Suchergebnisse

The nascent Ghanaian horticulture export sector, which emerged in the mid-1980s, has been ignored by ruling elites, especially after the return to multiparty democracy in 1993. Ruling elites across the two party governments between 1993 and 2008 did not actively pursue initiatives to support the industry. Without sustained political support, the types of public-private coordination of actions and investments needed to help the sector expand and upgrade were not forthcoming in an effective and timely manner. This private sector-driven non-traditional export sector constitutes a neglected opportunity for export diversification and building a new agro-industry, and also highlights some of the factors explaining why the country's economy was still dependent on the traditional exports of cocoa and gold by the close of the 2000s. The political challenges to changing the productive structure in Ghana can be found in the characteristics of ruling coalitions - vulnerability of the ruling elite in power, the high fragmentation within ruling coalitions, and their existing sources of and strategies for financing the state and the ruling coalition, combined with the country's existing economic structure as well as the size and capabilities of domestic capitalists. The characteristics of ruling coalitions in Ghana shaped the incentives facing ruling elites such that the ruling elites were not sufficiently compelled to support new productive sectors, such as horticulture export, which did not (yet) provide substantial revenues.

Since the Fourth Republic was inaugurated in 1993, politics in Ghana has been increasingly characterized by competitive clientelism. Ruling coalitions are characterized by a high degree of vulnerability in power due to a strong opposition party, by strong lower-level factions within the ruling coalition due to their importance in winning elections, and by a high degree of fragmentation among the ruling elite. These characteristics, combined with a weak domestic capitalist class and high inflows of foreign aid, have led the ruling elites across political parties to pursue and implement policies that have a short time horizon, that do not significantly shift the allocation of resources towards building productive sectors, and which are often plagued by problems of enforcement. The results have led to growth without economic transformation. In particular, the country has witnessed recurrent macroeconomic instability, a haphazard process of privatization of state-owned enterprises, and no serious attempt to build up productive sectors outside of cocoa and gold.

Ghana has exhibited rather strong economic growth since the 1980s, but little transformation of the productive structure of its economy. The paper argues that ruling elites' policy choices are shaped by their political survival strategies. In turn, these strategies are shaped by (1) the characteristics of the ruling coalitions, which include a high degree of vulnerability in power, strong lower-level factions of the ruling coalition, and a substantial amount of fragmentation among the higher factions of the ruling coalition; (2) the weak capabilities and political influence of the nascent productive capitalists; and (3) easy access to financing for the state and the ruling coalition from foreign aid, mining and cocoa bean exports. As a result, ruling elites' policy actions did not prioritize the development of new productive sectors (or upgrading of old ones), but were geared towards delivering benefits to the higher and lower levels of the ruling coalition, as well as delivering a small amount of visible goods and services to as much of the population as possible in an effort to 'swing' voters their way at election time. Neither of these political survival strategies resulted in significant productive sector investments.

Through a comparison of sector cases in Mozambique and Ghana, the paper analyzes why and how African states engage in developing productive sectors and with what success. It argues that successful state interventions depend on four factors: (1) sustained political support by the government leadership; (2) the existence of an embedded and mediating bureaucracy; (3) changing the 'rules of the game' which govern the distribution of economic benefits and resources; and (4) the organisation of industry actors and institutionalised interaction between industry actors and state actors. The paper starts with a case of successful intervention in Mozambique, using the four factors to explain why the Mozambican government's efforts to rehabilitate the sugar industry were successful over a fifteen year period. The paper then considers experiences in three sectors in Ghana that illustrate variation in the four factors and thus different economic outcomes. Specifically, cocoa, export is a case of sustained political support, palm oil is a case of poorly implemented industrial policy, and horticulture export is a case of political neglect of an industry. In concluding, the paper emphasizes the political context in which these sector cases are embedded and which shapes how ruling elites make policies and implement them, placing the comparisons within a broader conceptual framework.

We know a lot about what kinds of policies are needed to support the development of productive sectors, but much less about why governments pursue these policies and why some governments achieve better outcomes than others. The paper reviews the many but disparate arguments on the comparative political economy of development and presents a conceptual approach that builds on the most convincing insights to date. This provides a framework for analyzing why and how ruling political elites support productive sector development and with what outcomes, and for comparing outcomes across productive sectors within and among countries, regions and continents. The approach builds on three propositions: political survival is the key motivation for ruling elites, and the need to maintain ruling coalitions and winning elections shapes the kinds of policies that political elites choose and how they are implemented, in particular whether ruling elites share a mutual interest with relevant productive entrepreneurs and whether ruling elites are able to create 'pockets of efficiency' in the bureaucracy in charge of implementing the policies.