections. Specifically, these parties articulated a distinct, albeit ambivalent, stance by combining elements of both soft and hard euroscepticism at the same time. We argue that 'equivocal euroscepticism' can give these parties strategic advantages, including the freedom to cooperate both with other radical right, hard eurosceptic, parties at European level and more moderate parties at the national one.