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Germany's energy sovereignty is undermined by US sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. As a result, questions surrounding states' strategic capability in energy affairs have recently become a matter of discussion, particularly in Germany, where little attention was previously paid to the notion of energy sovereignty. In view of today's fundamental upheavals in international politics, especially with regard to the geostrategic US-China rivalry, debates about a state's ability to formulate its strategic interests, prioritise its actions and shape its options for energy policy are becoming increasingly important. China's industrial and connectivity policies, the role of the US in energy markets and the energy transformation at large are rapidly changing the global energy landscape and tipping balances of power. The Covid-19 pandemic further accelerates and reinforces these trends. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate energy sovereignty into political debates on the future of sustainable and resilient energy supplies, particularly at the EU level. In order for this to occur, strengthening EU cohesion remains a prerequisite, if not a conditio sine qua non.

The Nord Stream 2 project presents the German government with the dilemma of choosing between energy and foreign policy interests. Geopolitical arguments often prevail in the political discourse. Yet, a weighing of priorities requires a look at the energy policy context, too. When it comes to balancing interests, there are no easy or 'cheap' answers. With a focus on the energy context, it has to be emphasized that a cooperative approach toward energy transformation promises the greatest dividend for a balance of interests, but it presupposes a minimum consensus within the Euro­pean Union (EU), along with the United States (US), Ukraine, and Russia.

Russia is the world's largest gas exporter and Germany is its most important market. Moreover, natural gas is a centerpiece of the Russian economy and the backbone of its energy supply to the Russian population. In terms of its external gas relations, Germany has always kept a special and strategic position, both in terms of volumes, but also in substance. This contribution explores the impact of the energy transition on the bilateral gas relationship. It argues that the bilateral gas relationship has been subjected to various paradigm shifts in the past, but, until recently, the relationship has been seen as in line with the strategic energy triangle of climate change/sustainability, supply security and economic competitiveness. This perception has come into question over two issues: climate change and supply security. Moreover, Germany's authority over the conduct and the legal framework of bilateral gas relations has been increasingly contested, by Brussels, but also horizontally by other EU member states. At this stage, it is very uncertain whether both sides will manage to maintain and redefine their close energy partnership to address climate change. Decarbonizing the gas value chain would be a centerpiece. This would require a political shift away from securitization to decarbonization, not only in Germany, but even more so in the EU, and in particular, in Russia.

At least in the medium term Russia will remain the backbone of Europe's energy supply. While the European Union possesses enough storage capacity to bridge a temporary interruption of gas supplies routed through Ukraine, it has precious few other immediate alternatives. In the medium to long term, however, Europe has diversification options that would also expand its foreign policy leeway. Overall, strong reciprocal dependencies and economic rationality should mitigate against allowing the political conflict to spread into economic and energy relations. Otherwise both sides will suffer massive economic harm. (SWP Comments)

The United States is bucking the global energy trend, with a real prospect of becoming largely independent of fossil fuel imports, while major European consumers, China and India are preparing for increasing dependency. The global energy landscape is changing rapidly and profoundly, with trade flows shifting and security of supply issues re-shaping. At the same time, national energy paths increasingly diverge even within the OECD. Access to unconventional energy gives the United States a global competitive advantage, with far-reaching repercussions for economic and geopolitical structures. Russia – once an indispensable energy power – and the OPEC producers must adapt to a new market situation and enormous uncertainties about how the new world map for energy will fit together.

The shale-gas boom in the United States is accelerating drastic change in global energy markets. But the consequences are not nearly as clear as current scenarios suggest. Nor is it clear that the extraction of unconventional deposits in the United States will be profitable in the long run, nor whether a similar boom can be repeated elsewhere. Russia's model of a regional, network-based supply of natural gas is under pressure, but could hold Its ground. It will do so in particular, if the European Union is not able, as hoped, to fall back on a large global supply of cheap liquid petroleum for the diversification of Its energy Imports, but instead falls behind vis-a-vis the growth markets in Asia, the direction where energy trading will shift. Adapted from the source document.

With its twin objectives of phasing out nuclear power and decarbonising the energy supply, the German energy transition is of worldwide significance. All the more so if the challenges of climate change and sustainable energy security are taken seriously, for they can only be tackled globally. Although the international dimension of the energy transition has been largely ignored to date, internationalisation - alongside Europeanisation - represents an important aspect of climate protection and security of supply, as well as cost efficiency and competitiveness. If the energy transition succeeds, it will serve as an international model, demonstrating the objectives, options and development paths that are needed to deal with the unparalleled imponderables and growing heterogeneity of the global energy system. The allure of the German energy transition represents an important foreign policy resource, of which full use should be made. That means applying and refining a variable geometry of bi- and multilateral energy relations. If the energy transition is successful, it will raise Germany's international profile, while failure would have significant international repercussions

In February 2012 cuts in Russian gas deliveries led to shortfalls in south-western Germany, reviving old worries about security of supply. Delivery systems demonstrated less resilience than they had during the Russian/Ukrainian gas dispute of 2009 when Ukraine stopped supplies completely for a time. The lack of resilience is partly a function of the current sensitive transitional phase in the gas sector, so the market alone is unlikely to ensure security of supply. Political action is required both in the domestic market and in external relations

The Russian-Ukrainian gas controversy of January 2009 provoked the until then biggest gas supply crisis in Europe. At the same time, it marked a turning-point in the relationship between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union. The controversy clearly demonstrated that the recurrent confrontations between Russia and Ukraine have deep structural roots that jeopardize security on Europe's most important transit route. Although both countries concluded a new gas agreement in January 2009, this by no means signifies that all conflicts have now been settled. There is still the incessant political and economic crisis in Ukraine which is closely intertwined with severe problems in the country's energy sector. Russia and the EU, in turn, may have strategic interests in the Ukrainian energy market and its future orientation but their relationship is characterized by latent competition. The smouldering conflicts confront Germany and the EU with challenges on energy policy and, more broadly, on foreign policy whose urgency is connected with specific conditions of geography and infrastructure: The EU is the world's biggest net importer of gas; Russia is the biggest gas producer and exporter as well as the country with the biggest proven gas reserves; and Ukraine is by far the most important transit country for Europe. These facts of life will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. Gas imports from the East, therefore, will remain a constant irritant and testing ground for a common European energy policy. These interconnections pose the question as to the lessons and consequences that should be drawn for German and European policy

In February 2009, the Russian president presented his concept for an international framework agreement in the energy sector. Yet up to now, the proposal has passed largely without comment. This is partly related to the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, after which the document was seen as a further attempt to undermine the Energy Charter Treaty. Then in July 2009, the Russian government decided to withdraw from the Energy Charter Treaty. At the present stage, Europe should take Medvedev at his word. Now more than ever, his proposal should be used as a catalyst to flesh out the details of a global energy treaty that goes beyond existing documents such as the 2008 G8 Declaration on Global Energy Security

"The envisaged strategic partnership builds upon inter-regional cooperation. This article analyzes how this is used for external democratization. The development of open regionalism and democratization in Latin America (LA) had provided a resonance structure that matched with the EU's search for a global role and its norm-based, multilateral approach to international relations in the 1990s. The outcome for external democracy promotion in the inter-regional cooperation is ambivalent. The change from open regionalism toward a self-asserted and closed regionalism in LA fundamentally transforms the resonance structure for EU's policies. The new Latin American socio-political approach to development, the economic crises and the shifting geometry of regional integration challenge the EU's approach of socialization and norm-based inter-regional cooperation. The EU has no concept how to react and lacks an internal consensus at a moment when the representative democracy in LA is at stake." (author's abstract)