FINDS THE OPPOSITION OF ECONOMISTS TO MINIMUN W AGE LAWS TO BE IGNORANT OF POLITICAL REALITIES. THIS IS BECAUSE "THE MINIMUM WAGE IS AS POPULAR AMONG THE POPULACE AS IT IS UNPOPULAR AMONG ECONOMISTS." REVIEWS FRANK STEINDL'S THEORY THAT IF THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL IN JOBS WHO ARE HELPED BY MINIMUM WAGE LAWS EXCEEDS THOSE WHO ARE HURT BY THEM, THERE WILL BE POLITICAL GAIN IN THIS POLICY.
The education voucher system -- the primary purpose of which is to force competition among public schools as well as between public & private schools -- is examined. The voucher system has been repeatedly proposed & rejected: causes for this include the fact that public schools are protected monopolies, & the increasing "bureaucratic imperialism" that is shifting power from local communities to the larger jurisdictions of city, county, state, & now federal governments. A recent experiment in the use of the voucher system in NH is discussed, & reasons for its failure are reviewed. The costs of public schooling average about twice those of private education. In light of this, such suggestions as the reforming of the provoucher Coons/Sugarman proposal, & the use of the constitutional initiative, are made. D. Abrahams.
Although economists consistently reject the minimum wage, the public generally continues to support it. Even political figures who admit the validity of the substantial economic arguments largely continue to support minimum wage rates. Such interest groups as trade unions, protection-seeking employers, & public servants working in management relations all benefit from miminum wages & are organized to support them, while those unemployed because of minimum wage are not well enough organized to protect their interests. W. H. Stoddard.
The Supreme Court case of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) is examined to illustrate the government practice of allowing public employee unions & the judiciary to have a strong influence over the course of public educational policy. It is suggested that the regulation requiring schools to use agency shops in the negotiation of teacher contracts has considerable political implications & encourages labor monopoly in the public sector. The undemocratic effects on government of collective bargaining agencies & associations are discussed, as are the inadvertent high costs of the 1947 National Labor Relations Act. In Comments on E. G. West and R. J. Staaf, William L. Boyd (Pennsylvania State U, University Park) distinguishes "qualitative differences" in the collective bargaining used by public & private sectors, which give political powers to public employee unions. While West & Staaf correctly raise the issue of the threat to the public interest posed by public employee unions, their attribution of "labor monopoly" potential in the agency shop clauses in Abood is imprecise. Furthermore, legislatures, more than courts, have been primarily responsible for the political strength of public employee unions. Ronald G. Ehrenberg (Cornell U, Ithaca, NY) notes that agency shop use is the exception rather than the rule, as West & Staaf imply; a review of states' policies shows that union security clauses are used in only 16 states; 31 states forbid the adoption of union security clauses in public school teacher negotiations. They also ignore recent research pointing to the beneficial effects of collective bargaining in the public sector; further, their ascriptions of monopsony in the teacher-bargaining situation are based exclusively on a competitive model. 3 Figures. D. Dunseath.
